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JAMES S. ALBERTSON, S.J.

FINAL EVALUATION OF AUROBINDO'S THEORY OF THE ABSOLUTE
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***CERTITUDO* IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS**
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NOTES AND DISCUSSION

BOOK REVIEWS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

TABLE OF CONTENTS, MAY 1953

THE *ESSE* OF ACCIDENTS ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS
. . . . . JAMES S. ALBERTSON, S.J. 265

FINAL EVALUATION OF AUROBINDO'S THEORY OF THE ABSOLUTE . . . . . PAUL COLAÇO, S.J. 279

CERTITUDO IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
. . . . . FRANCIS A. CUNNINGHAM, S.J. 297

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

The 1952 Meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association . . . THOMAS J. FLYNN, S.J. 325

A Note on *In Idipsum* in St. Augustine . JAMES SWETNAM, S.J. 328

Chronicle 331

English Translations of St. Thomas 333

BOOK REVIEWS

W. DONALD OLIVER. *Theory of Order* . FRANCIS X. MEEHAN 335

JOHN M. WARBEKE. *The Power of Art*
. . . . . LEONARD A. WATERS, S.J. 339

F. RAHMAN. *Avicenna's Psychology* . BEATRICE H. ZEDLER 340

E. JORDAN. *Essays in Criticism* . LEONARD A. WATERS, S.J. 343

JOSEPH LECLER, S.J. *The Two Sovereignties*
. . . . . GUSTAVE WEIGEL, S.J. 345

BIBLIOGRAPHY 347

BOOKS RECEIVED 355

INDEX 356

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THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

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THE *ESSE* OF ACCIDENTS ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS

JAMES S. ALBERTSON, S.J.

It is not an easy matter to determine the precise existential status which St. Thomas gives to accidents. He discusses the question many times, but not always under the same aspect, or for the same purpose, so that if we are not careful we shall be unable to obtain any consistent interpretation of the texts. But this does not mean that a consistent interpretation is either unnecessary or impossible; and it is the purpose of this paper to indicate such a consistent line of interpretation of St. Thomas's texts on the existential character of accidents.

For convenience' sake the texts will be divided into two broad groups: the first group will deal with accidents as beings, while the second will be concerned with whether or not the *esse* of accidents, *esse accidentale,* is a proper *esse* or not.

ACCIDENTS AS BEINGS

In order to exist, a being must exist as a definite and determined being, and the fundamental determination of a being is its essence. Thus it is primarily through its essence that a being has its *esse,* or its act of existing, and is distinguished from nonbeing, or that which does not exist. A man, for example, is first and foremost distinguished from that which does not exist because he exercises the

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act of existing which is proportionate to a man; and it is because of this *esse homo* that he is a real being at all. And that is why early in the *Summa* St. Thomas says:

> Because "being" says of something that it is properly in act, and because act is properly ordered to potency, a thing is said simply to be being according to that by which it is first distinguished from what is in potency only. But this is the substantial *esse* of each thing; consequently, each thing is said to be being simply through its own substantial *esse*.[1]

It is because a man exists in the manner proper to human nature that he is in the world of real beings; it is for this reason that he is not nonbeing, or in simple potency. This act of existing proportionate to the essence of a being we have just seen St. Thomas call *esse substantiale;* and it is that act, he says, which is the reason a being is distinguished from that which is only in potency—nonbeing. To be without any act, to be in simple potency, is simply not to be. And so to have the act of existing as a man is truly to be; but man is not just an essence, and the *esse substantiale* is not his full existential act, though it is primarily by that that we conceive him as an existent. As St. Thomas puts it: "Consequently, each thing is said to be being simply through its own substantial *esse*."

However, as we mentioned, a man is much more than simply the essence "man"; for, over and above that, he is tall or short, thin or fat, brown or white, and so on. These characteristics do not in any way affect the fact that he is a man, but very definitely they do affect him. He is a man in this way or that way: as tall or short, as thin or fat, and as brown or white. As St. Thomas points out in the same text in the *Summa*, a man has other perfections besides the substantial one of being a man. It is not, he says, because a man is white that he is, for to be a white man he must first be a man. The perfection of whiteness comes to a being which already has the perfection of being a man,[2] and not to nonbeing or mere potency. It is not by reason of his whiteness that a man primarily is; but, nevertheless, the fact of

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[1]"Nam cum ens dicat aliquid proprie esse in actu, actus autem proprie ordinem habeat ad potentiam; secundum hoc simpliciter aliquid dicitur ens, secundum quod primo discernitur ab eo quod est in potentia tantum. Hoc autem est esse substantiale rei uniuscujusque; unde per suum esse substantiale dicitur unumquodque ens simpliciter" (*ST*, I, q. 5, a. 1 ad 1).

[2]This priority is not a priority in time, but is what St. Thomas calls a priority *natura* in the *De Ente*, cap. 6 (*Opuscula Omnia*, ed. John Perrier, O.P. [Paris: Lethielleux, 1949], I, 47): "Sed illud cui advenit accidens, est ens in se completum, in esse suo subsistens; quod quidem esse *naturaliter* praecedit accidens quod supervenit." We may translate this as a priority in intelligibility.

being white is an existential fact, for to be a white man is really to be in a different way than to be a brown man. St. Thomas says it this way:

> Through added acts a thing is said to be *secundum quid*, as "to be white" means to be *secundum quid*. "To be white" does not remove the state of being in potency simply, since it comes to a being already existing in act.[3]

Having seen that there are further determinations of a being which come to it in addition to its substance or essence, and which for that reason we call accidents, we are now in a position to pose our problem. Does St. Thomas look upon these determinations as in any sense real beings with some claim to existence in their own right? Many times St. Thomas says that beings are such because they have an act of existing; for example: "Ens dicitur quasi esse habens."[4] So we may propose the problem in these words: Does an accident have its own *esse*? Is the *esse secundum quid* an existential perfection possessed by the accident and contributed by the accident to the being it modifies?

We find St. Thomas saying in answer that accidents are said to be beings, for we all speak of things like whiteness and stoutness; but they are said to be such not because they exercise an act of existing, but because some real being exists in a way which we call white or stout. St. Thomas is most clear:

> But we must observe that . . . accidents . . . are called beings not because they themselves have *esse*, but because by them something is.[5]

Accidents, then, of themselves do not exercise an existential perfection, but rather a being exercises its existential act of *esse* in a way partially determined by its accidental perfections.

This point becomes even clearer when St. Thomas discusses the role which the substantial form plays in determining the existence of a material being. In composite substances, he says, there is a twofold ordination: the matter is ordered to the form, and the matter-form composite is ordered to the *esse* in which it participates; so that the *esse* of a being is neither its matter nor its form, but comes to a being

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[3] "Per actus autem superadditos, dicitur aliquid esse secundum quid, sicut esse album significat esse secundum quid; non enim esse album aufert esse in potentia simpliciter, cum adveniat rei jam praeexistenti in actu" (*ST*, I, q. 5, a. 1 ad 1).

[4] *In XII Metaphys.*, lect. 1 (Cathala no. 2419).

[5] "Sed tamen considerandum quod . . . accidentia . . . dicuntur entia non quia ipsa habeant esse, sed quia eis aliquid est" (*ST*, I-II, q. 55, a. 4 ad 1).

through the form.[6] That *esse* is neither matter nor form is a truth which needs no further explanation; and as we have already noted how the essence is the primary determination of a being, it is thus apparent that it is the essential act, or the substantial form, which is the foremost determining factor of the manner of existential perfection of a being. Now all this we find very concisely put by St. Thomas:

> The *esse* of a composite substance belongs neither to the form nor to the matter exclusively but to the composite; the essence, however, is that according to which a thing is said to be. It is therefore necessary that the essence by which a thing is denominated being should be neither the form only nor the matter only; it must be both, although the form alone is in its own way the cause of the relevant *esse*.[7]

With this in mind, we can appreciate more fully the comparison which St. Thomas makes between the existential character of the form and that of the accidents of a thing. A being of natural generation (and we thus restrict ourselves in order to avoid the multiplicity of beings found in an artifact) is properly said to exist because it has its own act of existing. But a form cannot be said to exist in the same way because by itself it does not have *esse* (we have already seen that it is the matter-form composite which has *esse*). And yet there is a sense in which it can be said to be, since it is through the form that our material being exists. In the same way, too, accidents are said to be beings because it is by means of that type of perfection that a being exists in a qualified or quantified way. Accidents are not the simple determining factor that first distinguishes being from mere potency, as we have seen essence, or more precisely, the active principle of essence—the form—to be. Yet they are determining factors.[8] And all of this can be put very succinctly by saying that accidents are not really beings, but rather they belong to beings. As St. Thomas says it:

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[6]*De Sub. Sep.*, cap. 6 (*Opuscula*, ed. Perrier, I, 151).

[7]"Esse substantiae compositae non est tantum formae nec tantum materiae, sed ipsius compositi; essentia autem est secundum quam res dicitur esse. Unde oportet ut essentia qua res denominatur ens, non tantum sit forma nec tantum materia sed utrumque, quamvis hujusmodi esse suo modo sola forma sit causa" (*De Ente*, cap. 2 [*Opuscula*, ed. Perrier, I, 28 f.]).

[8]For a very neat comparison of substantial and accidental forms which emphasizes that the actuality of the accident is from its subject, see *ST*, I, q. 77, a. 6. See also *De Princip. Nat.*, ed. John J. Pauson (Fribourg: Société Philosophique, 1950) cap. 1(p. 79, 1. 1, to p. 80, 1. 12).

> A being of natural generation is said to be properly and per se, as having *esse* and subsisting in its *esse,* while form is not said to be in the same way since it neither subsists nor per se has *esse.* Rather, the form is said to be or is called being because by it something is; just as accidents are called beings because by them the substance exists in a qualified or quantified way, and not because by them the substance exists simply as it does through its substantial form. Accidents are therefore more properly said to belong to beings than to be beings, as is clear from the *Metaphysics.*[9]

The note to be stressed in this text is that an accident is "magis entis quam ens"—an accident is not a being, but in some way it belongs to a being.

Now, properly speaking, it is the substance which exercises the existential act,[10] and the way in which it exercises that act is determined by the modifications of that substance as well as by its own formal principle. And that is why we say that accidents are not beings, but that they belong to beings; for, though they themselves have no *esse,* it is partly because of them that a substantially determined being exercises its *esse,* or has its *esse,* in the way that it does. In a text from the *Summa* which closely parallels the one we have just quoted from the *De Potentia,* St. Thomas says again that, though an accident has no *esse,* it can be called a being because it is in some way by means of the accident that an existent is the way it is. (In order to avoid a difficulty in terminology which would arise from calling an accident a being even though it has no *esse,* an accident is often referred to as a being-by-which, an *ens quo,* while a being which properly does exist, which has an *esse,* is referred to as an *ens quod.*) St. Thomas could not have been more explicit on the point when he said:

> That is properly said to be which has *esse.* . . . But an accident does not have *esse,* and it is called being because by it something is.[11]

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[9]"Res enim naturalis generata dicitur esse per se et proprie, quasi esse habens, et in suo esse subsistens; forma autem non sic esse dicitur, cum non subsistat, nec per se esse habeat: sed dicitur esse vel ens, quia ea aliquid est; sicut et accidentia dicuntur entia, quia substantia eis est vel qualis vel quanta, non quod eis sit simpliciter sicut per formam substantialem: unde accidentia magis proprie dicuntur entis, quam entia, ut patet in *Meta.* (lib. VII, comm. 2)" (*De Pot.,* III, a. 8). See also *ST,* I, q. 45, a. 4; *In VII Metaphys.,* lect. 1 (Cathala no. 1256); *De Pot.,* VII, a. 4 ad 2.

[10]Confer the text cited in note 7. Confer also *De Sub. Sep.,* cap. 6 (ed. Perrier, I, 151): "Invenitur igitur in substantia composita ex materia et forma duplex ordo: unus quidem ipsius materiae ad formam, alius autem ipsius rei jam compositae ad esse participatum."

Here again, later in this same text, we read that an accident is "magis entis quam ens"; and we have the example given that whiteness is called a being not because whiteness exists, but because a white thing exists and the reason for its being white we call the perfection of whiteness.[12]

In answer to an objection in the *De Veritate* St. Thomas discusses the resolving of a *quo ens est* to being and, in the process, sheds some light on our problem of the existential character of accidents. He first observes that something is said to be being (*ens*) either because it subsists in itself, or because it is a principle of subsisting, such as form, or because it is a disposition of a subsistent, such as quality, or because, like blindness, it is the privation of a disposition of a subsistent.[13] Then he goes on to say that if someone should therefore argue, "Essence is being; whence it follows that it is being by reason of something, and this reason is either itself or another—'ergo est aliquo ens, vel se vel alio,'" the argument would not follow. We do not say, he explains, that essence is being in the same sense that something subsisting in its own *esse* is being; but rather essence is that *by which* something is (*quo aliquid est*). The question is not, How does essence itself exist by reason of something? It is, How does something else exist through essence? With this established, St. Thomas can say that goodness is called good not as subsisting in goodness, but because that by which something is good is itself called good. The application of all this to the matter of the existential reality of accidents is immediate; for, just as essence or goodness—being not *quod est* but *quo est* and being that through which a subsistent is

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[11]"Illud autem proprie dicitur esse, quod ipsum habet esse. . . . Accidens vero non habet esse, sed eo aliquid est, et hac ratione ens dicitur" (*ST*, I, q. 90, a. 2).

[12]These same ideas are repeated identically in *De Ver.*, XXVII, a. 1 ad 8, and *In XII Metaphys.*, lect. 1 (Cathala no. 2419).

[13]*De Ver.*, XXI, a. 4 ad 4. In a very interesting comparison (*In XII Metaphys.*, lect. 1 [Cathala no. 2420]), St. Thomas says that we have as much reason for calling accidents beings, though strictly speaking they are not, as we have in saying that privations and negations are in some way beings. We say, for example, that some nonwhite thing exists. Now obviously we do not mean that nonwhite has an act of existing; we mean rather that there is an existing subject which is without the perfection of whiteness. Accidents and privations agree in this, that both are in some sense beings by reason of the subject of which they are predicated. Yet they differ inasmuch as the subject is positively perfected by having a certain kind of existential act because of the accident, whereas the subject is negatively affected by the privation since, because of it, the subject is not exercising a certain kind of existential act (*est deficiens ab esse*).

being or good—needs no act proper to itself as essence or goodness to resolve it to being or the good, so also an accident needs no existential act proper to itself as accident in order to be resolved to being, for an accident is precisely that by which a subsistent *is* in this way or that. To those who argue that if an accident is somehow being then there must be that proper to it by which it is being, St. Thomas simply answers: "Processus non sequitur."

ESSE ACCIDENTALE

The question we originally proposed was to determine whether or not accidents possessed an existential perfection of their own which they contributed to the being they modified. Thus far the answer seems to be quite clear that they do not, for we have seen how insistent St. Thomas has been on the point that accidents do not possess an act of existing, but rather that they modify the substance of a being in such a way that the being has its *esse* in a manner that is doubly determined: primarily by the essence, but also by the accidents. By themselves accidents have no being, and their only claim to existing is that by them a subject is existentially affected: "An accident does not have *esse,* and it is called being because by it something is."[14]

[14]That this interpretation is not solely our own is evidenced by the remarks of, among others, Joseph de Finance in his *Etre et agir dans la doctrine de saint Thomas* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1945), pp. 241 f.: "L'intention de saint Thomas semble être d'affirmer le caractère ontologique de l'enrichissement que l'accident procure à son sujet. Autrement dit, dans *esse album,* par exemple, il s'agit bien de l'act d'exister et non point de l'être-copule. Et la possession de la forme accidentelle n'a de valeur que parce qu'elle *conditionne une nouvelle participation de l'esse.* Mais celle-ci suppose-t-elle nécessairement une actuation surajoutée? Ne serait-il pas plus conforme à l'unite de l'etre de concevoir l'accident, et plus particulièrement l'operation, comme *dilatant, pour ainsi dire, la capacité du sujet à l'egard de l'esse,* en permettant à celui-ci d'exercer davantage sa fonction? *L'esse accidentale* ne dirait alors rien d'autre qu'un *aspect particulier de l'acte unique d'existence. . . .*" (Latin words aside, the italics are mine.)

Aimé Forest writes in a similar vein in his *La structure métaphysique du concret selon saint Thomas d'Aquin* ("Etudes de philosophie médiévale," XIV; Paris: Vrin, 1931), p. 89: "Les accidents ne constituent jamais à coté du sujet des réalités qui auraient leur acte propre et qui s'ajouteraient au sujet pour constituer on ne sait quelle mosaïque, plutot qu'un être concret. La doctrine de saint Thomas est faite pour rapprocher jusqu'à les confondre, l'existence et l'unité de l'accident et ceux du sujet."

Etienne Gilson says most explicitly: "Nous ne pensons pourtant pas qu'il faille renocer à identifier complètement l'esse de l'accident à celui de la substance. . . . En effet, pour l'accident, *esse est inesse;* mais *inesse* n'est pas n'être rien. Il est littéralement vrai que, par l'accident, la sub-

We shall now look at a number of texts which, in isolation, could be interpreted as signifying that St. Thomas attributed to accidents a proper existential act which was in some way independent of the subject of those accidents. The first two texts under consideration are such as might convey the idea that St. Thomas does attribute that type of act to accidents.

Note, first, the following text from the *Quodlibetales*:

> *Esse* is properly and truly attributed only to that which subsists per se. To such a being a double *esse* is attributed. One *esse* results from those factors integrating the unity of the being, and this proper *esse* is the substantial *esse* of the supposit. The other *esse* is attributed to the supposit over and beyond the factors integrating it; this is an added or accidental *esse*—as we attribute "to be white" to Socrates when we say, "Socrates is white."[15]

Does St. Thomas mean by this that there are two distinct existential

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stance s'ajoute l'*esse* meme qu'elle lui donne, sans quoi cet accident ne lui ajouterait rien" ("La notion d'existence chez Guillaume d'Auvergne," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen age*, XV [1946], 89, n. 1).

L. B. Geiger, O.P., says in his *La participation dans la philosophie de s. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Vrin, 1942), pp. 269 f.: "L'accident n'est pas. Par lui et selon lui quelque chose [270] est, et se trouve modifié d'une certaine manière. En autres termes, la réduction de l'accident à l'être n'est pas immédiate. Elle se fait par l'intermédiaire d'un autre mode de l'être, qui est la substance."

André Marc comes to a conclusion which differs from ours in expression but not, it would seem, in intent. He says, in discussing the existential unity of the substance, faculties, and operations: "Puisqu'elles doivent s'épanouir à partir de cette essence, en tant qu'elle est en acte, pour y etre recues en tant qu'elle est en puissance; l'*esse* étant ce par quoi cette essence est en acte, les facultés ne peuvent finalement jaillir que de lui; de sort que l'être de l'essence est encore celui des facultés; il n'y a qu'un seul et même être substantiel des deux. . . . L'accident contingent [comme l'opération] ne s'explique pas de meme. . . . Au lieu d'épanouir l'être une fois pour toutes dans sa ligne essentielle, elles [les opérations] y apportent un surcroît d'être et d'existence. . . . Maintenant comme tout à l'heure, la substance et l'accident n'ont toujours qu'un même être, qu'une même existence; donc ils sont un. Toutefois cette existence n'est pas l'etre substantiel de la substance mais un être accidentel qui tombe sur la composé, pour se multiplier et s'intensifier avec les divers actes et les divers accidents eux mêmes" (*Dialectique de l'affirmation* [Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1952], p. 636).

[15]"Esse ergo proprie et vere non attribuitur nisi rei per se subsistenti; huic autem attribuitur esse duplex. Unum scilicet esse resultans ex his ex quibus ejus unitas integratur, quod proprium est esse suppositi substantiale. Aliud esse est supposito attributum praeter ea quae integrant ipsum, quod est esse superadditum, scilicet accidentale; ut esse album attribuitur Socrati cum dicitur, Socrates est albus" (*Quodl.*, IX [q. 2], a. 2). A similar text is found in *De Princip. Nat.*, cap. 1 (ed. Pauson, p. 79, 11. 1-6).

acts in a being, the *esse substantiale* and the *esse accidentale,* so that the existing subject has not one *esse* but two somewhat different *esses?* If this were the only text of St. Thomas which we had to go on, it would be difficult or even impossible to say that that is not what he meant. But, as a matter of fact, we have other texts (and we have seen some of them already) in which he clearly says the contrary. We could simply dismiss the matter by saying that it is all an evident contradiction and worthy of no further consideration, but such a drastic and foolish course is by no means necessary. With a little attention we can discover that St. Thomas is saying in this text nothing different from what we have seen him already say.

To begin with, let us go back just a little in this same text and see what we find. Immediately preceding this quotation we find St. Thomas saying that *esse* can be used not only as a verbal copula but also as signifying the act of a being insofar as it is being. In this second meaning *esse* is attributed to a thing in two different ways: one of these is the way in which we attribute *esse* to those things which truly and properly have *esse,* or exist—that is, to substances alone; and the second is the way we attribute *esse* to that which does not have *esse,* but by means of which something is—such as whiteness, which does not in itself subsist but is that by which something exists as white.[16] Now this is what we have seen St. Thomas was saying all along; accidents do not have an existential act, but they are modifications such that a being exercises its *esse* in a way in which it would not exercise it without these accidents. Thus, when we find him saying in the very next line, "To that which subsists per se . . . a double *esse* is attributed," the only intelligent interpretation is to understand "attributed" as signifying that the single *esse* of a being can be looked

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[16]"Uno modo, secundum quod est copula verbalis significans compositionem cujuslibet enuntiationis quam anima facit: unde hoc esse non est aliquid in rerum natura, sed tantum in actu animae componentis et dividentis. Et sic esse attribuitur omni ei de quo potest propositio formari, sive sit ens, sive privatio entis; dicimus enim caecitatem esse. Alio modo esse dicitur actus entis in quantum est ens, idest quo denominatur aliquid ens actu in rerum natura. Et sic esse non attribuitur nisi rebus ipsis quae in decem generibus continentur; unde ens a tali esse dictum per decem genera dividitur. Sed hoc esse attribuitur alicui dupliciter. Uno modo sicut ei quod proprie et vere habet esse vel est. Et sic attribuitur soli substantiae per se subsistenti: unde quod vere est, dicitur substantia in I *Physic.* [text. comm. 27]. Omnia vero quae non per se subsistunt, sed in alio et cum alio, sive sint accidentia sive formae substantiales aut quaelibet partes, non habent esse ita ut ipsa vere sint, sed attribuitur eis esse alio modo, idest ut quo aliquid est; sicut albedo dicitur esse, non quia ipsa in se subsistat, sed quia ea aliquid habet esse album" (*ibid.*).

at in two ways.[17] And such is certainly the interpretation which St. Thomas indicates when he gives us the key to the meaning of all texts of that type:

> Everything which does not subsist per se but only in another and with another—whether it is an accident, substantial form, or any part at all—does not have *esse* so that it truly is, but rather *esse* is attributed to it.[18]

We can consider the being as existing determined by its primary distinction from mere potency—its essence; and, considering it in that light, we attribute to the being an *esse substantiale*. If, on the other hand, we consider the being as existing in a manner further determined by its accidents, we attribute to it an *esse accidentale*. With these considerations the text offers no difficulties.

The text from the *Contra Gentiles* in which St. Thomas says of a real relation belonging to a substance that "et postremum et imperfectissimum esse habet,"[19] is readily interpreted along the same

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[17]If pressed to put the distinction between *esse substantiale* and *esse accidentale* in precise Scholastic terminology, we would say that the distinction between them is a virtual major distinction. They are not really distinct as separate beings or as the act-potency principles of a single being; nor is the distinction a purely logical one, such as that in the classic example of Tully and Cicero. The distinction is rather a virtual distinction of reason (*rationis ratiocinatae*), and in this category it pertains to the major rather than minor type. It is not a virtual minor distinction such as that between the divine attributes, where the distinction is due to a superabundance of being that is beyond the capacity of our intellects to grasp. The distinction between *esse substantiale* and *esse accidentale*, on the contrary, is a virtual major one similar to the distinction between rationality and animality in man. The rationality is not really distinct from the animality, because the whole man is rational and animal; but since the substantial form is really distinct from the matter, we can speak of rationality and animality as distinct, the animality being linked with the material principle and rationality with the formal. In a similar way, the *esse substantiale* and the *esse accidentale* are not really distinct; but because substance and accidents are really distinct we conceive the two former as distinct in light of the real distinction of the latter.

[18]"Omnia vero quae non per se subsistunt, sed in alio et cum alio, sive sint accidentia sive formae substantiales, aut quaelibet partes, non habent esse ita ut ipsa vere sint, sed attribuitur eis esse" (*ibid.*).

[19]*CG*, IV, cap. 14 (Leonine no. 7 c). See also *De Pot.*, VIII, a. 1 ad 4, and *In XII Metaphys.*, lect. 4 (Cathala no. 2457). It is by fixing his attention on these three texts and neglecting the many others on the existential character of accidents that a recent author too hastily concludes to a proper *esse* for real relations in the created order. While establishing St. Thomas's thought on the distinction between a relation and its foundation, this author goes to the length of attributing a proper *esse* to relations. He says: "Et toute hésitation sur sa pensée vrai devient impossible devant trois passages catégoriques—dont deux dans des oeuvres personnelles—où il attribue littéralement à la relation créée un être propre. . . . Le fait

lines as was the text from the *Quodlibetales*. St. Thomas has said that *esse* is the actuality of all things, and the closer a thing approaches to *esse* the more act it has: "Nothing has actuality except insofar as it is; thus *esse* is the actuality of all things, even of forms themselves."[20] The existence which an accident has depends on the fact that it is the modification of an existing substance. Now, if one accident depends on another, its existence is doubly removed, we may say, from the existential act of the being, for it depends on an accident which in turn depends on the substance. This second accident, then, being farther from *esse*, will have less actuality than the accident on which it depends, and, a fortiori, less than the substance. Such is the case with the accident of relation, St. Thomas says, and that is why it is said to have "postremum esse." And not only that, but the existence of a relation also depends on the existence of another being to which the first is related, and this further dependence is the reason for attributing "imperfectissimum esse" to relation.

We take up now another text, this time from the *Summa*, which offers real difficulties from a different point of view and which is by no means easily understood.[21] Anything like a complete analysis

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que dans le premier texte, il qualifie l'être (*esse*) de la relation comme l'être *ultime et le plus imparfait*, prouve manifestement qu'il le distingue de l'être moins imparfait du fondement" (A. Krempel, *La doctrine de la relation chez saint Thomas* [Paris: Vrin, 1952], p. 257).

[20] *ST*, I, q. 4, a. 1 ad 3.

[21] "Respondeo. Dicendum quod quia in Christo sunt duae naturae et una hypostasis, necesse est quod ea quae ad naturam pertinent in Christo sint duo, quae autem pertinent ad hypostasim in Christo sint unum tantum. Esse autem pertinet et ad naturam et ad hypostasim; ad hypostasim quidem sicut ad id quod habet esse; ad naturam autem sicut ad id quo aliquid habet esse; natura enim significatur per modum formae, quae dicitur ens ex eo quod ea aliquid est, sicut albedine est aliquid album, et humanitate est aliquis homo. Est autem considerandum quod si est aliqua forma vel natura quae non pertineat ad esse personale hypostasis subsistentis, illud esse non dicitur esse illius personae simpliciter, sed secundum quid, sicut esse album est esse Socratis, non inquantum est Socrates, sed inquantum est albus. Et hujusmodi esse nihil prohibet multiplicari in una hypostasi vel persona; aliud enim est esse quo Socrates est albus, et quo Socrates est musicus. Sed illud esse quod pertinet ad ipsam hypostasim vel personam secundum se, impossible est in una hypostasi vel persona multiplicari, quia impossible est quod unius rei non sit unum esse.

"Si igitur humana natura adveniret Filio Dei, non hypostatice vel personaliter, sed accidentaliter, sicut quidam posuerunt, oporteret ponere in Christo duo esse, unum quidem secundum quod est Deus; aliud autem secundum quod est homo. Sicut in Socrate ponitur aliud esse secundum quod est albus, et aliud secundum quod est homo, quia esse album non pertinet ad ipsum esse personale Socratis. Esse autem capitatum, et esse corporeum, et esse animatum, totum pertinet ad unam personam Socratis; et ideo ex omnibus his non fit nisi unum esse in Socrate. Et si contingeret quod

of this text is altogether out of the question here, though we can make a few observations which will indicate a line of interpretation consistent with what we have already given. We have seen that the fundamental determination of a being through which it exercises its *esse* is the essence, or, in another light, the nature. If two natures were to be joined together in a way similar to the way accidents and substance are joined in a being, namely *accidentaliter,* then the being would exercise its *esse* in a way determined by both these natures, just as *esse* is doubly determined by substance and by accident. But since the nature, or essence, is the primary determination of *esse,* this so-called being would have to exercise two acts of existing, one through each of the natures. Such a thing or things could not be a person, for a person is precisely that which exists with a single proper act of existing. "It is impossible," St. Thomas here says, "that one thing should not have one *esse.*" There is no difficulty involved, however, in adding accidents to the nature of a person, for when accidents are joined to their substance *accidentaliter* they simply modify the way in which the being exercises its single *esse* through that substance, or essence, and so there is but one *esse* doubly modified. A nature, on the other hand, joined in the same way—*accidentaliter*—to another nature could not modify the act of existing exercised through the first nature and could be only the primary modification of another distinct *esse.* So it is that, though we are permitted to speak of one *esse substantiale* and of more than one *esse accidentale* in a person or hypostasis because there is really only one *esse* modified in different ways by perfections which are subordinate one to the other, we cannot speak of more than one *esse substantiale* in a person or hypostasis since the perfections—the natures—are not subordinate but are of equal metaphysical rank and would be the foundations for distinct *esses.* Thus it is that in the hypostatic union the human nature of Christ is joined to the divine nature of the Son of God in a union altogether different from the union of substance

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post constitutionem personae Socratis, advenirent Socrati manus vel pedes vel oculi, sicut accidit in caeco nato, ex his non accresceret Socrati aliud esse, sed solum relatio quaedam ad hujusmodi, quia scilicet diceretur esse non solum secundum ea quae prius habebat, sed etiam secundum ea quae sibi postmodum adveniunt.

"Sic igitur cum humana natura conjungatur Filio Dei hypostatice vel personaliter, ut supra dictum est, et non accidentaliter, consequens est quod secundum humanam naturam non adveniat sibi novum esse personale, sed solum nova habitudo esse personalis praeexistentis ad naturam humanam, ut scilicet persona illa jam dicatur subsistere, non solum secundum divinam naturam, sed etiam secundum humanam" (*ST,* III, q. 17, a. 2).

and accidents. The union is a unique one of such a character that a single *esse substantiale* is exercised through two natures: "Consequently, a new *esse personale* does not come to Him according to His human nature, but only a new relation of the pre-existing *esse personale* to this human nature."[22]

Lastly, we shall treat another text on accidental union which might be interpreted as being inconsistent with the doctrine we have seen.

The fact that St. Thomas says in the *De Ente* that the union of accident and subject forms not an *unum per se* but rather an *unum per accidens*[23] could cause difficulty if, for some reason, we were to consider that by *unum per se* St. Thomas means a being which has one *esse,* while by *unum per accidens* he means a group of beings, each with its own proper *esse.* That this is not what is meant here is perfectly clear from the text. By *unum per se* St. Thomas means that which is composed of realities or, better, principles of being that unite to form a single essence; namely, matter and form. And, therefore, it is evident that substance and accidents do not form an *unum per se* because their union does not form a new essence different from the substance to which the accident comes. The parts of an *unum per se* join to form the primary determining factor of the act of existing of a being; and such is obviously not the case with substance and accidents, for the accidents form a secondary and dependent determining factor of the *esse.* In the *De Ente* we read:

> As a substantial *esse* results from form and matter when they are composed, so an accidental *esse* results from accident and substance when an accident comes to a subject. . . . From the conjunction of matter and form there results that *esse* in which a being exists per se, and from them is formed an *unum per se;* thus some essence comes about from their conjunction. . . . From accident and subject there is formed not an *unum per se* but an *unum per accidens,* so that some essence is not formed from their conjunction.[24]

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[22] *Ibid.* For St. Thomas's distinction between the hypostatic or personal union of two natures and the union of soul and body into an *unum esse naturae,* see *ST,* III, q. 2, a. 6 ad 2. Besides clarifying the notion of hypostatic union, this text also confirms what we shall say later of the *unum per se* as used in the *De Ente.*

[23] *De Ente,* cap. 6 (*Opuscula,* ed. Perrier, I, 47).

[24] "Sicut ex forma et materia relinquitur esse substantiale quando componuntur, ita ex accidentibus et substantiis relinquitur esse accidentale quia accidens subjecto advenit. . . . Ex conjunctione utriusque [materia et forma] relinquitur illud esse in quo res per se existit, et ex eis efficitur unum per se; propter quod ex conjunctione eorum relinquitur essentia quaedam. . . . Unde ex accidente et subjecto non efficitur unum per se sed unum per accidens, et ideo ex eorum conjunctione non resultat essentia quaedam" (*ibid.*).

Whatever sense St. Thomas may have in mind when using *unum per se* and *unum per accidens* in other contexts, it is clear what he means at this particular point: those things which unite to form an essence are said to form an *unum per se,* while those which unite to form something other than an essence are said to form an *unum per accidens.* According to this distinction accidents come under the head of those things which form an *unum per accidens,* for accidents clearly do not join with substance to form an essence. When accidents are joined to an essence they modify the being that has that essence, but they do not form a new essence by their union: a suntanned Californian may lose his color during a winter in St. Louis, but that fact does not affect his human nature.

The consideration of the four preceding textual difficulties will be sufficient for our purposes, inasmuch as they treat three general areas in which shifts of meaning in St. Thomas's treatment of the existential character of accidents might seem to arise.[25] The general lines of interpretation developed therein should be sufficiently extensive in their applicability to enable us to maintain the consistency of St. Thomas's interpretation of the *esse* of accidents..

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[25]Since it is not a natural but a miraculous event, the existence of the accidents of bread without the substance of bread in the Holy Eucharist does not strictly pertain to this discussion and has therefore been omitted up to now. Nonetheless, it is a fact; and it will be useful to show, quite briefly, how St. Thomas treats it with the same metaphysical analysis of accidents as he has everywhere used before. We have seen that accidents have their existence through the substance (see the texts cited in note 9, and also *De Princip. Nat.*, cap. 1 [ed. Pauson, p. 80]: "Accidens autem non dat esse subjecto, sed subjectum accidenti"); and in that sense the substance is the cause of the accidents (*ibid.*, cap. 3 [p. 91]: "Causa est id ex cujus esse sequitur aliud"); but like all created things it is only a second cause. God is the first cause of all reality and all perfections, and consequently He is the first cause of both accident and substance. Now the effect (in this case the accidents), St. Thomas says, depends more on the first cause than on the second; whence it follows that though the second cause or substance is removed, the accident can be maintained in being by the power of God, the first cause. Confer: *ST*, III, q. 77, a. 1 ad 2; and *In IV Sent.*, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 1 ad 1 and 2.

Discussing the matter of corruption of the species of bread in the Eucharist, St. Thomas expresses a view which offers a fruitful line of further research in this particular facet of the question of the *esse* of accidents. He says that the more evident opinion in the matter is that the supposit which terminates the corruption and the activities of nutrition which may accompany the corruption are from the accidents just as they would be from the substance of bread if it were there (*Quodl.*, IX [q. 3], a. un. ad 3). The existential act, therefore, of these separated accidents in the Eucharist is there with reference not only to the accidents themselves but also with reference to the virtualities of the substance.

FINAL EVALUATION OF AUROBINDO'S THEORY OF THE ABSOLUTE

Paul Colaço, S.J.

It has been said that alogicalism is the last prop of tottering logic. This may be true or false; and even if it is true, few will have the courage to admit it. But Aurobindo has frankly told us that when the logic of the finite fails us we must have recourse to the logic and mathematics of the infinite[1] in which all antinomies and contradictions of logic "are reconciled by the divine Harmony,"[2] where even the statement that the "part is greater than the whole," so truthfully condemned by logic, might be found to be true because it pertains to transcendence.[3]

Such a recourse to the "logic" of the infinite as the saving plank of his philosophy was forced upon Aurobindo by the initial mistake he made in his honest inquiry into the puzzling fact of becoming. The nature of the substratum of change which, recognized as prime potency, was to Aristotle and the Scholastics the cornerstone of a rational and synthetic philosophy and the long-sought key to the problem of the one and the many, was for Aurobindo a stumbling block.

If the substratum of change was a purely immutable being, a static entity, then the change of forms which one observed succeeding in relentless movement stood against that substratum as another moving-entity, separate, distinct, irreconcilable with the pure being.

Here, then, Aurobindo was faced with a duality that defied the search of his mind for unity in multiplicity. Aristotle, as we have

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[1]Sri Aurobindo Ghose, *The Life Divine* (Calcutta: Arya Pub. House, 1939-40), II, Part I, 61.

[2]*Ibid.*, I, 39.

[3]*Ibid.*, II, Part I, 56.

seen in the previous article, was not faced with any such impossible duality. His penetrating search into the fact of becoming had discovered that change implies two correlative principles: act and potency, the former a principle of determination or perfection, the latter a principle of determinability and limitation. With two such incomplete and correlative principles, neither of which could exist independently of the other, a real unity of the finite being became intelligible. And the very limitation of the finite beings constituted by the union of these two principles opened out to him a way to a transcendent unmoved mover who has not become and cannot become, but is the cause of becoming in the world inasmuch as he is the cause of the principles of becoming—act as well as potency.

But Aurobindo has not arrived at any such synthesis. He has, on the contrary, resolved movement into two distinct realities: "the fact of Being and the fact of Becoming," "both real and neither of them an illusion."[4] In other words, since the idea of an intermediate term—the being in potency—between the complete being and pure nonbeing escaped his analysis, he has reduced all beings into one being with a capital *B* and all becomings into one becoming with a capital *B*. Faced with two such distinct facts, he had somehow to find a means to reconcile them.[5]

He tried to reconcile the two by making the becoming inherent in the being as "inevitable in the very self-power of the Infinite and Eternal."[6]

Consequently also he is obliged to affirm the pre-existence of the many in the one; for logic clearly tells him that nothing can become which did not in some way pre-exist in the cause.

But how? If the many were completely identified with the one prior to the becoming, the becoming would not be becoming but a creation. But creation Aurobindo will not admit, on the score that there is something of despotism about it and that it will lead to the conception of a cruel God.

He has then inevitably to admit that the many were eternally present in the one, not identified with it. Of the exact nature of their nonidentity or diversity from the one, he is uncertain and sometimes even self-contradictory in expression. The one, he asserts, was not "a sum of the many," was not "a collection," not "a plurality." On the other hand, so as not to identify them with the one,

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[4]See "The Absolute of Creation in the Philosophy of Aurobindo," THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXIX (March, 1952), 211-36.

[5]*Life Divine*, I, 119.

[6]*Ibid.*, II, Part II, 557.

he has in the same breath to say that the one and the many eternally "co-existed," "without co-mingling," but as "simultaneous" terms somehow forming "at once an essentiality, a boundless totality and a multitude."[7]

However puzzling his language on this point, his intention is clear: the many pre-exist in the one with some kind of reality which cannot simply be identified with the one. That is why Professor Malkani could trenchantly remark:

> While this [that God's thought is truly creative] is to a certain extent intelligible, it is not intelligible how that which is already true in God come further to birth in the forms of a . . . cosmos. Either the [many are] non-existent in God, in which case their creation would be pure conception, which would not represent truth; or if they are already in some extent existent in Him, where is the scope for creation at all? We cannot both have the cake and eat it![8]

Professor Malkani has probed the weak point in Aurobindo's system with much force. But he has not discovered anything that Aurobindo has not himself foreseen and admitted. Aurobindo has nowhere affirmed that his system holds together logically. He has openly confessed that his one-many God would seem from a logical point of view "difficult for the mental reason."[9] "Our reason cannot grasp it";[10] it is "difficult for our reason to understand,"[11] "irrational";[12] it "contradicts the conceptions of our finite reason"[13] and is "contradictory"[14] and full of "irreconcilable contraries."[15] And when we notice that so many assertions of the kind have been made within so few pages of one single chapter, we can have no doubt at all that Aurobindo has clearly perceived that on logical grounds his integral God is untenable. He was not so dull as not to understand that by forcing the becoming in the being, the many in one, he had stained and scarred the pure unity of Brahman. He himself confesses that there is "demarcation"[16] in his God though there is no division, that there is a "spiritual plurality"[17] though not a spatial one.

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[7]See "The Absolute of Experience in the Philosophy of Aurobindo," THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXIX (January, 1952), 99-118, and "The Absolute of Creation."

[8]*Philosophical Quarterly* (Sind), January, 1943.

[9]*Life Divine*, II, Part I, 50.

[10]*Ibid.*, 53.

[11]*Ibid.*, 51.

[12]*Ibid.*, 54.

[13]*Ibid.*, 67.

[14]*Ibid.*, 71.

[15]*Ibid.*, 126.

[16]*Ibid.*, 66.

When one has stained a thing there are two ways of remedying the evil: to wash the stains away or to throw the stained thing away. Aurobindo, in our opinion, has done the second of the two. By placing God above the cloud of supremely transcendent unknowability he thought that he could place him also above all the assaults of logic. Logic asserts, with Professor Malkani, that the notion of a one-many God is full of difficulties, that a possibility cannot be the same thing as reality, that

> if the world is never wholly unreal in God . . . it becomes a part and a constituent of God; and if there is any change signified by creation, that change would be a change affecting God Himself. . . . But then God would no longer remain an immutable and eternal God. . . . God is not an entity that can be in *a real* relation to anything.[18]

To all these and other peckings of logic Aurobindo could placidly answer: Why bother about logic? Mind is not a faculty of knowledge. It cannot know the nature of God, which transcends all human knowability. What appears to us self-opposed and contradictory could be in an ineffable way harmonized in the transcendental aspect of God. What is illogical to us might be logic and mathematics to the infinite.

> The apparent incompatibility of the two states is an error of the limited mind which, accustomed to trenchant oppositions of affirmation and denial, . . . is unable to conceive of a comprehensive consciousness vast and strong enough to include both in a simultaneous embrace.[19]
>
> In the logic of the Infinite there is no such opposition and the eternity of the Many in the One is a thing that is perfectly natural and possible.[20]

But one might ask Aurobindo how, if the absolute were beyond the pale of mental knowledge, he could assert the possibility of the existence or the naturalness of the one-many God? He has a ready answer: "It is not altogether and in every way unknowable"; "it is attainable by a supreme effort of consciousness. There is even a kind of Knowledge which is one with Identity and by which, in a sense, it can be known."[21] In other words, it is not by logical reasoning that one can know what God is, but by an alogical experience.

This is an elegant escape from difficulties—an unnecessary mystifi-

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[17]*Ibid.*, 62.
[18]All this is discussed in the *Philosophical Quarterly* (Sind), pp. 254-60.
[19]*Life Divine*, I, 41.
[20]*Ibid.*, 63.
[21]See "The Absolute of Experience."

cation of the problem of the one and the many and not a philosophical solution of it. This is regrettable, for the moment Aurobindo called in the aid of an "unknowable God" to justify the logical difficulties with which he was faced, he definitely abandoned the role of a philosopher and assumed that of a pseudo-mystic. Pseudo-mysticism might appeal to the imaginative but is of no interest to a philosopher.

One now understands why Mr. Shahani, in his sketch of Aurobindo as a philosopher of reconciliation, makes the following observation:

> These volumes [the *Sri Aurobindo Mandir Annuals*] helpful as they are, make tiresome reading; they deafen one with their tom-tom. Aurobindo is called "Master", "World Teacher", "Messiah", and so on and so forth. This is childish; it proves once again that Indians, as a race, are pretty poor critics. Aurobindo is a powerful and original thinker and at times even an inspired seer, but he is certainly not above criticism. His universe to my mind, is noonday bright; there are no saving or soothing mists in it. Awful is the glare, and even the shadow seems to burn. The dark impenetrable night, peopled with phantoms, does not exist for him. Light, light, all is light. In other words the universe is too clear. It is all divine, Satan does not even put in an appearance, or if he does, he looks pale and ghostly. All this is very pretty, but—yes, there is a big but. We know that there are creatures like Iago possessed of motiveless malignity.[22]

What he really means is that Aurobindo's explanation of God and the world does not answer to the bleak reality of life and cannot satisfy the human craving for real truth.

To whatever heights of experimental knowledge of God and divine truths a mystic might be raised by a free supernatural grace of God,[23] the knowledge thus obtained can never contradict the truths or the first principles of reason. For truth cannot contradict truth nor light extinguish light. God, who is the source of all light and all truth, cannot Himself be the principle of self-contradiction. The mystic's knowledge might be *above* reason in the sense of unattainable by the sole light of reason, but it can never be *against* reason, denying or overriding the truth of reason. Should it ever do so, it carries with it

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[22] *Indian Art and Letters*, First Issue, 1944, p. 35.

[23] Mystical knowledge of God, being direct, immediate, or experimental knowledge, has been maintained by Christian theology to be beyond the natural capacity of human intelligence. Man's natural knowledge must from the very frame of his body-mind structure come necessarily from the senses. But God, a pure Spirit, could not possibly be an immediate object of man's inner experience unless God freely chose to make Himself immediately present to the faculties of man. This is a gift which man, as man, has no right to.

its own condemnation, its sign of unreliability and falsity.

Aurobindo maintains that the human mind cannot attain knowledge of an absolute truth and therefore is not a faculty of knowledge but of ignorance. Hence he concludes that a faculty of half-knowledge, a faculty of error and ignorance, cannot be the instrument for knowing the nature of God.

What have we to say to this? If Aurobindo intended to say that the human mind is not a faculty that can immediately reach the individual essences of things, but must abstract them from material things and is therefore an imperfect faculty, or that it can never obtain a comprehensive notion of anything, experience and philosophy would endorse his view without difficulty. The human mind, being a middle term between the purely spiritual world and the material world, is the lowest in the hierarchy of intelligences and shares in the inertia and imperfection of the material body on which it depends for its being and activity. But to have an imperfect or partial knowledge is not the same thing as having an absolutely relative or false knowledge. The *mode* of knowing does not deny the *fact* of knowing; and to the extent that the mind knows things its knowledge can be absolute; that is to say, things are necessarily such as we judge them to be, not for our intellects alone, or relatively to our intellects only, but absolutely and for all conceivable intellects.

Father Rickaby makes this apt observation:

> Not any absence of likeness between thought and thing is straightway falsehood: rather such mere absence is ignorance. Before downright error is reached there must be not only want of conformity but positive deformity. Knowledge however limited is true knowledge so long as it does not transgress or deny its own limits.[24]

The question therefore really turns, not on how we know, but on whether or not our intellect grasps the reality of things as they are. If our intellect can know things as they are, then one cannot reasonably doubt that we can attain to a knowledge which, as far as it goes and as far as it is true, attains to what reality is *absolutely,* what it is in itself, and what it must therefore be for all intellects.[25]

Aurobindo does not always distinguish between apprehending and reasoning. He often confuses the one with the other and attributes to the one the accidental defects of the other. We do not thereby

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[24]John Rickaby, S.J., *The First Principles of Knowledge* ("Stonyhurst Philosophical Series"; London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1901) pp. 7-8.

[25]See Peter Coffey, *Ontology; or, The Theory of Being* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1914), II, 209 ff.

imply that intelligence and reason constitute two faculties in man. They are two activities of one and the same faculty of knowledge—mind.[26] There is a natural connection and continuity between the two. Still, as acts they cannot be simply identified; the acts in themselves remain different, as is evident from the nature of their activity.

The first and primary act of the mind is not reasoning but a simple apprehension of the object. That is to say, the intellect of man, being a spiritual faculty, immediately grasps, in the sensible data presented to it by the senses, the *being* that is found materialized, conditioned, limited by matter. And that is knowledge. For to know is to grasp an object in its intelligible form. Now, that which is directly intelligible in a corporal object is not its matter but its form, the principle by which something is a being. Strictly speaking, matter is not a principle of being, but a principle of nonbeing; it is that which makes a being not-a-complete being, makes it a limited being.[27]

When, therefore, the object of the faculty of knowledge is material, to know an object is to prescind from all that gives to the object its nonbeingness; that is, materialness. And this is what is meant by abstraction.[28]

There is, therefore, no distinction of truth in mental abstraction. There could be if the act of abstraction were distinct from the act of apprehension of being; but abstraction, as the Scholastics hold, is nothing but the reaching out of the faculty to the being of the sensible object, the immediate grasping of the being of the object without its material conditions of time and space. To quote M. Maritain:

> The intellect by the very fact that it is spiritual proportions its objects to itself, by elevating them within itself to diverse degrees, increasingly pure, of spirituality and immateriality. It is within itself that it attains reality stripped of real [physical] existence outside the mind.[29]

Incidentally, we may remark that if to know is most truly to grasp and attain and hold the being freed from material conditions,[30] there can be no essential identity between matter and spirit. Hence Auro-

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[26]See St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 78, a. 4.

[27]See St. Thomas, *De Ente et Essentia*, cap. 2.

[28]See J. Maréchal, *Le Point de départ de la Métaphysique* (Paris: Alcan, 1927), V, 187.

[29]Jacques Maritain, *Preface to Metaphysics* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1939), p. 58.

[30]"Cognoscentia a non cognoscentibus in hoc distinguuntur, quia non cognoscentia nihil habent nisi formam suam tantum, sed cognoscens natum est habere formam etiam rei alterius, nam species cogniti est in cognoscente" (St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 14, a. 1).

bindo's theory that all things, even the most material, are potentially spiritual and capable of knowledge because matter is not different from spirit except only in appearance, cannot be upheld against the evidence of facts. A principle of being cannot be identically the same as the principle that limits the being and gives it nonbeingness. Hence any being that cannot in any degree rise above the material conditions of time and space in its activity—in other words, anything that is intrinsically and solely matter—is not capable of knowledge; for what is thus material can only touch the surface of things but never penetrate to their innermost being,[31] and anything that does not grasp and possess within itself the being of other things does not know them.

If, then, the first act of the mind is a direct apprehension of the being of other things by an active mental assimilation of them, this is an intuitive act. Reason has no part in it. It is an act of the mind by which it immediately possesses the essences of things. The abstraction which accompanies it is conditioned by the fact that the human mind has to use the body as an instrument of knowledge. But that condition does not affect the act of the mind *as mind,* which is immediately, without any intermediary act, to assimilate into itself—or, rather, to assimilate itself to—the object presented to it by the senses.[32] Such an act is in a true sense an intuitive act.[33] Whatever, therefore, Aurobindo postulates in his theory of intuitive knowledge—except such elements in it as are irrational or impossible—is already contained in the Scholastic explanation of the human intuitive act of knowledge.

Since in this first act of the mental apprehension of the object the mind is immediately actuated by the form of the object without

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[31]Father Pierre Rousselot, S.J., prefers to apply the word "abstraction" to the activity of material objects rather than to intellect. His reason is that material activity, however powerful, just touches the surface of things, alters it, but never, as the mind does, "invades it, penetrates it, and conquers it whole and entire." In this sense all material activity abstracts from the one thing that really matters in an object, its being. Cf. *The Intellectualism of St. Thomas,* tr. with a foreword by James E. O'Mahony (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1935), pp. 25-26.

[32]"Cognitio fit secundum assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam. Sic enim actus intelligit res, cum species rei facta fuerit forma intellectus possibilis" (St. Thomas, *Compendium Theologiae,* cap. 83).

[33]"L'intuition—définie d'une manière absolument générale—est l'assimilation directe d'une faculté connaisante à son objet. Toute connaissance est en quelque façon une assimilation, une "information": L'intuition est une "information" immédiate, sans intermédiaire objectivement interposé; c'est l'acte par lequel la faculté connaissante se modele, non pas sur une similitude abstraite de l'objet mais sur l'objet lui-même" (Joseph Maréchal, S.J., *Études sur la psychologie des mystiques* [2e éd.; Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1937-38], I, 117).

anything coming in between, it rigorously excludes any possibility of mistake or error; it cannot itself be false. That is why St. Thomas tells us: "Circa quod quid est intellectus non decipitur."[34] No error therefore is possible in the essential act of the intellect, which is to apprehend, to understand.

But this first understanding does not begin with a distinct notion of a thing or its specific notes. It knows a thing first under the most vague and primitive notion of all, being. St. Thomas tells us that the mind first acquires imperfect knowledge by means of the most universal concepts through which things are known indistinctly in a certain confusion.[35] It gradually perfects the concepts by successive acts of analysis and synthesis, and thus acquires distinct knowledge of the thing apprehended. Error may creep into these new acts of judgment through haste, wrong analysis, prejudice, or bad condition of the instruments of knowledge, particularly the sense organs and sense faculties such as imagination and cognitive estimation.[36]

And even here one must not exaggerate the possibility of error in human judgments. Aurobindo himself admits that chance is not the regulative law of life, but that there is a teleological purpose in the activity of things. If so, the human mind in spite of the possibilities of error cannot be said to be working always and normally without a purpose or an end. If its nature is to know, it should normally know without error; otherwise it does not deserve to be called mind at all. Hence we must admit, if we do not want to surrender ourselves to blind fate, that normally our faculties, whether sensible or intellectual, are trustworthy.[37] And whatever errors the mind may occasionally make through want of attention it can correct by reflection or study or counsel. To conclude, therefore, to the absolute inefficiency of the mind because of accidental errors is itself a lack of judgment.

We would do well to bear in mind the following excellent remarks by Father D'Arcy:

> The intellect of itself is flawless; it is the faculty of truth. To deny this is to commit intellectual suicide; in fact the denial can only be verbal, for in the very denial a belief in the truth of one statement at least is implicit. To go behind knowledge in order to criticise it is an impossible feat, for our criticism is an intellectual act; we might as well turn out the light in order to study our appearance in the dark. . . . We might compare the

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[34] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 17, a. 3. See *In VI Metaphysicorum*, lect. 4.

[35] *Summa Theol.*, I q. 85, a. 3.

[36] See Leo W. Keeler, S.J., *The Problem of Error from Plato to Kant* (Rome: Gregorian Univ., 1934), pp. 89 ff.

[37] See St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 17, a. 2.

> mind to a shell. In an oyster the shell shuts off the world, but in man the shell is translucent, all things flood in: the self can englobe all reality, though all reality must dwindle in size so as to be accommodated within the microcosm.[38]

The truth of these statements is admitted by Aurobindo himself. Although he has mercilessly attacked reason and made it appear as a faculty more of error than of truth, one is struck by his constant appeal to logic to maintain his position or to condemn his adversaries. Thus in one single page of Aurobindo[39] we read: ". . . it is . . . *rational* in itself"; "it is the only *logical* completion of a rule . . ."; "that seems to be a fundamental *method of Nature* . . ."; "there seems to be *no reason* why"; "there seems to be *little objection* to." If really the human mind cannot possess absolute truth or were not guided in its activity by absolute first principles, these statements have no meaning.

If our intellect is a faculty of real being—as we have shown it to be—and not a faculty of purely subjective representations, then God, who is the highest being, the most perfect of beings, cannot *as being* fall outside the scope of human knowledge. He cannot simply and absolutely be unknowable to an intellect without ceasing to be being Himself. This is a logical conclusion from our premise that every intellect is a faculty of knowing, and to know is to grasp the being of things actual or possible; for *being* is the formal object of all intellects.

The reason adduced by Aurobindo for the unknowability of God is His transcendence. This is because he has a mistaken notion of transcendence. Transcendence really means that God does not fall under any of the human categories of being—that His mode of being is infinitely different from that of any created nature—for the obvious reason that He is a pure being without even a shadow of potency in Him, whereas all created things are intrinsically composed of an act and a potency. In other words, God is His "to be"—"I am Who am" is His own definition of Himself[40]; creatures, no matter how exalted they are, are not their own "to be" but, proportionately to their capacity, have received a "to be" from God.

One sees from this how the Christian notion of divine transcendence explains His immanence in creation consistently with His transcendence.[41] Precisely because God is immanent He is necessarily also

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[38]M. C. D'Arcy, S.J., "The Idea of God," *God and the Supernatural*, ed. by Father Cuthbert, O.S.F.C. (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1936), pp. 47-48.

[39]*Life Divine*, I, 4.

[40]Exod. 2:14.

[41]"Catholic Immanentism", writes Father Erich Przywara, S.J., "is the immediate consequence of the rigid Super-creatureliness of the universal

transcendent.[42] God as such, considered in His absoluteness, is neither transcendent nor immanent; He is pure being. But the moment He created, He assumed toward creatures an aspect of transcendence as well as immanence. He is transcendent because He is not the substance of creatures; He is not modified into creatures; He remains unchanged, unaffected, by His donation of being to creatures. In a very strikingly original way Father Ledrus brings home this idea:

> God is the perfect, self-subsisting infinitive of Being, an absolute TO-BE, supreme pattern of all our human verbs and of their intrinsic identity. God, Being, cannot be double. The world, its participle, may be multiple in itself or rather in its subjects; but the multiplication leaves being unaffected in itself, as sun and light are unaffected by any number of their reflections. The laws of light, though differently manifested, are ultimately the same in the sun, symbol of self-subsisting light, and in the mirror. . . . So also the transcendent identity of being is verified and absolutely unaffected in itself, whether we consider being in its un-communicable Plenitude or in its communicated finitudes.[43]

Such a notion of transcendence clears the way also for a real immanence.

> God is the self-subsisting infinite "TO-BE"; He is "like ether"; creatures are participles of that infinitive, of that ontological Verb of intellectual substance; they are "like the ether in the jar"; being is only their constituent.[44]

It stands to reason, then, that a creature is always in relation to the Creator in a relation of dependence, and this dependence is not something extrinsic to the creature; it is, as Professor Gilson says, shot through and through with it.[45] It affects it not only at the first moment of its existence but during each moment of its duration; to exist each moment it must receive "to-be" even as each moment the ray of light needs a communication from the sun. This means that for a creature to remain or act as a finite creature the creative presence of God is absolutely necessary. In other words, God is present to the creature continually by His creative operation, giving it the "to-be" in order to be.

Creator, while ordinary immanentism simply confines Him to being within His creation" (*Polarity*, tr. by A. C. Bouquet [London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1935], p. 38).

[42] See Eric L. Mascall, *He Who Is* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1943), p. 126.

[43] "Advaita and Creation," *The New Review* (Calcutta, 1938), p. 269.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 262.

[45] Etienne Gilson, *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, tr. by A. H. C. Downes (London: Sheed & Ward, 1936), p. 71.

This is the sense of divine immanence in creation which is a natural correlative of divine transcendence.

How different and elevating is this notion of divine immanence, which implies a continuation of a loving donation of being by God, from the pantheistic immanence advocated by Aurobindo. For him, God is immanent inasmuch as He is the hidden substance that modifies itself, plays itself on the surface, and supports that play for His delight of self-evolution. Such an immanence degrades the pure being of God to the status of a material cause. Sankara, with good reason, shrank with horror from such material modification in God. If God, he argued, is the material cause of the world, or if the world is the finite form of God, then God must have passed into the world either totally or partially. If totally, He is no longer self-subsistent but a mere world-substance; if partially, then God is internally divisible, subsisting in Himself by one part and in the world by another. Both assumptions he declared absurd, since God must remain self-subsistent and indivisible.[46]

Given such an immanence as Aurobindo conceives, transcendence remains only a word; it amounts to unknowability or, more accurately, to a mere zero placed on top of creation in order somehow to give it a fictitious *raison d'être*. Once such a zero is placed on top of the hierarchy of creation, anything can be affirmed or denied of it, even contradictions. Aurobindo is right in saying that reason can never hope to know his God. How could it? To know God there must be some causal relation betwen the creature and God. And for such a causal relation there must be distinctness of beings. Where everything is identical, where "thisness" and "thatness" are illusion, how can mind, if it exists at all, know God?

But if God's transcendence and immanence are understood as we have explained above, the knowledge of God not only becomes possible for the human mind but even a necessity.

> As soon as causality is interposed as a gift of being [writes Professor Gilson], we are necessarily led to set up a new relation between effect and cause; the relation namely of analogy. . . . If the being that causes does nothing but communicate itself to the effect, diffuse itself into the effect, then it is still the cause that is found in the effect, under a new mode of being. . . . Few formulae recur as often in the writings of St. Thomas as the one that expresses this relation: since all that causes acts according as it is in act, every cause produces an effect that resembles it: *omne agens agit sibi simile*. . . . If then . . . the Christian universe is an effect of God, it must of necessity

[46]Sankara Bhashya, II. 1. 25-27 (Sacred Books of the East [ed. by Max Müller], XXXIV, 349-52).

> be an analogue of God. . . . An analogue is always drawn towards its principle in virtue of being an analogue, and at the same time departs from its principle in virtue of being no more than an analogue. . . . Without the doctrine of analogy the identification of God and being leads to pantheism.[47]

If a creature, then, is an analogue, then an analogical knowledge of God is within the capacity of a created mind which can grasp the similarity between the effect and the cause. But the similarity is not univocal, for God and creatures are not the same in nature; the pure mode of divine existence absolutely differs from the limited and participated mode of creaturely existence. Nevertheless, God and creature are not equivocal terms: they are both beings. What distinguishes creatures from God is not their being but the nonbeing that is in them, a nonbeing absolutely alien to God's identity of being. Hence there is between God and creatures a similarity-dissimilarity relation, or, in Father Przywara's telling phraseology, "the ultimate tension of 'likeness-unlikeness' which is the fundamental basis of the *analogia entis*."[48]

The human mind can therefore legitimately predicate of God in an infinite and eminent degree the very same perfections which are found in creatures. If creatures are real effects of His creative act, then it is obvious that whatever perfections are found in the universe must in some eminent way be found in God. Sankara was right in arguing against Nyaya-Vaisesika that if effects were in no way contained in the cause, all causation would be reduced to magic; there would be no relation between the effect and the cause, and therefore anything could come out of anything.[49]

Now, perfections in creatures are of two kinds: pure perfections, like life, intelligence, will, goodness, which do not in their formal notion imply any materiality (one could, for instance, think of pure intelligence not depending upon a body for its existence and activity); and mixed perfections, which even in their concept imply a composition with matter (one cannot, for example, think of sight without associating it with a material eye.)

But whether the perfections we find in the world be mixed or pure, they are all somehow found in the Creator, since both are finite expressions, created modes of being, of His infinite being. But the way in which they are found in God is different from the way in which they are found in creatures. The pure perfections are found in

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[47]*Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, pp. 95 ff. See the notes in the appendix, pp. 447-49.

[48]*Polarity*, p. 84.

[49]Sankara Bhashya, II. 1. 18.

God as His formal attributes, as His real perfections, since in themselves they imply no imperfection; mixed perfections can only be found in Him in some eminent, but nevertheless real, way.

We must not, however, conclude that the pure perfections which are formal attributes of God are in Him in the same formal way in which they are found in creatures. They must be realized in God in an essentially different and superior mode. Mascall is right when he says that "perfections exist in God, not merely *formaliter,* but *formaliter eminentius.*"[50]

We readily agree with Aurobindo that the eminent mode of God's infinite perfection is beyond our *widest* affirmations. He is right again in saying that all the perfections we might attribute to God are so ineffably one in Him that the transcendence of their unity in God is beyond anything that we can conceive. While affirming that the human mind can in an analogical way know God and that the perfections which are in creatures are found in God, Christian philosophy has always taken care to insist that the human mind can never hope to understand the exact mode in which they are found in God. To know that, we must be God ourselves, we must have the infinite knowledge and therefore the infinite mode of being of God. But that is ruled out by the very notion of Christian transcendence. Father Przywara rightly points out:

> As truly as Deity can never cease to be Deity, and creature, creature, so truly every descent of God into the creature, however deep, and every elevation of the creature to God, however lofty, always and of necessity remains within the limits of the ultimate tension of 'likeness-unlikeness' which prevails between Deity and creature.[51]

And so long as creature remains creature there is surely no possibility of comprehending the transcendent nature of divine existence, which is infinitely different from any of the created modes of creaturely being.

In fact Christian philosophy and theology have so insistently affirmed the incomprehensibility of God's supreme mode of being, that some of the Greek Fathers of the Church and some later writers borrowed their terminology from the Neo-Platonists and used expressions liable to be misunderstood. But inability to define God does not mean that we do not know Him or that the attributes we predicate of Him taken from His creatures are not verified in Him.

> It would surely be contradictory [writes Father Sertillanges] to admit God's existence and then refuse to Him that without which He could not fulfill His office. . . . We have named God

[50] *He Who Is*, pp. 117 ff.
[51] *Polarity*, p. 84.

> the cause of all things, because being, in all its forms and manifestations, requires this postulate; because a less supposes a greater. We cannot deny to God the plenitude of worth which this need demands. Of what use would God be, if He did not possess this under the form (or absence of form) which belongs to the First Principle? God must supply being; therefore we are bound to attribute to Him everything in being that is really being; that is, every perfection which does not imply limitation or imperfection.[52]

The same author then answers the charge that our predication of perfections to God amounts to mere symbolism:

> Analogy as we understand it is not a simple magnifying of all these names and ideas which leaves them still with their proper form. It is a complete transposition, putting one unique term in place of a multiplicity of terms, yet one which corresponds to them all. Our names of God are not mere arbitrary, subjective figures of speech. They have a real foundation, since they correspond to a real relation, one term of which is quite definable. It is also an essential relation because it follows upon the natures of the things related, even though one of them is outside the categories of being. For this relation is one between cause and effect, and God is the cause of being. And when attributes have a real foundation, we may apply them to God, and our words will not be mere symbols, but formal truths, though deplorably inadequate.[53]

If, then, the human mind can have an analogical knowledge of God and therefore know in its own limited way His essential perfections, Aurobindo's assertion that an alogical experience is the only means of knowing the nature of God cannot be reasonably maintained. In fact, what has he really told us about God with his so-called experience, intuition, and knowledge by identity, except that God is existence, consciousness, bliss; that He is a pure being, first cause, ultimate perfection? All this can be known without any mystical experience; it is a knowledge within the ordinary capacity of man.

If, however, Aurobindo postulates a faculty of experience in order to know a God who simultaneously with His perfections holds within Himself imperfection, contingency, becoming, then we agree that such an irrational God cannot fall within the object of human knowledge and only an irrational experience can attain to an irrational God.

Because of this irrational opposition, Aurobindo finds himself forced to attribute to God different statuses, like the unmanifest state, the

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[52]A.-D. Sertillanges, *Foundations of Thomistic Philosophy*, tr. by Godfrey Anstruther, O.P. (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1931), pp. 76 ff.

[53]*Ibid.*, pp. 85-89.

sachchidananda or manifest state, and the supermind or knowledge-will state. He tells us, of course, that they are mere shifts of divine consciousness and do not imply plurality. But even if they do not introduce plurality or division in God, they at least imply change, a becoming, a movement from passivity or from one status to another. But change of any kind is incompatible with a pure act such as God. There is no passivity or potentiality in God. His perfections are not first in a potential state and then deployed as manifest perfections. Any such conception of God is not only anthropomorphic but destructive of the very nature of God.

Knowledge and will, being pure perfections in themselves, are not incompatible with the ultimate reality. If so, why should we posit a new status in God? If these statuses are identically the same, then we cannot speak of statuses; or if they are in some way different, then we introduce in the pure being of God differences and distinction—in other words, composition. Professor Malkani has argued well in favor of divine unity that

> the so-called intermediate principle (Supermind) will have either to be taken into Sachchidananda and made part of It with all the consequences that this would entail, or taken out of It which would involve a prior creation of the principle itself before the creation of the cosmos. If we accept the first alternative, the principle ceases to be intermediate, and Sachchidananda ceases to be really transcendent; and if we accept the second alternative, we must find a reason in what is transcendent for a moment out of itself; and if this reason be found, there is no logical necessity for any intermediate principle.[54]

We have witnessed the mental struggle of a great man. To the more critical, Aurobindo's theory about God and the world might appear unphilosophical. But we experience at the end of this study a feeling of regret. It is unfortunate that Aurobindo made that initial false step in his philosophical quest for the solution of the problem of the one and the many. That mistake was the undoing of his philosophy and robbed him of the coveted honor of making good what was lacking in Sankara's philosophy. Sankara gave us a faultless "thesis" on the nature of God, but he left it to his successors to find a cogent explanation of the world by working on the correct premises he left behind. "Indeed," writes Father Ledrus, "we find in the inductive part of Sankara's doctrine what is perhaps the closest approach ever made outside Catholicism to a clear statement

[54] *Philosophical Quarterly* (Sind), p. 261.

of the doctrine of creation.''[55] His successors one after another tried to solve the problem of the world. Aurobindo in our own time took up the problem anew with zest and set about solving it presumably with the Greek Heraclitus and Plato as his guides.

By grafting the *élan vital* of Bergson and the Evolving Thought of Hegel on the Pure Substance of Spinoza, Aurbindo has succeeded in giving us a God who is neither really transcendent nor really immanent. For if his being-becoming God is really transcendent in the rational sense we have explained above, then the world which his imagination has pictured for us would vanish into thin air and the real world of our daily experience would be left without an explanation. Or if his God is really immanent in the manner he has told us—that is, as the form and substance of all things—then his God cancels Himself out of existence, for a becoming God, a contingent God, cannot be the first cause. Thus unintentionally Aurobindo's philosophy paves the way either for atheism or for acosmism, the very two evils he has strenuously fought against in his writings.

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[55]"Advaita and Creation," p. 262.

CERTITUDO IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

FRANCIS A. CUNNINGHAM, S.J.

There are a number of reasons for believing that the term *certitudo* as it occurs in St. Thomas carried connotations which it does not carry today, and the contrary is also true.[1] Because these differences have often gone unnoticed, it would seem very useful to investigate first the Thomistic usage as contrasted with the modern, and then the Thomistic usage in itself.

I

CERTITUDO IS NOT A STATE OF MIND

1) First of all, there are passages in St. Thomas which offer immediately evident difficulties if *certitudo* is understood in the modern way. Such are these apparent contradictions: *certitudo opinionis,*[2] *probabilis certitudo.*[3] St. Thomas was not a careless writer, nor was he given to paradox; yet he refers casually to a *certitudo prolis,*[4] *certitudo spei,*[5] *certitudo artis.*[6] He calls an analogy or mathematical ratio a *certitudo—proportio est certitudo;*[7] he applies the same term to the ultimate determination, entelechy or form—*per formam significatur perfectio vel certitudo uniuscujusque rei.*[8]

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[1]There has been a growing tendency since the time of Hobbes to restrict the word to this sense [security of mind]; which, though not etymologically founded, is practically useful (OED, under "certitude"). Cf. ". . . (au sens psychologique seulement) . . . au xvii siècle: . . . Descartes" (André Lalande, *Vocabulaire Technique et Critique de la Philosophie* [Paris, 1951], under "certitude" and "certitude morale").

[2]*In III Sent.*, d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 3 ad 1.

[3]*ST*, II-II, q. 70, a. 2.

[4]*De Malo*, XV, a. 1.

[5]*ST*, II-II, q. 18, a. 4.

[6]*Ibid.*

[7]*In II Sent.*, d. 24, q. 3, a. 6 ad 3. Cf. *In III Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1 ad 3.

[8]*De Ente*, cap. 1. "The Arabian expression which the medieval translator rendered by this Latin word has the meaning of perfection or complete determination. . . . See A.-M. Goichon, *La Distinction de l'essence*

2) He never makes use of any of our distinctions. He finds no occasion to discriminate between good, legitimate, formal, and objective certitude as opposed to practical, respective, bad, illegitimate, and purely subjective certitude; nor between direct, spontaneous, and natural certitude as opposed to reflex, technical, and scientific certitude; between metaphysical, physical, and moral certitude; between necessary and free, mathematical and nonmathematical certitude.

3) He had twice as many varieties of his own. Yet just as he did not seem to feel the need for any of our distinctions, so, too, we, for our part, seem to consider his as no less superfluous. Who, for instance, in the history of modern epistemology has ever had occasion to mark the difference between his primary, essential *certitudo* considered as a cause and his secondary, participated share in that *certitudo* considered in some subject?[9] Or his fundamental distinction between *certitudo cognitionis et ordinis?*[10] his *certitudo naturae et artis?*[11] the different kinds of *certitudo* in the intellectual virtues[12] and those in the moral?[13] between his *certitudo adhaesionis*[14] *and inhaesionis,*[15] and *fidei?*[16] and his *certitudo inclinationis et spei,*[17] which, numerically speaking, is probably the most common of all? It is not a question here of more or less; there is no overlapping at all. St. Thomas did not use any of our variants of the term; we do not use any of his. This cannot be accounted for by any shift of interest. It must mean his understanding of the term carried shades of meaning which ours does not have, and vice versa.

4) Thomistic *certitudo* does not fit into the same context as ours. St. Thomas does not group his *certitudo* with the different states of

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et de l'existence d' après Ibn Sīnā (Avicenne), p. 34, note 7" (*On Being and Essence*, trans. Armand A. Maurer, C.S.B. [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949], p. 28, note 8).

[9] *ST*, II-II, q. 4, a. 8 and q. 18, a. 4; *In III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4 ad 1. Cf. nn. 73-75.

[10] ". . . duplex est certitudo; scilicet cognitionis et ordinis" (*De Ver.*, VI, a. 3); ". . . inclinationis ad unum, non autem certitudo cognitionis" (*ibid.*, X, a. 10 ad 9); ". . . numerus praedestinatorum certus Deo dicitur, non solum ratione cognitionis . . . sed ratione electionis et definitionis cujusdam" (*ST*, I. q. 23, a. 7).

[11] *De Ver.*, X, a. 10 ad 9.

[12] Cf. nn. 105-15.

[13] ". . . virtutes morales certius arte . . ." (*ST*, II-II, q. 18, a. 4).

[14] ". . . certitudo adhaesionis . . . convenit virtutibus intellectualibus . . . " (*Quodlibet.* VI, a. 6).

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] ". . . qui est certitudo signata nomine fidei" (*ST*, II-II, q. 8, a. 8 ad 3).

[17] ". . . ipsa inclinationis naturae certitudo dicitur spes . . ." (*In III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4 ad 2).

mind, parallel to opinion and doubt. His is often a principle of direction in the movement of a cognitive faculty, an *alicujus rationis processus,*[18] or *argumentum,*[19] whose term may be the *certa cognitio* of *scientia.* Yet it can also be found in the *cogitatio* of opinion or the adhesion of faith: ". . . certitudo fidei dictur media inter certitudinem scientiae et opinionis."[20]

5) His syntax does not match ours. For him, knowledge arises *ex certitudine,*[21] *ex ratione certitudinis,*[22] *certitudine,*[23] *per,*[24] *secundum,*[25] and *propter certitudinem,*[26] *certitudinaliter.*[27] It often expresses a means or a manner of knowing. It is never used as the term of an argument. I have not found a single instance of an arrival *ad* or *in certitudinem,* as a state of mind, such as epistemologists have been looking for since the time of Descartes.[28]

6) Then, of course, there are his own explicit declarations that his *certitudo* is not to be confused with any knowledge of the object.[29] Indeed, he shows little patience with that erroneous opinion which would interpret the *certitudo* of hope as belonging to the intellect.

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[18]". . . cum scientia sit certitudinalis cognitio . . . "(*De Ver.,* XI, a. 1, ob. 17); ". . . per hujus rationis processum scientiae certitudo acquiritur" (*In I Post. Analyt.,* lect. 1).

[19]". . . argumentum enim importat certitudinem . . . " (*In III Sent.,* d. 23, q. 2, a. 1 ad 8); ". . . nomen scientiae importat quandam certitudinem judicii . . . " (*ST,* II-II, q. 9, a. 2).

[20]*In III Sent.,* d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 3 ad 1.

[21]*De Ver.,* XI, a. 1 ad 13.

[22]*In I Sent.,* d. 38, q. 1, a. 5.

[23]*De Ver.,* X, a. 10 ad 9.

[24]*ST,* I, q. 82, a. 2; *De Ver.,* XI, a. 1 ad 13 and *passim.*

[25]*ST,* I, q. 85, a. 6.

[26]*ST,* I, q. 22, a. 1 ad 1 and *passim.*

[27]*ST,* I-II, q. 40, a. 2 ad 3 and *passim.*

[28]I do not consider the phrase "quantum ad certitudinem" in *In III Sent.,* d. 14, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 2, or "pertinet ad certitudinem" in *ST,* I, q. 22, a. 4 ad 3, as implying a state of rest after motion. Further, the phrase "nondum ad veritatis certitudinem pertingens," in *Lib. Boethii de Trinitate,* proemii explan. (Parma XVII, 351), refers to the certainty of a proposition concerning the proper object of the human mind; it does not refer to certitude in the modern sense.

[29]". . . natura autem certius et directius pertingit ad unum finem quam ars; et per hunc modum dicitur quod virtus est certior arte [*B*]; non ut certius aliquis [*C*] in se percipiat virtutem quam artem" (*De Ver.,* X, a. 10 ad 9). ". . . certitudo spei et aliarum virtutum non est referenda ad cognitionem objecti vel principiorum, sed ad infallibilem [ex *A*] inclinationem in actu [in *B*]" (*De Spe,* a. 1 ad 10). Cf. the lack of appreciation of the articles of faith: ". . . sicut oculus noctuae ad lumen solis, non est propter incertitudinem rei sed propter debilitatem intellectus humanae" (*ST,* I, q. 1, a. 5 ad 1). Cf. also *De Ver.,* VI, a. 5 ad 2; *In III Sent.,* d. 23, q. 1, a. 2 ad 1 and d. 26, q. 2, a. 4 ad 5.

That explanation distinguished between an absolute, universal *certitudo* of faith—"as, that any good man will possess eternal life"—and a particular, conditioned *certitudo* of hope—"as, that this man, if he acts well, will possess eternal life. But this cannot stand . . . since, according to this interpretation . . . they would not be in different faculties: and this is entirely false."[30] This was strong language.

7) The etymological argument does not rate highly today. But St. Thomas used it. He claimed he was using it here. And it is his usage which we are trying to determine. The root, *krinein, kritēs,*[31] summons up a picture of a thresher, fan in hand, winnowing the chaff from his wheat. Applied to a mental separation, this root took on the connotation of a decision, a crisis, or a criterion, according to which some definite determination was decreed (*decernere, decrevi, decretum*). Nestor used it of the strategic plan of war determined upon after counsel—finality in the order of intention;[32] Odysseus, of those heroes who were most responsible for carrying out that plan in the war's outcome—finality in the order of execution.[33] Derivatives follow this analogy. *Certificare* (*certum facere*) meant to make something certain with definite set limits, to execute or to notarize a document,[34] to define a word;[35] *certiorari,* to be made determinate in one's own mind, to become informed. *Certus vir* was opposed to *homo quidam* as one definite certain individual to any substitute at all. St. Thomas defines his *certitudo* as a determination which makes some ordination of cause and effect definite or certain: ". . . the term *certitudo* was transferred from the order of cause to the effect."[36] This determination originates in the mind of the agent and is then communicated to the subject itself. It is this determination which (*propter quid*) makes the thing certain; that is, a certainty. We, on

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[30]". . . quidam dixerunt . . . certitudo fidei est in universali, sicut quod quilibet bonus habebit vitam aeternam, certitudo autem spei est in particulari, sicut quod iste, si bene facit, habebit vitam aeternam. . . . Sed hoc non potest stare; . . . unde secundum hoc spes a fide non differret secundum habitum, neque in alia potentia esset; quod omnino falsum est" (*In III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4).

[31]". . . on trouve aussi dans la 1. de l'Eglise *certifico,—as,* et les abstraits très tardifs *certitudo et certitas*" (A. Ernout et A. Meillet, *Dictionaire Étymologique de la Langue Latine* [Paris, 1939], under *cerno*).

[32]*Iliad* ii. 387.

[33]*Odyssey* xviii. 264.

[34]Cf. our "guarantee" from "warrant" and "*Warandia*" in Charles Du-Fresne Du Cange, *Glossarium Mediae et Infimae Latinitatis,* (Paris, 1840), under *certitudo.*

[35]Alexander Souter, *A Glossary of Later Latin* (Oxford, 1949).

[36]". . . ideo tractum est nomen certitudinis ab ordine causae ad effectum" (*De Ver.*, VI, a. 3).

the contrary, seem to have been calling a thing certain, not because of any ontological principle received from the author into the thing itself, but rather by reason of some mere extrinsic denomination; that is, a logical connection (*quia*). It serves me to make up my mind about it, to have "certitude" concerning it.

8) The root *cert-* brings out the notion of a determination in a cognitive faculty. The suffix *-itudo* expresses that determination as the relation of a *principium* to a *principiatum*. Tacked on to a verbal root implying motion, this termination carries the nuance of a real relation; that is, the *habitudo* of a cause to its effect, particularly in the language of the Fathers.[37] Thus, *aptitudo* indicates the inclination

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[37]The dental suffix *-tu* is an old supinal form with the force of an ablative of "the point of view from which." Examples of *-tudo* may be found without this note of a principle in their comprehension—for example, the substance *testudo*—but I have not found any *-itudo* without it. In classical Latin this termination seems to have been used chiefly in measurements; that is, the logical relation between the point of origin and some extrinsic term. Thus, *altitudo* was the distance up or down from sea level; *dulcitudo* in food was the principle of the *dulcedo* in the taste buds. Similarly, *latitudo, longitudo, amplitudo, magnitudo, plenitudo, multitudo* as numbered from one.

Once Christianity had introduced the concept of an all-providential God as the author of nature, we find this suffix becoming much more common. Only now it is charged with the real relation of final causality. The classical pagan culture could think down in the terms of efficient causality. The old Greeks had their patronymics *-dēs*, with its Latin counterpart *-itas*. This Christian *-itudo*, however, seems to have become its direct antithesis. It points up as the ontological principle or providential reason (*propter quid*) why the quality in *-itas, -ies* is such as it is. And it turned out to be as convenient a tool for pointing up this finality which runs all through nature, as that other tool they were discovering about this time, the zero for manipulating their numeration. Thus,

simplitudo (Barnab.)→simplicitas,
simplicitudo (saec.iv)→simplicitas,
asperitudo (ii - H.)——→asperitas,
levitudo (iv - H.)——→levitas,
rectitudo (Tert.)——→rectitas (iv?)
sanctitudo (Hier.)——→sanctitas
teneritudo (Hier.)——→teneritas
gravitudo (v)——→gravitas
habitudo (vi)——→habitas
certitudo (vi) Boet-OED, certitas (Meillet),
inquietudo (iii)——→inquies,
nigritudo (Aug.)——→nigrities,
pigritudo (Greg.)——→pigrities,
beatitudo (Serm.onMt.)
turpitudo (Hier.),
sollicitudo (iv),
dulcitudo (vi),
promptitudo (vi),
incertitudo (Greg.M.).
celsitudo (iv),
aptitudo (Boet.),
vicissitudo (vi),

in a faculty proper for the satisfaction of its appetite;[38] *gravitudo,* the tendency of a stone downwards;[39] *rectitudo,* the proportion or conformity of a movement for the norm of that movement;[40] *certitudo,* the principle of finality in a cognitive faculty which makes something definite or certain;[41] *promptitudo,* the ordination of the appetitive faculty to good;[42] *sanctitudo,* the ontological foundation for union with God;[43] *beatitudo,* the final determination of the whole man to happiness in the possession of God.[44] According to this analogy, when St. Thomas tells us, "*Certitudo* properly means the firmness of adhesion of a knowing power to its object,"[45] that is simply the

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The origins are from Souter's *Glossary* (save where noted), Ernout and Meillet's dictionary, OED, and Harpers' dictionary. Du Cange gives us the still later *ineptitudo, quietudo,* and *claritudo* as the cause of *claritas.* Compare the *infinitudo* (M or Mod L) in the potency of prime matter or the "continuum" with that of the pure act of *ipsa infinitas.*

I should be inclined to find fuller meanings for old classical forms in, for instance, *similitudo,* as the fundamental reason why an image is similar to its exemplar; *firmitudo* (that is, nailed to the floor) as the foundation for a thing's *firmitas* (that is, steadiness); *aegritudo* ("exhaustion") for *aegrities; severitudo* for *severitas. Amaritudo* is the root of bitterness; *fortitudo* makes a man brave; *pulchritudo* makes for beauty; *lassitudo* for weariness. *Solitudo* leaves a man alone, deserted. *Servitudo* reduces him to the condition of *servitus.* The *necessitudo* of blood relationship is responsible for many other kinds of *necessitas.* Our English "platitude" flattens out wit. *Gratitude* is the principle of disquietude within a man which makes him anxious to repay a favor; it is the correct attitude (from *aptitudo*) or "correctitude" of good manners. Debilitude, exactitude, decrepitude, are the principles or reasons for debility, exactness, and so on.

The point is this: If all the other late Latin uses of *-itudo* carry the connotation of a real relation or principle of operation, so too should *certitudo,* particularly in the terminology of one who claimed he was using it according to its etymological significance; that is, as a principle of finality.

[38] *ST,* I, q. 5, a. 3 ad 3.

[39] Souter.

[40] *ST,* I-II, q. 55, a. 4 ad 4.

[41] Cf. text for nn. 71-91.

[42] *In Isaiam,* cap. 40, ad finem.

[43] Souter.

[44] *ST,* I, q. 62. a. 1.

[45] *In III Sent.,* d. 26, q. 2, a. 4. In this article St. Thomas has just excluded the *certitudo spei* from the intellect of *B.* Cf. n. 30. Now he continues: "Et ideo aliter est dicendum, quod certitudo proprie dicitur firmitas adhaesionis virtutis cognitivae in suum cognoscibile [original determination for *B*]. Sed omnis operatio et motus . . ." Cf. text for n. 71. Interpreted in the light of what went before or what comes after, this sentence corresponds to our principle of finality. Lifted out of its context it could be understood as our act of certitude, the Thomistic *assensus.* Perhaps it caused trouble in his own day. At any rate, he leaves it out when he repeats the rest of the article in the *Summa.*

dynamic thrust in the cognitive faculty for its object, which is not quite the same thing as a state of rest or sensible feeling of security, freedom from the fear of error, consequent upon the exercise of that finality.

9) St. Thomas defines his *certitudo* in a number of other ways also. But in no place does he ever speak of it as anything which need be mistaken for a static attitude of mind. His etymological definition—"ab ordine causae ad effectum"[46]—just does not fit into our modern concept of certitude at all; neither does his ". . . *certitudo* implies a determination in regard to that of which *certitudo* is said."[47] That is the language of finality. Other expressions are commonly tried, much as you might try to squeeze a size eleven foot into a size seven shoe; but the foot is not comfortable; you cannot get up and walk around in it. And no modern epistemologist either has ever been able to make use of those definitions as they stand. We hope to be able to show that a final cause is also a *proprietas cognitivae virtutis*[48] considered as a principle. And it is a *determinatio intellectus ad unum*[49] considered in act. In the order of intention, the principle of that finality "implies a determination in regard to that of which *certitudo* is said," the term of that principle. In the order of execution, this ordination *ab ordine causae ad effectum* can be substituted for the word *certitudo* in some hundred texts, as it is in this paper with a much fuller and richer meaning than that of our English term "certitude" or "firm assent." And I do not know of any passage where this note of finality is absent.

10) If St. Thomas did not use the word *certitudo* to express a firm assent, what words, then, did he use? The first answer to that is easy: *firma assensio*.[50] A further answer is in order, however, to point out a threefold assumption implied in that query. In the first place, St. Thomas did not need our distinction between a firm and an "infirm" assent. That distinction is based on a subjective attitude of mind specified by the sensible feeling of fear.[51] St. Thomas had already made a much more valuable distinction based on an objective

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[46] *De Ver.*, VI, a. 3.

[47] ". . . certitudo autem importat determinationem respectu eius ad quod dicitur certitudo" (*In III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 1.

[48] *ST*, I-II, q. 40, a. 2, ob. 3.

[49] *In III Sent.*, d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 3.

[50] *ST*, II-II, q. 2, a. 1.

[51] "Talis status certitudinis nota specifica est sola *firmitas* seu exclusio formidinis errandi" (Paul Geny, S.J., *Critica* [Rome, 1927], p. 61).

liability to error. "No intellectual virtue is liable to error."[52] And that was the only kind of knowledge or *scientia* which St. Thomas considered worthy of the name. A mere intellectual habit, such as opinion, lacks this essential ordination to the good of the faculty. And that is why it is an imperfection to be avoided even when true.[53] Further, St. Thomas does not make this distinction between a firm and an infirm assent which we take for granted today.[54] He did not recognize any "infirm assent"; that is, an assent properly so called which was not firm. Every Thomistic assent, true or false, included a *firmitas adhœsionis*— ". . . assent implies *certitudo* and determination";[55] ". . . hence, one who expresses an opinion does not assent."[56] Thirdly, St. Thomas knew what a "determinata acceptio alterius partis contradictionis" was. Only he did not call it *certitudo;* he called it *assensus.*[57] Our "certitude" goes beyond his *certitudo.* His *certitudo* was only a principle of direction in the movement of the intellect, it was not the movement itself. The actual movement or determination of the intellect to its object is the *assensus* in the Thomistic terminology.[58] Hence, rather than translating his

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[52]"Nulla virtus perficiens intellectum se habet ad falsum, secundum quod est malum intellectus . . . ergo ei non potest subesse falsum" (*ST*, II-II, q. 1, a. 3, sed contra). One of the symptoms of the difference between St. Thomas's position and our own is our utter neglect of his intellectual habits and virtues. We have not felt the need for them because we have been using a substitute, our modern certitude as opposed to opinion.

[53]". . . ex quo patet non solum in eo [Adamo] nulla falsa opinio fuisset, sed penitus nulla opinio in eo fuisset" (*De Ver.*, XVIII, a. 6 ad finem).

[54]*In III Sent.*, d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 1. What is the textual evidence for an "infirm" assent? Towards the end of that same article there occurs this: "Opinans autem habet cogitationem sine assensu perfecto; sed habet aliquid assensus, inquantum adhaeret uni magis quam alii. Dubitans nihil habet de assensu." I would translate thus: "The man who has an opinion has a movement of the intellect without the perfection of an assent. He may be said to partake of the determination of an assent insomuch as he adheres to one alternative more than to the other, whereas the man in doubt does not even do that." In view of St. Thomas's explicit denials in the same context, as well as in parallel passages, I do not think we should infer more than is strictly implied. The adjectives "firm" and "perfect" in his description of *assensus* do not necessarily imply any infirm assent—any more than *terra firma et arida* would imply the existence of some land which was not dry land and solid. Cf. *De Ver.*, XIV, a. 1 and ad 3.

[55]". . . assensus certitudinem et determinationem importat" (*In III Sent.*, d. 25, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 1).

[56]". . . et ideo opinans non assentit" (*ibid.*, d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 1).

[57]*Ibid.*

[58]*Ibid.*

certitudo by our "firm assent," I think we should do better to look for our "act of certitude" in his *assensus*.[59]

11) There are a few more ramifications which should be indicated here while we are thinking the problem through, even though they may be more controversial in themselves than probative at this stage. Personally, I am convinced that the notion of finality was dominant in the term *certitudo* even from its earliest emergence in Boethius's sixth-century rendering of Aristotle.[60] That would lend meaning to the thousand-year controversy over Pope St. Gregory the Great's expression, "the *certitudo* of hope."[61] And it would also imply that this fuller, richer meaning was the original etymological background for the word which St. Thomas took for granted. This would clear him of any insinuation of putting a cabala in accepted terminology. For, after all, what other Latin word did he have to express our notion of final causality from the point of view of the author or agent?[62] Or are we going to deny him that elementary distinction in Latin which we ourselves find indispensable in English—that is, certitude as opposed to certainty?[63] But we must not let these corollaries or scholia lure us away from the main *status questionis;* no, nor any general dissatisfaction with modern epistemology as un-Thomistic.[64] That is not the immediate issue. Our concern here is *certitudo* in St. Thomas, and we must not attempt to prove too much.

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[59]The Pauline equivalent to this Thomistic *assensus* is *argumentum* (Heb. 11:1). ". . . ipsa firma adhaesio intellectus . . . vocatur hic argumentum, unde alia litera habet convictio" (*ST*, II-II, q. 4, a. 1).

[60]*PL*, LXIV, 740 and 760. See Note on the Aristotelian *certitudo* at the end of this article.

[61]*PL*, LXXV, 742. 24 (191).

[62]Certainly not *finalitas*. Cf. "finalité — etym. Lat. *finalitatem* (qui ne signifie que desinence, terminaison)" (É. Littré, *Dictionaire de la Langue Française* [Paris: Hachette, 1873]). Cf. also OED: "1859 DARWIN in *Life & Lett.* (1887) II. 247, 'On the contrary he [Naudin] brings in his principle of finality'." My authority for the correct Latinity in the use of *certitudo* as an expression for a principle of final causality viewed from the vantage point of the author in the order of intention is the Rev. Anthony M. Guenther, S.J.

[63]The standard translation by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province uses both words to translate *certitudo*. Thus, "lapis certitudinaliter tendit deorsum" (*ST*, I-II, q. 40, a. 2 ad 3) is rendered "a stone is certain to tend downwards." I would ask, With certainty from whom? *A?* Or "certitude" for whom? *C?* I should prefer "a stone tends downward according to the finality implanted in it by the author of its nature."

[64]Cf. Louis-Marie Régis, O.P., *St. Thomas and Epistemology* "Aquinas Lecture," 1946 (Milwaukee, Marquette Univ. Press). Also his "La Critique neo-Thomiste est-elle Thomiste?" *Etudes et Recherches, Philosophie*, Cahier II, (Ottawa, 1938), now, unfortunately, out of print.

12) Lastly, there is the undeniable fact that while St. Thomas was well acquainted with the epistemological problem,[65] our giant fits very awkwardly into the debate. A moderator might suspect his use of terms. The history of language is full of examples of words which have lost old connotations only to acquire new ones down through the centuries. The pregnant Thomistic concept of *amor* is scarcely conveyed adequately in our cheap Hollywood version of *l'amour;* neither is *finis* correctly taken to mean a terminal end product with all of its finality left out. The same thing happened to *certitudo,* I believe. Only in this case, it left just enough protective coloring to let our "certitude" pose as a valid substitute and thus muddle up St. Thomas's whole presentation of the validity of knowledge.

Hence, even if we could not discover any positive interpretation or key which would unlock all of the Thomistic uses of the word with a consistent meaning, I think we should still have grounds for believing his usage was not the same as ours. The principle of direction in the movement of a faculty is not the movement itself or any sensible redundance consequent upon the term of that movement. These formally distinct aspects are enough to inject a fourth term in any syllogism. And that is enough to imply that we are not in full possession of St. Thomas's authentic thought on this subject.

II

CERTITUDO IS A PRINCIPLE OF FINALITY

The Thomistic concept of finality begins in the mind of God, the prime mover and supreme architect. Unlike modern philosophers, St. Thomas had no inhibitions about bringing in the name of God. He does not attempt to prove that "whatever acts, acts for an end" is an analytical principle without tracing the comprehension of "action" back to the note of a prime mover who also happens to be an intelligent prime mover.[66]

And he does not scruple to call this separate intelligence by its proper name, our own personal, all-provident God. He does not spell nature with a capital *N*. Aristotle had formulated a comparison

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[65]"Opinio namque quorumdam erat quod nulla veritas alicujus rei haberi posset ab homine: et ex hac derivata est heresis Academicorum dicentium, nihil pro certo scire posse in vita ista" (*In Joann.*, cap. 4, lect. 4, medio) "Si autem nihil concedit, non potest cum eo disputare, potest tamen solvere rationes ipsius" (*ST*, I, q. 1, a. 8).

[66]"Postquam Philosophus ostendit qualiter primum movens est intelligens et intelligibile, hic intendit inquirere qualiter primum movens sit bonum et appetibile" (*In XII Metaphys.*, lect. 12, initio).

between nature and art in their common quest for an end, "natura certior arte."[67] But then, Aristotle had never succeeded in detaching this first intelligence in the final cause from his formal cause of nature itself, his hypothetical world soul.[68] St. Thomas turns this comparison around completely. Thomistic art is not restricted to imitating nature in part and to perfecting nature in part.[69] That is because his nature is just one other form of art, the divine art communicating an intrinsic determination to the nature of his creatures, *indita rebus,* whereas human art must needs be content with a mere extrinsic modification of their accidents.[70]

The Thomistic *Weltanschauung* is God-centered. That is St. Thomas's distinctive vantage point. It orients his perspective of final causality just as it does of everything else. God is his primary analogue in being, truth, goodness, life, wisdom, love, infallibility, law, order, beauty. And God is his primary analogue in the concept of *certitudo,* too, which we shall try to trace here, first through a vertical analogy in the terms of final causality.

THE VERTICAL ANALOGY

The primary analogue in the Thomistic concept of *certitudo* is an ordinance of the practical intellect in a prime mover, determining something to be fixed, definite, set, or certain. This is St. Thomas's "primary," "principal," and "essential" CERTITUDO[71] which communicates a "participated share" of this determination to the subject or secondary analogue "by way of likeness." It is this directing cognition, preceding cognition, or determination of the practical intellect in making something else certain which is his original CERTITUDO.

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[67] *Nicomachean Ethics* 1106b9.

[68] *Metaphysics* 1044a5; *Physics* 198a3.

[69] *Physics* 199a5.

[70] "In nullo enim alio natura ab arte videtur differre, nisi quia natura est principium intrinsecum, et ars est principium extrinsecum. Si enim ars factiva navis esset intrinseca ligno, facta fuisset navis a natura, sicut modo fit ab arte . . . natura nihil est aliud quam ratio cujusdam artis, scilicet divinae, indita rebus, qua ipsae res moventur ad finem determinatum" (*In II Phys.*, lect. 14 ad finem).

[71] CERTITUDO, upper case, refers to the primary analogue; *certitudo,* lower case, to the secondary. The practical intellect differs from the will as the principle directing a motion, e.g., steering gear, differs from the principle of the motion itself, e.g., motor. "Intellectus practicus est motivus non quasi exsequens motum, sed quasi dirigens ad motum" (*ST*, I, q. 79, a. 11 ad 1).

> Every activity and movement of anything tending to an end arises from a directing knowledge [in *A*] which is
> either joined, as in agents which act through will,
> or removed, as in agents which act through nature.
> But because it would not determinately tend to its end unless it were ordered to it by some preceding knowledge, hence it is that the work of nature is like a work of art, inasmuch as it tends to its end by determinate means, which tendency flows from the determination of
> divine wisdom [*A*]
> establishing nature [*B*],
> and consequently terms which pertain to knowledge [in *A*] are transferred to natural activities; as we say, for example, that nature [*B*] acts wisely and infallibly; and in this sense we also speak of certitude [ordination] in nature [*B*] which tends to an end.[72]

St. Thomas places his CERTITUDO as a principle of finality

{ primarily (*primo*) / principally (*principaliter*) / essentially (*essentialiter*) } in an ordination of the practical intellect **A** in the agent { architect / artisan / author of nature }

the primary analogue (+) *ex parte causae* (—) in the order of intention
the secondary analogue — *ex parte subjecti* — in the order of execution

{ secondarily (*secundarie*) as an ordination of means to end (*ab ordine causae ad effectum*) / by way of communication (*participative*) *in omnibus operibus* { *naturae* / *virtutis* / *artis* } / by way of likeness (*per similitudinem*) }

a sagittante ——— *sagitta tendit* ——→ *in finem* ——→
(+) **B** ———*lapis certitudinaliter tendit deorsum*———→ } **C** (—)
———*ignis habet certitudinem absolutam calefaciendi*→

ontological principle (*propter quid*) ←—— vs. ——→ logical reason (*quia*)

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[72] "Omnis operatio et motus cujuscumque tendentis in finem est ex cognitione dirigente [in *A*]vel conjuncta sicut in agentibus per voluntatem, vel remota sicut in agentibus per naturam. Quia vero non tenderet determinate in finem suum nisi ab aliqua cognitione praecedente in ipsum ordinaretur, inde est quod opus naturae est simile operi artis, inquantum per determinata media tendit in suum finem. Et hoc habet ex determinatione divinae sapientiae [*A*] instituentis naturam [*B*]; et ideo nomina quae ad cognitionem [in *A*] pertinent ad naturales operationes transferuntur; sicut dicitur quod natura [*B*] sagaciter operatur et infallibiliter: et sic etiam dicitur *certitudo* [ordination] in natura [*B*] tendente in finem" (*In III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4).

> . . . certitude can be considered in two ways; in one way, from the cause of certitude [*A*] . . . in another way, certitude can be considered from the side of the subject [*B*].[73]
> . . . certitude is found in something in two ways, that is, essentially and by participation; it is found essentially in the knowing power [*A*], but by participation in everything [*B*] which is moved infallibly to its end by a knowing power.[74]
> . . . certitude is primarily and principally in knowledge [*A*]; but by likeness and by participation it is found in all the works [*B*] of nature and virtue.[75]

What makes a thing certain? "You might just as well call a thing, *B*, certain because you, *C*, have made up your mind about it as to make up your mind, *C*, about it because, you say, it, *B*, is certain." That might be the philosophy of a Victorian March Hare, but it badly confuses the ontological principle (*propter quid*) with a logical reason (*quia*).

St. Thomas was six hundred years removed from Wonderland. For him, it was *certitudo* which made a thing certain, not vice versa. The real question is, Just where is this *certitudo*? In *A* or in *C*? And what is it? In St. Thomas it is the primary CERTITUDO in *A* which is the ontological principle (*propter quid*) for the certainty in the nature of *B*, which, on a second bounce, might serve as the extrinsic determination for some other *certitudo* or direction of the movement in an intellect, *C*, to its proper term. This certitudo in *C*, some chance passer-by, might serve as a logical reason (*quia*) why I should happen to call *B* certain; but it is in no way the ontological principle, *A*, which makes it so. Indeed, it is no more than the extrinsic denomination of a rebound.

I might call a house firm because I am not able to shake it by shifting my weight. That is a logical reason (*quia*). But the real ontological principle (*propter quid*) why the house is firm is the fact that it is made of heavy stone set in correct alignment, all mortared together and anchored in steel and concrete. An engagement or appointment might be called "certain" by extrinsic denomination because I am confident that it is going to be kept. But the

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[73] ". . . certitudo potest considerari dupliciter; uno modo ex causa certitudinis [*A*]: . . . alio modo potest considerari certitudo ex parte subjecti [*B*]" (*ST*, II-II, q. 4, a. 8).

[74] ". . . certitudo invenitur in aliquo dupliciter; scilicet: essentialiter et participative: essentialiter quidem invenitur in vi cognoscitiva [*A*]; participative autem in omni eo [*B*], quod a vi cognoscitiva movetur infallibiliter ad finem suum" (*ibid.*, q. 18, a. 4).

[75] ". . . certitudo primo et principaliter est in cognitione [*A*]: sed per similitudinem et participative est in omnibus operibus [*B*] naturae et virtutis" (*In III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4 ad 1).

real reason why it is a certain engagement is that someone else and I made it fixed, definite, set, and certain. We set it down on paper in detail; that is, we executed a document or notarized it. The only thing "uncertain" about the weather is our prediction of it.

> . . . *certitudo* is attributed to the movement,
> not only of the sensible appetite,
> but also of the natural appetite;
> as it is said that the stone certitudinally tends downward;
> and this is because of the infallibility which it [*B*] has
> from the *certitudo* of the knowledge [in *A*] which precedes
> the movement of the sensitive appetite
> or even of the natural appetite.[76]

It is not only CERTITUDO which belongs essentially in *A*, the primary analogue, and only secondarily in *B* by way of participation or likeness. In these same passages St. Thomas tells us that names in general which belong, properly speaking, to the practical intellect of the artisan are transferred to the artifacts themselves.[77] The law of gravity is a "wise" law. It works "infallibly" for the same reason that it is "certain" to pull down, whereas fire mounts up. That is not because I like it and think it wise, nor because I am any infallible judge of natural laws, nor because I may happen to be fully confident that it will operate inevitably on schedule. It is rather because of the divine wisdom (*ex determinatione divinae sapientiae*) which is wise and infallible, and has determined upon its *certitudo* ahead of time (*tendente in finem*). The appreciation of Greenwich Village might characterize an *objet d'art* as "arty" (*quia*). It is the touch of the master himself which makes it artistic (*propter quid*). It is the infallible governance or providence in *A* which imparts the definite inevitability in the government of secondary causes and effects. We have been transferring this notion of infallibility from *A*, the author, to *B*, the motive, and thence to *C*, the human intellect which happens to recognize the consequent consistency.

St. Thomas maintains this perspective of *A*, the primary analogue, consistently all through his exposition of reality. The very name "certitudo" is derived from the priority of the terms determined upon as certain in the mind of the first cause. And even though

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[76]". . . certitudo attribuitur motui non solum appetitus sensitivi sed etiam appetitus naturalis: sicut quod dicitur lapis certitudinaliter tendit deorsum et hoc propter infallibilitatem quam [*B*] habet ex certitudine cognitionis [in *A*] quae praecedit motum appetitus sensitivi vel etiam naturalis" (*ST*, I-II, q. 40, a. 2 ad 3).

[77]*Ibid.* Cf. *In III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 1, quoted in n. 72.

no creative act were to actuate any essence at all with its efficient causality, the pure act of being itself would still be the ultimate foundation for all the definite dimensions in the forms of possible being in all their mutual relationships. ". . . by the form is signified the perfection or *certitudo* of every thing";[78] ". . . proportion is the *certitudo* of the measuring of two quantities of the same kind."[79] We can have *certitudo* without a term.

The term of the simple divine intelligence includes all these possible forms and formalities articulated in the *Verbum,* as mathematically precise in all their dimensions as the lines of a spectrum.[80] The object of the divine vision (*certitudo cognitionis*) includes the recognition of the actual order of being in its exemplary ideas, the term of the order, even though the real relation of the order itself (*certitudo ordinis*) is left out (*exclusa causalitate*). It is the object of the divine cognition which has been made certain by this *certitudo.* And this is prior in nature at least to the *certitudo* of the divine knowledge itself; that is, in the speculative intellect. This *certitudo* is in the thing known (*in scito*), not in the mere knowledge of it.

> . . . since science is a certain knowledge, it requires, by reason of this *certitudo, even apart from causality,* a *certitudo* and determination *in the thing known* which are excluded by contingence. This is evident in our science which is not the cause of things, and in the science God has of evil. . . . It is necessary that there be some *certitudo in the thing known* in order that science be certain.[81]
>
> . . . the *certitudo* of the divine foreknowledge does not exclude the contingence of future singulars, because it bears on them inasmuch as they are present and already *determined to one.*[82]

Once we emerge from the formal causality or *rationes* of the essences into the motion received from efficient causality flowing into real being, this *determinatio ad unum* is implied in every movement from the prime mover as well as in those of all its secondary causes and

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[78] *De Ente,* cap. 1, quoted above; cf. n. 8.

[79] ". . . proportio est certitudo mensurationis duarum quantitatum eiusdem generis" (*In II Sent.,* d. 24, q. 3, a. 6 ad 3).

[80] *ST,* I, q. 34, a. 3.

[81] ". . . cum scientia sit certa cognitio, ex ipsa ratione certitudinis etiam exclusa causalitate requirit certitudinem et determinationem in scito quam contingentia excludit; ut patet in scientia nostra quae non est causa rerum et in scientia Dei respectu malorum . . . oportet enim invenire ad hoc quod sit certa scientia aliquam certitudinem in scito" (*In I Sent.,* d. 38, q. 1, a. 5); cf. *De Ver.,* VI, a. 3.

[82] ". . . certitudo divinae praescientiae non excludit contingentiam singularium futurorum; quia fertur in ea, secundum quod sunt praesentia, et jam *determinata ad unum*" (*ST,* II-II. q. 171, a. 6 ad 1).

effects. The divine vision of approbation, insomuch as it is the cause of things (*mediante voluntate*) includes this CERTITUDO in its exemplary ideas;[83] so does the eternal law, which is the "ipsa ratio gubernationis rerum in Deo, sicut in principe universitatis existens."[84] CERTITUDO in the divine providence is given a whole chapter in the *Summa Contra Gentiles;*[85] the CERTITUDO in predestination, a full article every time the subject comes up.[86]

Notice, the correct terminology here is "utrum praedestinatio certitudinem habeat?" It is not a question of whether I am certain, or whether God is certain, but whether the abstract concept *praedestinatio* includes the note *certitudo cognitionis* in its comprehension just as the divine foreknowledge does, plus the added note *certitudo ordinis,* the real relation of cause to effect,[87] and just as the concept *certitudo* itself commonly includes the note of "counsel" when found in human knowledge.[88]

It is this primary CERTITUDO in the order of intention which is chiefly responsible for the degrees of *certitudo* in the order of execution. This CERTITUDO *cognitionis* of the practical intellect never fails (*numquam deficit*). The archer always means well; he always intends to hit the target. It is the *certitudo* in the order of execution which varies. First of all, according to its cause, "a *certitudo* is greater, the more powerful the influence that causes the determination."[89] It makes a difference whether the agent is God, some master craftsman, or some arrant bungler. Secondly, according to the disposition of the subject,

> . . . nothing prevents that which is more certain according to its nature from being less certain as far as we are concerned,

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[83]*Ibid.* Cf. "Contingens enim certitudini cognitionis non repugnat nisi secundum quod futurum est, non autem secundum quod praesens est contingens" (*CG*, I, cap. 67); ". . . scientia approbationis" (*ST*, I, q. 14, a. 8).

[84]*ST*, I-II, q. 91, a. 1. ". . . lex, cum sit regula, et mensura, dupliciter potest esse in aliquo: uno modo sicut in regulante, et mensurante: alio modo sicut in *regulato* et *mensurato*: quia inquantum participat aliquid de regula, vel mensura, sic regulatur, vel mensuratur" (*ibid.*, a. 2).

[85]*CG*, III, cap. 94.

[86]*ST*, I, q. 23, a. 7; *In I Sent.*, d. 40, q. 3; *De Ver.*, VI, a. 4.

[87]*Ibid.*

[88]". . . ipsa ratio rerum agendarum consilium in Deo dicitur, non propter inquisitionem, sed propter certitudinem cognitionis, ad quam consiliantes inquirendo perveniunt" (*ST*, I, q. 22, a. 1 ad 1). Yet, not necessarily, ". . . unde in pluribus artibus [e.g., of writing] non est consilium propter certitudinem" (*ST*, II-II, q. 49, a. 5 ad 2).

[89]"Tanto autem maior est certitudo, quanto est fortius quod determinationem causat" (*In III Sent.*, d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 3). Cf. *De Ver.*, XIV, a. 1 ad 7.

because of the weakness of our intellect, which in the face of the most manifest things in reality is like the eye of the owl to the light of the sun.[90]

Thirdly, according to the relative importance of the subject's proximate end in the mind of *A*. Lesser ends are sacrificed to greater for the good of the whole.

. . . therefore
the CERTITUDO of knowledge
[in *A* which is from itself] *never fails,*
but the *certitudo* of nature [in *B*] does fail, not of itself,
but incidentally,
because such failure is not from that which directs to the end,
from which [God] it has *certitudo,* but from some accident;
as fire has the absolute *certitudo* of heating,
and yet sometimes fails because of some impediment.
The same solution applies to hope.[91]

- CERTITUDO *cognitionis* (in *A*, God or man) numquam deficit
  (order of intention)
- *certitudo* (order of execution)
  - *artis* (human varies with (1) the skill of artist, (2) the quality of the instrument, (3) priority in care and ends
  - *virtutis* receives its direction from a human intellect (second nature) and does not depend upon external tools
  - *naturae* (from God) partakes of His infallibility, wisdom, and so on
    - *per se* — *numquam deficit*
    - *per accidens* — *quandoque deficit* (for a higher end)

(Proximate ends are not unconditionally guaranteed in the order of execution, neither fire to burn, nor hope to glory.)

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[90] ". . . nihil prohibet id, quod est certius secundum naturam, esse quoad nos minus certum propter debilitatem intellectus nostri, qui se habet ad manifestissima naturae, sicut oculus noctuae ad lumen solis" (*ST*, I, q. 1, a. 5). Cf. *In I Ethic.*, lect. 3.

[91] ". . . et ideo CERTITUDO cognitionis [in *A* quae est ex seipsa] numquam deficit sed certitudo naturae [in *B*] deficit quidem non per se sed per accidens, quia talis defectus non est ex ipso directivo in finem, ex quo [Deo] habet certitudinem, sed ex aliquo accidente; sicut ignis habet certitudinem absolutam calefaciendi et tamen deficit quandoque ex aliquo impedimento. Et similiter est de spe. . ." (*In III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4 ad 2).



The Thomistic concept of finality might be represented by a triangle, which takes its origin in a first cause, *A*, at the apex. That is the essential CERTITUDO or primary analogue, first in the order of intention, prior to any creative act at all. It proceeds down the left arm of the triangle with the vertical thrust proper to Thomistic thought. There it turns left into *B* and continues horizontally along the base of secondary causes, marked out in the order of execution by Aristotle's comparison of nature and art. Then it turns left again and goes up the right arm to God, our last end, in the accepted Christian concepts of providence and predestination.

THE HORIZONTAL ANALOGY

The vertical analogy of attribution is the more fundamental, the horizontal analogy of proportion is the more common and much the more complicated. The vantage point which dominated our view of the vertical analogy was the primary or essential CERTITUDO in *A*. Here it will be a horizontal perspective ranging through all the movements of nature, of virtue, and of art. And just as that primary CERTITUDO is supposed in the terms "creation," "law," "providence," "predestination," so, too, this secondary *certitudo* is implied in inclination, tendency, ordination, fate, directing principle, determination, appetite, and so on, in the actual government of things according to their natures.

Certitudo artis is the simplest variety. The archer communicates the original CERTITUDO or finality of his aim to the arrow itself by means of the bow. This participated *certitudo* is the determination in the direction of the flight of that arrow. It is not an intrinsic determination such as the stone or a bird might have. But it is, nonetheless, a real ontological principle riding high like some witch or gremlin on the back of the arrow itself, steering its motion and guiding it to its target. The primary CERTITUDO *cognitionis* never fails in the order of intention. The archer always intends to hit the target. It is his secondary *certitudo ordinis,* his finality in execution, which is fallible. That depends upon the technique of the archer (the cause), the deficiencies in the material (poor materials in the bow and arrow), and the nonintervention of some higher end (shield).[92]

Certitudo naturae is merely one instance of the *certitudo* of the divine art. The determination which God imposes, however, is intrinsic to the nature itself, *indita rebus,* whereas the determination which the human archer or clockmaker imposes never gets beyond an extrinsic modification of their accidents. If a ship were built according to nature it would grow up like a tree from within.[93] Since God is *A,* the author of nature, it is obvious the *certitudo naturae* in a stone to tend downwards will be infallible, not only in the mind of God, as it is for every agent, but also in the order of execution as well, per se; it will be infallible, that is, so long as some higher end—for instance, my hand—does not intervene, per accidens. ". . . as the fire has the absolute *certitudo* of heating, and yet sometimes fails because of some impediment. The same solution applies to hope."[94]

> . . . *Nature* acts certitudinally [according to its finality], as moved by the divine intellect which certitudinally moves everything to its end. In this way also, the moral *virtues* are said to act more certainly than *art,* inasmuch as they are moved *by reason* to their acts after the manner of a nature. In this way also, hope *certitudinally tends to its end,* as participating the *certitudo* of faith which is in knowledge.[95]

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[92] *Ibid.*

[93] *In II Physic.*, lect. 14 ad finem, quoted in n. 70.

[94] ". . . sicut ignis habet certitudinem absolutam calefaciendi, et tamen deficit quandoque ex aliquo impedimento. Et similiter est de spe" (*In III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4 ad 2).

[95] ". . . natura certitudinaliter [according to its finality] operatur, tanquam mota ab intellectu divino certitudinaliter movente unumquodque ad suum finem. Et per hunc etiam modum virtutes morales certius arte dicuntur operari, inquantum per modum naturae moventur a ratione ad suos actus. Et sic etiam spes certitudinaliter tendit in suum finem quasi

This *certitudo* of nature and of art is comparatively easy to follow. It is a simple quality or real relation directing the movement of a fully active power—downwards in the case of the stone, upwards in the case of the fire, targetwise in the case of the arrow, clockwise in the case of the clock. These are all instances of a simple, single polarity. (—) is attracted to (+). Remove the obstacles and the needle will point to the north; open the eyes to the light and see the shape of things in the terms of color. All these are single principles of finality which may be frustrated only in their immediate ends.[96]

Certitudo virtutis, however, is that of a passive potency.[97] God respects the work of His own hands. He draws all thing to their appointed ends sweetly, according to their natures. He has entrusted to man a limited share of self-determination, whence comes the need for passive potencies with their dispositions, habits (second natures), virtues, and supernatural gifts, and whence also comes the place for several new varieties of *certitudo* operating in the same subject.

Father Walter M. Conlon, O.P., has called attention to this multiple *certitudo* operating in a noncognitive faculty in an example taken from St. Thomas's own teacher, St. Albert the Great.

> If fire is joined to the cause which generated it and which gives the motion or movement which follows the form, it will rise in a more certain manner, because then its motion or movement would follow its proper form and also the impulse of that which generated the fire.[98]

A more pointed example, I believe, would be that of a ship heading out to sea, taking advantage of the current or tide (certitude *a*), the wind (certitude *b*), an auxiliary engine with its rudder (certitude *c*), plus its tugs (certitude *d*). Or that of a rocket launched with all the apparatus of a piece of artillery (certitude *a*) and sustained in its aim with the electronic gadgets of a guided missile (certitude *b*), plus the radar which happens to be guiding it to its goal as to a magnet (certitude *c*).

Notice, in these examples there are not many *certitudines.* There is only one definite goal. But there may be several disparate principles of motion to that goal. The different sources of power correspond to the appetitive faculties. The determination of the direction of the movement is the function of the practical intellect. Just as the

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participans certitudinem a fide quae est in vi cogniscitiva" (*ST,* II-II, q. 18, a. 4).

[96] *In III Sent.,* d. 23, q. 1, a. 1.

[97] ". . . intellectus possibilis qui de se est indeterminatus, sicut materia prima, habitu indiget quo participet rectitudinem suae regulae" (*ibid.*).

[98] "The Certitude of Hope," *Thomist,* X (1947), 116.

motion itself must have some power for its principle, so, too, the direction of that movement must have some principle or directive force whence the term of that movement is made certain or definite. Otherwise there could not be any movement at all, since, without some determination of its term, its motion could never get started. But this *certitudo inclinationis* in an appetitive faculty need not be conscious, any more than that of the stone—for example, the Freudian libido, Adler's inferiority complex, the theological virtue of hope in the newly baptized infant.[98a]



[98a] A remark made by Father Henri Renard in his *The Philosophy of God* (Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1951) is pertinent here. "Let us repeat once more," he writes, "that a *natural* appetite, a natural desire, need not result from the *known* good. It is merely the inclination of a nature to its end. (Cf. *De Malo*, V, 3; *S.Th.*, I. 62, 2; *In II Sent.*, dist. 33, q. 2, a. 2)" (p. 151, n. 58).

Starting from the bottom of this diagram, St. Thomas distinguishes a threefold *certitudo* in the theological virtue of hope.

> . . . therefore the *certitudo* of hope is caused
> by the divine liberality ordering us to the end, (1)
> and also by the inclination of all the other virtues, (2)
> and also by the inclination of the habit itself. (3)
> And therefore, in addition to the *certitudo* which hope has as a [virtue, (3)
> it includes the *certitudo* which is in all the other virtues, (2)
> and also the *certitudo* of the divine ordination.[99] (1)

St. Thomas does not hesitate to compare these different kinds of *certitudo spei* in the sinner who is predestined to eternal life and in the *praescitus* who is now in the state of grace. The *certitudo* or inclination of the habit itself—No. 3a—is greater in the *praescitus* who is now in the state of grace, since it is a formed virtue rather than a mere habit lacking in the form of charity. Yet, with regard to the *certitudo* or inclination which comes from the ordination of God—No. la—and the consequent merits *in proposito,* that *certitudo* or inclination is equal in both.[100]

That is, it is equal in both at this particular moment of the movement. For besides this manifold *certitudo* or distinct principles of direction, each single principle may be distinguished according to the particular moment of its movement, all the way from its origin in the potency, through (*a*) the inclination it receives from habit, (*b*) the definition of its operation, and (*c*) the acquisition of its term or event. Father Ramirez drew this distinction directly from St. Thomas's doctrine on habits.[101] And Father Conlon, O.P., expresses it appositely here:

> In this way we attribute to hope the certainty of nature, since every habit implies a disposition in relation to a thing's nature, and to its operation [b] and end[c]. It should be noted here that this determination of act to end does not imply the act of attaining the end itself [c]. Thus, it could happen that, although the determination [a] existed, the end[c] would not be attained. It might be impeded accidentally by an ex-

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[99]". . . ideo certitudo spei causatur ex liberalitate divina ordinante nos in finem et etiam ex inclinatione omnium aliarum virtutum, et etiam ex inclinatione ipsius habitus: et ideo praeter certitudinem quam habet ut quaedam virtus includit certitudinem quae est in omnibus aliis virtutibus, et ulterius certitudinem divinae ordinationis" (*In III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4).

[100]*Ibid.*, ad finem.

[101]Cf. Fr. Conlon, pp. 228-29, nn. 61 and 63 for references to Fr. Ramirez, "De Certitudine Spei," *La Ciencia Tomista* (Sept. 1938), p. 195.

> trinsic force. In this way St. Thomas has definitely destroyed the force of the objection which denies the certitude of hope [a] because some fail to attain that end [c]. This attainment of the end [c], in fact, is in no way included in the order of act to end [a]. That [c] is the certitude of event while this [a] is the certitude of order. This certitude of hope, then, refers to the determination towards the end [a].[102]

"Hope", St. Thomas tells us, "is the very *certitudo* of inclination in our nature" (*unde ipsa inclinationis naturae certitudo dicitur spes*).[103] It is not the *certitudo* of the operation, much less of the event itself. We may have the first without the second or the third. Few stones will ever reach the final term of their inclination; that is, the center of the earth. That I am hungry is no guarantee that I am going to be fed.

The *certitudo cognitionis* in the speculative intellect is just one more example of a *certitudo naturae*. Only, it is a second nature example; that is, a virtue. And hence it is a multiple *certitudo* which may be distinguished in the dimensions of breadth as well as in those of length and depth, not unlike hope. The *certitudo* of hope was the principle of direction in the movement of an appetitive faculty. The *certitudo* of the speculative intellect is the principle of direction in the movement of an intentional faculty assimilating its object to itself. Hence it presupposes its term.

St. Thomas distinguishes three different sources in human cognition.

> . . . for intellectual knowledge three things are required, namely, the power of intellect [No. 1], the light by which it understands [No. 2(-)], and the similitude of the thing by which the knowledge of the thing is determined [No. 3(+)]; and according to these three things one knowledge can be greater than another in three ways. First [*a*], with regard to the efficacy of knowing, or the CERTITUDO of knowledge, or the clarity—which is the same thing—which follows from the light itself.[104]

Then he distinguishes some dozen varieties of this *certitudo inclinationis*, (a), according to their objects:

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[102]Cf. Conlon, p. 233.

[103]*In III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4 ad 2.

[104]". . . ad cognitionem intellectivam tria requiruntur: scilicet potentia intellectus, lumen quo intelligit, et similitudo rei per quam cognitio rei determinatur; et secundum haec tria potest aliqua cognitio esse altera potior tripliciter. Primo, quantum ad efficaciam cognoscendi, sive certitudinem cognitionis, sive limiditatem, quod idem est, quae ex ipso lumine consequitur" (*In III Sent.*, d. 14, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 2).

certitudo	in the eye to see COLOR	is called the power of [SIGHT[105]
inclination	in the ear to hear SOUND	is called the power of [HEARING[106]
aptitude	in the senses for BODIES [(material)	is called *certitudo ex-* [*perimentalis*[107]
ordination	in the intellect for FIRST [PRINCIPLES	is the habit of UNDER- [STANDING[108]
syllogism	in the intellect for CONCLU- [SIONS	is the habit of REA- [SON *scientia*[109]
natural light	in the intellect for ULTIMATE [CAUSES	is the habit of WIS- [DOM[110]
supernatural [light	in the intellect for the invisible [things of God	is the habit of [FAITH[111]
light of glory	in the intellect for the FACE [OF GOD	is the principle of [VISION[112]
facility	in the practical intellect [for MAKING things	is the habit of ART[113]
directive prin- [ciple	in the practical intellect [for DOING things	is the habit of PRU- [DENCE[114]
certitudo	in the speculative intellect for [contingent singulars	is the habit of OPIN- [ION.[115]

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[105]". . . caeteris paribus visio est certior auditu" (*ST*, II-II, q. 4, a. 8 ad 2).

[106]". . . sic certior est auditus, quam visus" (*ibid.*).

[107]". . . quia tamen principium humanae cognitionis est sensus, in eo consistit maxima certitudo" (*ST*, III, q. 30, a. 3 ad 2). ". . . et haec vocatur certitudo experimentalis" (*In III Sent.*, d. 14, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 5).

[108]". . . intellectus importat certitudinem absque demonstratione" (*In I Post. Analyt.*, lect. 42).

[109]". . . scientia importat certitudinem cognitionis" (*ibid.* Cf. n. 18).

[110]". . . sapientia . . . deficit a certitudine . . . cui innititur fides" (*ST*, II-II, q. 4, a. 8 ad 3).

[111]". . . certitudo signata nomine fidei" (*ST*, II-II, q. 8, a. 8 ad 3). ". . . fides quae est certitudo de rebus invisibilibus" (*ST*, I-II, q. 111, a. 4). ". . . fidei quae est causa prima certitudinis spei" (*ST*, II-II, q. 20, a. 2 ad 1).

[112]". . . antequam per certitudinem divinae visionis necessitas hujusmodi connexionis demonstretur, voluntas non ex necessitate Deo inhaeret" (*ST*, I, q. 82, a. 2).

[113]". . . ea enim quae sunt artis, licet sint singularia, tamen sunt magis determinata, et certa; inde . . . propter certitudinem" (*ST*, II-II, q. 49, a. 5 ad 2). Cf. n. 88. Also, *In III Sent.*, d. 35, q. 2, a. 3, qa. 2.

[114]". . . non potest certitudo prudentiae tanta esse, quod omnino sollicitudo tollatur" (*ST*, II-II, q. 47, a. 9 ad 2).

[115]*In III Sent.*, d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 3 ad 1, quoted in text for n. 20.

a) All these powers or habits in the right-hand column may be predicated of the synonyms for *certitudo inclinationis* in the left-hand column in recto; for example, ". . . *fides, quae est certitudo de rebus invisibilibus*";[116] ". . . *ipsa inclinationis naturae certitudo dicitur spes.*"[117] (*b*) *Certitudo cognitionis* in act is the assent (*certitudo adhaesionis*).[118] (*c*) *Certitudo cognitionis* in the term or the event is *certitudo inhaesionis.*[119] "Intellectus in actu est intelligible in actu."[120] Our "certitude" corresponds to a redundance in the sensible appetite or feeling of security consequent upon the achievement of this term. That is our feeling of freedom from the fear of error.

This *certitudo cognitionis* is just one line of a Thomistic epistemology set in an Aristotelian framework. It implies the ordination of a cognitive faculty for its proper object. This ordination is just as wise and infallible as the ordination in a stone to fall. No more, no less. They both have the same wise and infallible author of their nature.

Within the range of its own proper object, each faculty is an active potency necessitated to that object and immune to error in regard to that object per se; that is, short of a diseased organ.[121] Outside that narrow range, the senses are free to judge shape and distance, the common sensibles. And here they may err. The intellect is a passive potency, free in the exercise of its intellectual habits, but not free with regard to the specification of its virtues. This leaves a wide scope for error in opinion.[122]

The will can influence the intellect in its assent to its common object with regard to its exercise in *scientia* and *sapientia,* with regard to its specification in opinion and faith. Divine faith differs from

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[116]*ST*, I-II, q. 111, a. 4.
[117]*In III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4 ad 2.
[118]*Quodlibet.*, VI, a. 6.
[119]*Ibid.*
[120]*ST*, I, q. 14, a. 2.
[121]*ST*, I, q. 17, aa. 2 and 3; q. 85, a. 6; q. 94, a. 4; *In I Post. Analyt.*, lect. 1.
[122]". . . alio modo intellectus assentit alicui, non quia sufficienter moveatur ab objecto proprio, sed per quandam electionem voluntarie declinans in unam partem magis quam in aliam. Et si quidem hoc sit cum dubitatione, et formidine alterius partis, erit opinio: si autem sit cum certitudine absque tali formidine, erit fides: . . . nec fides, nec opinio potest esse de ipsis visis, aut secundum sensum aut secundum intellectum" (*ST*, II-II, q. 1, a. 4). Notice that this *cum certitudine* is not our state of mind. Just as a movement of the intellect without any definite determination might end in opinion, so, too, that movement with its determination supplied by the will ends in faith.

the other intellectual virtues insomuch as it is a truly supernatural light by which the intellect can see as in a glass darkly the things of God which were hitherto invisible to both sense and intellect.[123]

The formation of a false opinion or error is like the birth of a little monster in nature. It is unnatural. When it happens, it is due to a defect in one of the principles of reasoning.[124] It is in this context that Father Leo Keeler, S.J., told us, "St. Thomas implies repeatedly what he never quite says in so many words, that every full-fledged mistake involves an influence of free will."[125]

CONCLUSION: *CERTITUDO* MEANS THAT WHICH MAKES SOMETHING DEFINITE (OR CERTAIN)

Certitudo in St. Thomas may be translated as that principle of finality which makes a thing definite or certain. It may be extrinsic, *A*, in the agent, or intrinsic in the subject itself, *B*. This principle of finality is itself an analogous concept, and hence it must be articulated more and more explicitly according to its context. For St. Thomas rang all the changes on this analogous term. Thus:

certitudo	means a determination *of*		an intellect *to* its term
certitudo ordinis	means a determination *by*	a practical imposed	intellect *on* its term
certitudo cognitionis	means a determination *in*	a speculative specified	intellect *by* its term
certitudo adhaesionis	means a determination *in*	a speculative commanded	intellect *by* the will

CERTITUDO, -INIS (ML *cerno, Gr., Krinein*)

(A) the determination or ordinance of a practical intellect

(B) the determination or ordination in all the works

(a) of nature

(b) of virtue { (i) assimilation in the cognitive faculties, (ii) thrust of the appetitive faculties

(c) of art.

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[123]*Ibid.*

[124]*In I Post. Analyt.*, lect. 1.

[125]*The Problem of Error from Plato to Kant* (Rome: Gregorian Univ. Press, 1934), p. 102.

(A) in the order of intention: "Neque autem defectibilitas causarum secundarum . . . certitudinem divinae providentiae potest auferre" (*CG*, III, lect. 94). ". . . fidei, quae est causa prima certitudinis spei (*ST*, II-II, q. 20, a. 2 ad 1). Cf. n. 71-91.

(B) in the order of execution: **(a)** "Natura certitudinaliter operatur" (*ST*, II-II, q. 18, a. 4). ". . . certitudo prolis" (*De Malo*, XV, a. 1). "Ex causa necessaria certitudinaliter sequitur effectus" (*CG*, I, lect. 67); ". . . lapidis" (*ST*, I-II, q. 40, a. 2 ad 3); ". . . ignis" (*In III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4 ad 2). **(b)** ". . . certitudinem quae est in omnibus aliis virtutibus" (*In III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4). (1) In cognitive faculties it is the direction of the movement to its proper object; that is, the process of assimilation of the term: ". . . certitudo cognitionis in diversis naturis invenitur diversimodo" (*ST*, II-II, q. 9, a. 1 ad 1); ". . . et ideo quod aliquid per certitudinem sciatur, est ex lumine rationis divinitus interius indito, quo in nobis loquitur Deus" (*De Ver.*, XI, a. 1 ad 13); ". . . certitudinem scientiae ut dictum est, habet aliquis a solo Deo, qui nobis lumen rationis indidit, per quod principia cognoscimus, ex quibus oritur scientiae certitudo; et tamen scientia ab homine quodammodo causatur in nobis" (*ibid.*, ad 17). Cf. nn. 104-19. (2) In appetitive faculties it is the inclination of the habit towards its object; that is, the dynamic thrust towards its term: ". . . virtus dicitur certior omni arte; sicut et natura, inquantum inclinat infallibiliter, quantum ex ea est, in finem" (*In III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4); "ipsa inclinationis naturae certitudo dicitur spes" (*ibid.*, ad 2). Cf. text for n. 99. **(c)** ". . . virtutes morales certius arte dicuntur operari" (*ST*, II-II, q. 18, a. 4).

APPENDIX

THE ARISTOTELIAN *CERTITUDO*

The earliest example of *certitudo* which I have been able to find is in Boethius's rendering of Aristotle. He uses the root[1] to express the relationship of superiority of nature over virtue, of virtue over art (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1106b9), of knowledge of the ontological principle *propter quid* over that of the logical reason *quia*, pure mathematics (for instance, arithmetic) over applied (for instance, harmonics), the knowledge of simpler principles (for instance, the point) over that of the composite (for instance, three dimensions) (*Posterior Analytics* 87b1); the knowledge of first principles over that of the conclusions of a syllogism (*ibid.*, 100a5).

	PROPORTIO	ARISTOTLE
i)	nature : virtue :: virtue : art	ἀκριβεστέρα
ii)	propter quid/quia pure sc./applied simple/composite	ἀκριβεστέρα
iii)	*1st prin.* conclusions	τιμιωτέρα κατ' ἀκρίβειαν

[1] "ἀκριβής, 'exact, soigneux'; ἀκριβόω, ἀκριβείω 'faire exactement' . . . — ‹ἀκρο-κρίβης 'examinant avec acuité' par haplologie, et appartient à la

BOETHIUS	VERSIO ANTIQUA	V. RECENS[2]	ROSS[3]
(*PL*, LXIV)	"certior"	"limatior"	"more exact"
"certior" (p. 740)	"certior"	"exquisitior"	"more exact" (Mure)
"honorabilior-secundum certitudinem" (760)	"honorabilior-secundum certitudinem"	"praestantior-ratione certitudinis"	"accurate" (Mure)

St. Thomas's Commentary:

i) ". . . virtus enim moralis agit *inclinando determinate ad unum*, sicut et natura" (*In II Ethic.*, lect. 6).

ii) ". . . causa est prior et certior suo effectu . . . forma est certior materia" (*In I Post. Analyt.*, lect. 39).

iii) ". . . cognitio conclusionum fit in nobis ex praeexistente cognitione" (*In II Post. Analyt.*, lect. 20).

CONCLUSION: All these analogies have a common point of comparison. They point to a deeper, more fundamental principle responsible for the definition found on a more superficial level. Just as the ontological principle takes precedence over that which flows from it, so, too, the knowledge of that which makes a thing definite or certain is deeper and hence more perfect than the mere knowledge of the fact itself—for example, a circular wound is slower in healing than a triangular one. The movement of the cognitive faculty begins with the fact that a thing is that way. But then it moves according to its own inner finality towards an explanation of that fact, the *why, propter quid*, or ontological principle or reason for that fact, why a thing is or acts that way. And the intellect grows in this *certitudo* or determination in the movement of the cognitive faculty towards truth, not by excluding fear of error, but by attaining its own proper object, lifting veil after veil, all the way back until it reaches the original and ultimate determination of that fact in the CERTITUDO of the first cause, God, the author of nature and of grace, truth itself.[4]

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même base que κρίνω, 'examiner, juger' (—g —suffixal!?) pour Walde *KZ*, 34.532' (Émile Boisacq, *Dictionaire Étymologique de la Langue Greque* [4e ed.; Heidelberg, 1950]).

[2]The *Versio Antiqua* and the *Versio Recens* may be found handily at the head of each *Lectio* in St. Thomas's Commentary.

[3]W. D. Ross and others, *The Works of Aristotle* (Clarendon, 1925).

[4]For the final cause of the intellect, see Régis, *St. Thomas and Epistemology*, pp. 56-57. For the general idea, cf. Pierre Rousselot, *The Intellectualism of St. Thomas*, (Sheed & Ward, 1935).

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

The 1952 Meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association

Thomas J. Flynn, S.J.

Almost five hundred philosophers, representing a hundred and fifty colleges and universities, met at the City College of New York on December 29, 30, and 31, 1952, for the annual meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association. As an innovation this year the symposia papers were published ahead of time in book form under the title of *Science, Language and Human Rights* (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1952). This enabled members and friends to prelect the topics under discussion.

The topics for the most part were not pretentious and avoided the cosmic reach that is favored in some philosophical circles on the Continent. Discussion was confined rather to things near at hand, such as sense-knowledge, the social sciences, and language analysis. The latter proved a dominant preoccupation and reached a climax in the paper given by R. M. Martin in the symposium "What is a Rule of Language?" Mr. Martin, using the semantics of multiple denotation, gave his own answer in a virtuoso style that left some of his colleagues pleased and others, less initiate, bewildered or bored.

A. I. Melden, of the University of Washington, began his paper on universal human rights by carefully stating his intention of defending the common-sense persuasion of human rights, which had been recently restated by UNESCO. But he quickly admitted two very serious objections: (1) human rights cannot be derived, or, more exactly, deduced, from human nature ("no set of sociological, anthropological, or psychological data about man will enable us to deduce that he has any rights"); and (2) "we can always imagine cases in which it would be wrong to provide what in each article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is said to be a man's human right." The answer Mr. Melden proposed is that "the whole search for airtight directives is a mistake in principle." Moral rules have another function and cannot be understood apart from the con-

text in which they are used; "they are linguistic, not natural signs" and function "in a radically different manner from the utterances used to describe matters of fact." They are demands and must be capable of moving a hearer who has moral feeling and are valid only if a number of such "significance conditions" are found in a given case. The general rule, then, is a general reminder to live in a world where moral discourse is possible. It is not, nor can it be, anything more. The so-called "universal rights" thus become only universal invitations not to relapse into vengefulness and cruelty but to act as moral agents.

The second speaker on the symposium, W. K. Frankena, did not find these last statements as clear as they might be. But he did not disassociate himself from Mr. Melden's thesis, save in a few secondary details. He began by bluntly calling Melden's position that of "a non-cognitive theory of moral judgments." What Mr. Frankena insisted on is that a "normative" ethics is compatible with all sorts of metaethical theories. One can be right for the wrong reasons. But Frankena wished to go even beyond this and separate ethics from ontology or "metaethics" not only in fact but also in principle. Certainly he himself is making a metaethical judgment when he asserts that "metaethical relativism does not entail normative relativism." Willy-nilly he is involved in metaethics—that is, ontology—when he says that "a statement of human rights does not presuppose any metaethical theory about its nature or semiotic status." Frankena would say that a statement like "There are universal rights" merely expresses the respect that the speaker and his society feel for persons as persons. But what if the speaker should lose his respect for the person? Does it not follow that therefore the person loses his right? To this question Frankena gives an astonishing answer: metaethically, yes; normatively, no. "It may be true, metaethically speaking, that on their view [he is speaking of the opponents of Maritain and other believers in Natural Law] these rights are in a sense 'conferred' by the speaker and his society; normatively speaking they are had by nature." If, then, "all men have certain universal human rights," by what dialectical sleight-of-hand can one escape the conclusion that they have not these rights in themselves, but rather because an individual or society at present chooses to confer them on "all men"? But what if tomorrow we choose to confer them on only a few men? Have we not here come full circle from the view of the signers of the Declaration of Independence that "all men are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights"?

Roderick Firth of Swarthmore in the symposium on phenomenalism explained that modern epistemologists, taking their cue from Russell forty years ago and later abetted by G. E. Moore, Prichard, and Broad, had attempted to establish "incorrigible" statements by insisting upon the language of "sense-datum." Thus, instead of saying, "I see a blue cat," one should say, "I have a blue-cat-like sense-datum." Recently, however, an attempt has been made to substitute the language of "appearance" for that of the rather clumsy sense-datum of phenomenalism. This meant, went on Firth, "Instead of saying, for example, that after dark a blue cat presents . . . a black sense-datum, these philosophers prefer to say that after dark a blue cat looks black, seems black or appears black." In discussing this view Firth attempted to show that the language of pure appearance and the language of sense-datum were not alternative languages, and that especially in the case of hallucination the pure appearance language would not do.

The next speaker on the symposium, Max Black, in perhaps the cleverest critique of the convention, drew a direct bead on phenomenalism and its sense-datum terminology. He argued that sense-datum terminology might be provided with "ostensive" grammatical rules, but not with compatible or adequate "syntactical" rules, and that the vaunted "incorrigibility" of sense-datum terminology could be achieved only by making its statements *exclamations,* to which the notions of truth or falsity do not apply. The first commentator, Norman Malcolm, was unwilling to accept such a devastating indictment of phenomenalism and seemed to agree with Russell and Ayer that sense-data were the real things. The second commentator on the symposium, Harvard's W. V. Quine, well known for his work in symbolic logic, agreed with Black that sense-data were very debatable. F. S. C. Northrop, who, in his valuable presidential address of the preceding night on types of law, had frequently agreed with Berkeley, Newton, and Galileo that in regard to sense-objects their "esse est percipi," spoke from the floor and argued here that evidence for sense-data statements could be adduced. Despite this, however, more than one spectator agreed later with the judgment of Max Black: "My own view is that if we are willing to use the sense-datum language we expose ourselves to the danger of perpetuating the confusions that have been in the minds of its inventors."

A NOTE ON *IN IDIPSUM* IN ST. AUGUSTINE

JAMES SWETNAM, S.J.

An interesting example of the Neoplatonic background of St. Augustine in his interpretation of Scripture is furnished by his commentary on the phrase *in idipsum.* It occurs six times in the Vulgate text of the Psalms.[1] There is some difference of opinion about its precise meaning in one or two of these places; but there seems to be general agreement among Scripture scholars that it translates a Greek and/or Hebrew idiom meaning, according to context, either "together," "at once," or "completely."[2]

St. Augustine, however, interprets the phrase quite differently. For him, *idipsum* is a peculiarly apt expression for God, for it emphasizes some of the basic divine attributes: simplicity, unity, immutability, eternity. An examination of his comments on three of these passages reveals this with startling clarity.

St. Augustine's version of Psalm 4, verse 9, runs thus: "in pace, in idipsum obdormiam, et somnum capiam."[3] His comment here is not explicit, but the meaning he attributes to *idipsum* is clear.

> Non . . . multiplicatio semper ubertatem significat, et non plerumque exiguitatem: cum dedita temporalibus voluptatibus anima semper exardescit cupiditate, nec satiari potest, et multiplici atque aerumnosa cogitatione distenta, simplex bonum videre non sinitur; qualis est illa de qua dicitur: 'Corpus enim, quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam, et deprimit terrena inhabitatio sensum multa cogitantem' (*Sap.* ix, 15). Talis anima temporalium bonorum decessione et successione, id est, a tempore frumenti, vini et olei sui, innumerabilibus completa phantasmatibus sic multiplicata est, ut non possit agere quod praeceptum est: 'Sentite de Domino in bonitate, et in simplicitate cordis quaerite illum' (*Id.* i, 1); ista enim multiplicitas illi simplicitati vehementer adversa est.

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[1] Pss. 4:9; 33:4; 40:8; 61:10; 73:6; 121:3.

[2] In our presentation of current interpretation we are relying on the English translation of the Reverend Charles J. Callan, O.P. (*The Psalms* [New York: Wagner, 1945]) and the new Latin version of the Biblical Institute (*Liber Psalmorum cum Canticis Breviarii Romani,* cura Professorum Pontificii Instituti Biblici edita, Editio Altera Americana [New York: Benziger, 1947]).

[3] Fr. Callan: "I will lay me down at once in peace to sleep"; new Latin version: "In pace, simul ac decubui, obdormisco."

> Et ideo istis relictis qui multi sunt, multiplicati scilicet temporalium cupiditate et dicunt, 'Quis ostendit nobis bona,' quae non oculis foris, sed intus cordis simplicitate quaerenda sunt, vir fidelis exsultat et dicit: 'In pace, in idipsum obdormiam, et somnum capiam.'[4]

The simplicity and unity of God are opposed to the complexity and multiplicity of temporal things.

"Et exaltemus nomen ejus in idipsum" is the version given of Psalm 33, verse 4.[5] The aspect of unity is brought out here.

> 'Et exaltemus nomen ejus in idipsum.' Quid est, 'exaltemus nomen ejus in idipsum'? Hoc est, in unum. Nam multi codices sic habent: 'Magnificate Dominum mecum, et exaltemus nomen ejus in unum.' Sive 'in idipsum' dicatur, sive 'in unum'; hoc idem dicitur. Ergo rapite quos potestis, hortando, portando, rogando, disputando, rationem reddendo, cum mansuetudine, cum lenitate: rapite ad amorem; ut si magnificant Dominum, in unum magnificent.[6]

But it is in his discussion of Psalm 121, verse 3, that the full force of the phrase is brought out. The passage is too lengthy to be quoted in full; indeed, it is a miniature tractate on St. Augustine's philosophy of God. But these two selections are sufficient to show the main trend of his thought:

> Sed dicat quod sequitur, et auferat omnem dubitationem, quia non carnaliter debemus accipere, 'Jerusalem quae aedificatur ut civitas. Cujus participatio ejus in idipsum."[7] Jam ergo, fratres, quisquis erigit aciem mentis, quisquis deponit caliginem carnis, quisquis mundat oculum cordis, elevet, et videat 'idipsum.' Quid est 'idipsum'? Quomodo dicam, nisi 'idipsum'? Fratres, si potestis, intelligite 'idipsum.' Nam et ego quidquid aliud dixero, non dico 'idipsum.' Conemur tamen quibusdam vicinitatibus verborum et significationum perducere infirmitatem mentis ad cogitandum 'idipsum.' Quid est 'idipsum'? Quod semper eodem modo est; quod non modo aliud, et modo aliud est. Quid est quod est? Quod aeternum est. Nam quod semper aliter atque aliter est, non est, quia non manet: non omnino non est, sed non summe est. Et quid est quod est, nisi ille qui quando mittebat Moysen, dixit illi: 'Ego sum qui sum'? Quid est hoc, nisi ille qui cum diceret famulus ejus, 'Ecce mittis me: si dixerit mihi populus, Quis

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[4] *Enarrationes in Psalmos* (*Patrologia Latina*, XXXVI, 82).

[5] Fr. Callan: "and let us exalt His name togcther"; new Latin version: "et extollamus nomen eius simul."

[6] *PL*, XXXVI, 311.

[7] Fr. Callan: "O Jerusalem, thou art built as a city, whose parts are firmly united"; new Latin version: "Jerusalem quae aedificata est ut civitas, in se compacta tota."

> te misit? quid dicam ei?' nomen suum noluit aliud dicere, quam, 'Ego sum qui sum'; et adjecit et ait, 'Dices itaque filiis Israel, Qui est, misit me ad vos.' Ecce 'idipsum, Ego sum qui sum, Qui est, misit me ad vos.' Non potes capere; multum est intelligere, multum est apprehendere.[8]

The reference to "Ego sum qui sum" to support a metaphysical view of God should strike a familiar note. The text was used by St. Anselm, and through him by other medievals in the Augustinian tradition, to support this same view of God as the supreme immutable.[9] St. Thomas Aquinas refers to it to support his view that the phrase "qui est" is the most appropriate name for God, thus using it in a radically different sense, at the summit of his existential philosophy.[10]

> Idipsum nemo habet ex se. Intendite, fratres. Quod corpus habet, non est idipsum; quia non in se stat. Mutatur per aetates, mutatur per mutationes locorum ac temporum, mutatur per morbos et defectus carnales; non ergo in se stat. Corpora coelestia non in se stant: habent quasdam mutationes suas, etsi occultas; certe de locis in loca mutantur, ascendunt ab oriente in occidentem, et rursus circumeunt ad orientem: non ergo stant, non sunt idipsum. Anima humana nec ipsa stat. Quantis enim mutationibus et cogitationibus variatur! quantis voluptatibus immutatur! quantis cupiditatibus diverberatur atque discinditur! Mens ipsa hominis, quae dicitur rationalis, mutabilis est, non est idipsum. Modo vult, modo non vult; modo scit, modo nescit; modo meminit, modo obliviscitur; ergo idipsum nemo habet ex se.[11]

The other three loci are not very revealing. In one of these (Ps. 61:10), St. Augustine's version substituted *in unum* for the *in idipsum* of the Vulgate. But in all three, as in the three quoted above, it seems that St. Augustine did not perceive the real meaning of the phrase because of the extremely literal nature of the version he possessed.[12]

That he made use of the word so providentially given him in Scripture is shown from the following texts.

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[8]*PL*, XXXVII, 1621-22.

[9]Cf. Etienne Gilson, *Le Thomisme* (5th ed.; Paris: Vrin, 1944), pp. 76-81; 123-27.

[10]*Summa Theologiae* I, q. 13, a. 11. Cf. Etienne Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, tr. by A. H. C. Downes (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1940), p. 51, note. 10.

[11]*Enarrationes in Psalmos* (PL, XXXVII, 1623).

[12]Their places in the *Patrologia* are XXXVI, 460 (40:8); XXXVI, 740 (61:10); XXXVI, 935-36 (73:6).

> Temporalium . . . specierum multiformitas ab unitate Dei hominem lapsum per carnales sensus diverberavit, et mutabili varietate multiplicavit ejus affectum: ita facta est abundantia laboriosa, et, si dici potest, copiosa egestas, dum aliud et aliud sequitur, et nihil cum eo permanet. Sic a tempore frumenti, vini et olei sui multiplicatus est, ut non inveniat idipsum (*Psal.* iv, 8, 9), id est naturam incommutabilem et singularem, quam secutus non erret, et assecutus non doleat.[13]
>
> Deum ergo diligere debemus trinam quamdam unitatem, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum, quod nihil aliud dicam esse, nisi idipsum esse.[14]

And then, of course, there are the references in the *Confessions*, especially:

> Cumque ad eum finem sermo perduceretur, ut carnalium sensuum delectatio quantalibet, in quantalibet luce corporea, prae illius vitae jucunditate, non comparatione, sed ne commemoratione quidem digna videretur; erigentes nos ardentiore affectu in idipsum, perambulavimus gradatim cuncta corporalia, et ipsum coelum, unde sol et luna et stellae lucent super terram. Et adhuc ascendebamus interius cogitando, et loquendo, et mirando opera tua; et venimus in mentes nostras, et transcendimus eas, ut attingeremus regionem ubertatis indeficientis, ubi pascis Israel in aeternum veritatis pabulo, et ubi vita sapientia est, per quam fiunt omnia ista, et quae fuerunt, et quae futura sunt; et ipsa non fit, sed sic est ut fuit, et sic erit semper; quin potius fuisse, et futurum esse non est in ea, sed esse solum, quoniam aeterna est: nam fuisse et futurum esse, non est aeternum.[15]

Other texts could doubtless be found in the vast range of St. Augustine's works to supplement these.

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[13] *De Vera Religione*, xxi, 41 (PL, XXXIV, 139).
[14] *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae*, I, xiv, 24 (PL, XXXII, 1321).
[15] IX, x, 24 (*PL*, XXXII, 774). Cf. also XII, vii, 7; XII, xv, 21; XII, xvii, 25.

CHRONICLE

The Metaphysical Society of America held its fourth annual meeting March 21, 1953, at Union Theological Seminary, New York. In the morning session, the Reverend George P. Klubertanz, S.J., spoke on "Realism and System"; Professor George Burch was the commentator. Professor Richard Kroner, the second speaker, gave a paper on the topic, "What is Really Bad?"; Professor John E. Smith served as commentator. In the afternoon session, Professor Paul

Weiss's presidential address, entitled "The Contemporary World," was given; Professor Adolf Grünbaum was the commentator. Professor Richard McKeon spoke on "Process and Function"; Professor Y. Krikorian was the commentator. The last paper, by Professor Roderick Chisholm, was called "Empirical Justification."

The American Catholic Philosophical Association held its annual meeting at the University of Notre Dame, April 7 and 8. At the first general session, the Reverend Edward Q. Franz gave a paper entitled "Philosophy and Unity of Knowledge," and the Reverend Leo Schumacher gave a short comment. The second paper at this session, "Philosophy and Unity of the Sciences," was given by M. Jacques Maritain, and the comment, by Reverend Joseph Clark, S.J.

At the annual dinner, greetings were extended by the Very Reverend Theodore Hesburgh, C.S.C., President of the University of Notre Dame; and Professor Elizabeth Salmon, President of the Association, gave as her address, "Philosophy and the Unity of Wisdom."

At the second general session, the Very Reverend Louis-M. Régis, O.P., presented a paper on "Philosophy and Unity of Philosophy of Nature," and the comment was given by the Reverend James A. McWilliams, S. J. The second paper, "Philosophy and the Unity of Man's Ultimate End," was presented by the Reverend Gerard Smith, S.J., and the comment was given by Professor Vincent E. Smith.

Brother Benignus Gerrity, F.S.C., well-known teacher of philosophy and writer, died on January 27, 1953, at Manhattan College, aged 45. His untimely death is mourned by philosophers as well as by his colleagues.

A New and Important Magazine, *Theology Digest,* has begun publication. Its purpose is to make available in brief form the most significant current articles dealing with Catholic theology; ordinarily the articles chosen for publication were written in languages other than English. For many who have neither the time nor the opportunity to follow the more than a hundred theological journals, this magazine will be a valuable service. In its first—winter—number, eleven articles are digested, nine others are summarized, and four annotated bibliographies are given. The editor is the Reverend Gerald Van Ackeren, S.J., of St. Mary's College, St. Marys, Kansas (the School of Divinity of Saint Louis University).

ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF ST. THOMAS

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, carrying on the work begun in the issue of November, 1948 (Vol. XXVI, No. 1) and continued in that of March, 1950 (Vol. XXVII, No. 3), lists these recent translations of St. Thomas, whether they are printed, mimeographed, or filed as theses in university libraries. Supplementary lists will be published as material warrants. Those who are preparing any sort of translation of the writings of St. Thomas are requested to send a complete description of the translation to the editor of THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN.

In the list below, the Latin titles are printed in bold type, and the translations are listed under them. The order of listing the Latin titles is that used by Vernon J. Bourke in his *Thomistic Bibliography, 1920-1940*, published by THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN (St. Louis, 1945).

Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate

Caldwell, T. A., S.J. "The *De Veritate* of St. Thomas, Q.6. 3-6." With introd. and notes. Unpublished M.A. thesis, Saint Louis University.

Grier, J. H. "The *De Veritate* of St. Thomas Aquinas, Q.5. 1-4." With introd. and notes. Unpublished M.A. thesis, Saint Louis University.

Mauel, J., S.J. "The *De Veritate* of St. Thomas Aquinas, Q.7." With introd. and notes. Unpublished M.A. thesis, Saint Louis University.

Sherburne, R. F., S.J. "The *De Veritate* of St. Thomas Aquinas, Q.6. 1-2." With introd. and notes. Unpublished M.A. thesis, Saint Louis University.

Mulligan, Robert W., S.J., McGlynn, James V., S.J., and Schmidt, Robert, S.J. *Truth*. 3 volumes. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952-. Vol. I, pp. xxvi + 472, $7.00; Vol. II, $7.00.

Expositio in librum Boetii de Hebdomadibus

Joda, R. J., S.J. "In Librum Boetheii de Hebdomadibus Expositio." With introd. and notes. Unpublished M.A. thesis, Saint Louis University.

Quaestio Disputata de Potentia Dei

Shapcote, L., O.P. *On the Power of God*. (Reprint.) With introd. by Thomas Gilby, O.P. Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1952. $6.50.

In Decem Libros Ethicorum Expositio

Conway, Pierre, O.P. *St. Thomas Aquinas on Aristotle's "Love and Friendship." Commentary on Aristotle's* Ethics, *Books VIII-IX*. Providence: Providence College Press, 1951. Pp. xvi + 132. $2.50; paper, $1.50.

Quaestiones Disputatae de Virtutibus

Grana, A., S.J. "De Virtutibus Cardinalibus, A. 3-4." With introd. and notes. Unpublished M.A. thesis, Saint Louis University.

Reid, J. P., O.P. *On the Virtues (in General)*. With introd. and notes. Providence: Providence College Press, 1951. Pp. xxix + 188. $3.00; Paper, $2.00.

Young, R. F., S.J. "Questio Disputata de Virtutibus Cardinalibus, A. 1-2." With introd. and notes. Unpublished M.A. thesis, Saint Louis University.

De Aeternitate Mundi contra Murmurantes

Bailey, R., S.J. "De Aeternitate Mundi contra Murmurantes." With introd. and notes. Unpublished M.A. thesis, Saint Louis University.

In Libros de Anima Expositio

Foster, K., O.P., and Humphries, S., O.P. *Aristotle's* De Anima *with the Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas.* With introd. by Ivo Thomas, O.P. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. 504. $6.50.

De Substantiis Separatis

Lubbers, Leland, S.J. "De Substantiis Separatis, Ch. 1-8." With introd. and notes. Unpublished M.A. thesis, Saint Louis University.

Selections

Gilby, T., O.P. *Philosophical Texts.* Selected, with introd. and notes. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. xxii + 405.

Thomas Aquinas, St. *On Man.* "Great Books Series"; Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1951. Pp. 121. Paper, 80¢

————. *Political Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas.* Ed. by Dino Bigongiari. New York: Hafner Pub. Co.; Sept., 1952. $3.00.

BOOK REVIEWS

THEORY OF ORDER. By W. Donald Oliver. Yellow Springs: Antioch Press, 1951. Pp. x +345.

Professor Oliver's work, written under a Guggenheim Fellowship, has been jointly sponsored by the Research Council of the University of Missouri and the Publications Committee of the American Philosophical Association. The book, the result of years of study, is an ontological and epistemological study of order, an investigation into the place of order in a larger theory of knowledge and metaphysics. Professor Oliver sets forth what is felt to be a full-scale account of the role played by order in man's attempt to understand and control his natural environment, and bases his book on a definition of order that is carefully and cautiously drawn from an analysis of mathematical series. The body of the work is taken up with the development of the ramifications of this definition of order, in the course of which a surprisingly large number of traditional philosophical problems are treated.

Professor Oliver in one place (p. 188) very sensibly observes that ". . . no one but an imbecile—or perhaps an inchoate philosopher—ever faces a situation with a simple blank What? How? Why?" To his question about the nature of order Professor Oliver brings an intellectual background and comprehension of the situation that enable him to see to his own satisfaction the possibility of relevant answers. Empiricism, naturalism, pragmatism, constitute a major part of that background, with some sprinkling of personalist idealism. Without reflecting on his own originality, which gives the book a unique stamp, we may say that he owns up to a philosophical indebtedness to such philosophers as James, Dewey, Whitehead, and G. H. Mead, all men whom he has "long admired" (ix). "The influence of James' pluralism and radical empiricism," he tells us, "is obvious" (*ibid.*); the contribution of Dewey is penetratingly permeative, but not so distinctive; that of Whitehead and Mead is quite limited by comparison. Oliver has eclectically filtered the thoughts of these men to such an extent that the distillation which emerges can truly be said to be "neither expressed in their terminology nor containable within the rubric of their thought" (*ibid.*). Royce helped formulate the problems Oliver has struggled with; Ernst Cassirer

afforded him the insight into the "continuity of theme that runs beneath the diversities of philosophic opinion." Especially, in a more formative way, does Oliver admit indebtedness to his teacher of several years, E. B. McGilvary (to whom the book is thus appropriately dedicated).

Professor Oliver rightly recognizes that order is a precondition of all rational activity from the highest flights of the metaphysicians to the simplest calculations of the carpenter. Wherever thought comes into play it either functions against a background "order of connectedness" or is directed towards a "discovery of such an order" (p. 3). Though his theory with respect to order is sufficiently general, he feels, to apply to order whether it be purely ontological or purely conceptual, he is chiefly interested in it in the measure that it "connects thought with things" (p. 23); for it is a main theme of the book that order is one of the most important "devices employed by finite minds . . . to 'make sense' out of their concepts and their experience" (p. 22). The author's realistic interpretation of the ordering or organization of thought, incidentally, is clearly evident when he says that just as "we need not infer from the fact that man has stated the law of the lever, that he invented the lever," so, similarly, to say that "order is an intellectual tool" does not necessarily mean it is "a tool invented by the intellect" (p. 24).

Part I, entitled "Theory of Order," attempts to show in a rather formal manner the deficiencies of the view that absolute limits can serve the needs of human thought. Part II turns attention to the beings that are the subject of order and is entitled "The Entity." Part III, "Theory of Media," represents the author's most concentrated attempt to express the technical background or matrix for human thought as he conceives it, in chapters dealing with concrete and abstract media, the descriptive and the control medium. Part IV, "Theory of Abstractions," is something in the nature of a final touch to the general theory. Here Professor Oliver attempts to show that "the appeal to abstract concepts, Platonic Ideas, essences, eternal objects [it would appear they are all one with him] as absolute limits is . . . uncalled for" and that "the effort to establish any systematic, thorough-going philosophy upon the supposed existence of such categories cannot be logically supported" (p. 338). What his theory of abstraction contributes, he claims, is this:

> The things of which we think abstractly are not isolated from the conditions under which things must exist, but are simply set within those conditions in such a manner that degrees of

> freedom are permitted to them that might not be permitted to the concrete things that make up our world (p. 339).

The author writes calmly and uncontentiously, but not altogether objectively and impartially. It is certainly not unjust to say of him that he has adopted so slanted a perspective in the approach to nature that the surprise is he has done so well in the attempt to suggest a theory for the ordering of experience. It is his conviction that there is no "all-around" view of the world (p. 313), that one must take a limited "squinting" attitude. The squinting viewpoint from which he has observed and written is of "an admittedly naturalistic and pragmatic bias" (p. 334). He regards reality with "the eyes of an empiricist" (p. 306), seeks to evaluate interpretative views of it in the light of principles "essential to empiricism" (pp. 66 and 97), and labels certain varieties of metaphysics that are at variance with the empiricist's point of view as "highly undesirable" (p. 305). He champions, however, what he regards as "our own particular variety of empiricism" (p. 93). This would seem to be a variety that stands between pure empiricism on the one hand—which would avoid any formalization of reality ("all hypostatization of self-identical and selfsufficient entities" such as Hume abhorred [cf. p. 67]), contenting itself with merely describing the distribution of experienced characteristics in space and time and eschewing therefore any attmpt to "explain nature"—and on the other hand excessive rationalisms that would "hypothecate a formal structure of necessary relations" (p. 63) between conceptualized entities, such as might serve as the ground or medium for necessary inference about reality. In regard to the latter he is desirous, indeed, of having some such structure for inferential purposes; but he fears that when it is elaborated too much and fixed too rigidly it causes the empirical entity to disapppear (cf. p. 64).

It is the empiricist's "squint," rendered even more myopic by an addiction to Hume, that unfortunately limits and hampers the author's laudable efforts to devise a satisfactory theory that would enable us to reduce our concepts and experiences to order. Nothing, for example, would seem to be more important for the ordering of our experiences than to be certain of the identity of the arrangeable, empirical entities of that experience. And Oliver, from the outset, stresses that importance. Indeed, the two abstract characteristics that define an entity, he tells us, are self-identity and distinguishability (p. 8). He promises (p. 90) that he will discuss "the ways in which entities of different kinds can change and yet be regarded

as self-identical." The discussion, in the seventh chapter, proves quite disappointing and confusing.

Extreme haziness surrounds the matter of sameness and distinction. For one thing, he fails to make any clear-cut distinction between *real* sameness or identity and *logical* sameness or identity. Thus he speaks of "identity" where there is real distinction (as when he refers to "two regions [of space] filled with *identical* qualitative content," [p. 109]) and of "sameness" where there is only real similarity (as when he speaks of the "same" memory or the "same" idea not only as occurring and recurring in the same individual at different times—hence with at least a really distinct temporal position—but as occurring in different individuals at the "same" time and hence with at least a distinct spatial position! [pp. 117-18]). He even alludes to the latter phenomenon as "one entity that appears at different times and places" (*ibid.*).

His treatment of space, too, lacks the clarity, precision, and consistency that is desired. He recognizes that space, along with time, is a continuum so elemental to human thought that it is almost impossible to speak of arrangements and rearrangements except in terms of continua (p. 10), and that all other media must be conceived "in analogy with spatial spread-outness and temporal strung-alongness" (p. 339). Clearly they are not in the nature of a priori Kantian categories. What the exact nature of each is, however, is not so obvious.

It is a pity that Professor Oliver does not show more familiarity with the views of the ancient and modern Schoolmen. Deeper knowledge might have brought more respect, less casual and cold disregard, and definite help in the clarification and solution of problems. To be sure, there is very little direct reference to Scholastic philosophy. The term, if I mistake not, is used but once—and then only to charge it with the error (one of its greatest, he maintains) of assuming "that the process of abstraction comes to an end with the definition of a class" (p. 316). His attitude toward, and misunderstanding of, Scholasticism is typified by one such offhand expression as "the arrogance of the Middle Ages, bred of anthropocentrism," which made man proud enough to think he can "unravel the structure of nature from the center outwards" (p. 147)—a thought quite at variance with the viewpoint, for example, of one of the greatest of the Schoolmen, St. Thomas, who, for all his stress on rationalism and intellectualism, felt that man's mind is but "in the shadowland of intelligence" and only slowly and laboriously penetrates the shell of nature. If Pro-

fessor Oliver were as familiar with the Schoolmen as he is with Hume, James, Mead, Dewey, Russell, and Whitehead, he would have much less to criticize, much more to admire; he might strangely find that on many points the Scholastics are closer to him than he thinks. It is honestly felt by this reviewer that (1) a correct understanding of the Scholastic doctrine of essences (in the concrete as well as in the abstract) would convince Oliver that the Scholastics are not trying "to solve the problem by the invocation of a word" (p. 98); (2) a fuller knowledge of Aristotle's notion of potentiality as understood by the Scholastics would reveal their acquaintance with, and appreciation of, its dynamic, referential, functional role, which he feels Aristotle overlooked; (3) a thorough knowledge of the historical elements in the medieval discussion of the universals would have aided him considerably in threading his way through the nominalism of Hume, the conceptualism of Locke, and the exaggerated realism of Santayana and Whitehead, and would have given him a simpler and more satisfactory solution to the question of whether his abstract "symbols of ambiguous denotation" have *an* object or not. It hardly seems that the question would have been raised in that fashion if he were aware of the moderate realistic solution to the problem of the universals. Would it be too forward to suggest, by way of introduction to Scholasticism and by way of indication of what it has to offer, that Professor Oliver read a modern Schoolman's treatment of order as set forth in Bishop Joseph M. Marling's *The Order of Nature* (Washington: Catholic Univ. Press, 1934)—especially his chapter on the metaphysics of order? We might note that in Bishop Marling's treatment of order there is emphasized what is strikingly lacking in Professor Oliver's discussion of it; that is, the role purpose plays in the primary idea of order (*ibid.*, pp. 20 ff.).

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The Power of Art. By John M. Warbeke. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1951. Pp. 493. $6.00.

Whatever enhances and enriches life is good, and the arts are exceptionally fitted for such enhancing and enriching effects. This is conceived as "the power of art" and its demonstration is the burden of this book.

The author gives us a rapid and somewhat superficial survey on historical lines of six major art fields: sculpture, painting, music,

poetry, drama, and architecture, chapter by chapter. Intermingled are chapters on the dynamic influence of art upon other fields—industry, morality, religion, philosophy—together with some analysis of the psychological effects of art on mankind.

Dr. Warbeke is careful, in this book, to deny that art is a mere tool in the hands of social and political designers. Dynamic influence upon life is not the purpose of art, as he correctly says, but simply an attribute which the author is most anxious to promote as a means toward a new "golden age" in men's lives.

Without denying in any way the harmonious effects of the arts upon life, we nevertheless feel that this book will largely fail to promote either sound artistic values or the good life. If one does not have a solid intellectual hierarchy of values in life, together with solid moral and religious—not to say philosophical—principles, then no use of the arts will ever supply for the deficiency. And without these same principles, the world of art can be "used" to defend any and every hierarchy of values.

Thus, for example, for Dr. Warbeke moral values are relative and definable in terms of usefulness. Hence the arts follow the same relative, empirical standards. Likewise for the author, religion is neither objective nor absolute. It is an evolutionary value and his god is a "cosmic power" ever coming into being. The arts are to enhance the worship of such a deity. And, philosophically, the author demonstrates the insufficiency of Hegelian, Lockean, Kantian, or Nietzschean metaphysics to present a solid foundation for art.

The total effect of this foundation for "the power of art" is to make the author's critique subjective and sentimental and to demonstrate once again that art has neither power nor self-respect when it is conceived as a defense of empirical or merely expedient values.

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Avicenna's Psychology. By F. Rahman. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. xii + 127. $2.50.

Dr. Rahman's book is a welcome addition to the very limited number of works of Arabian philosophy in English. Written as an Oxford University thesis, his work presents an English translation (from a critical Arabic text which he himself made) of a section of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Najāt* ("The Book of Salvation"), Book II, Chapter VI. The *Najāt,* an abridgement of the *Shifā'*, has so far been known to

Western readers primarily through the Latin translation of its metaphysical section by Carame (*Avicennae Metaphysices Compendium,* [1926]) and through references to the original text by Arabists who have written in French or German.

The translation is preceded by an introduction in which the author indicates the content of the treatise, relates it to its historical background, includes a brief discussion of his own interpretation of controversial points, and lists the manuscripts on which his work is based. The translation is followed by a commentary which consists of good summaries of the contents of each chapter and brief notes explaining the meaning of terms and referring to parallel discussions in peripatetic and Neoplatonic works. It also includes more lengthy discussions in which the author gives his own opinion on such topics as the meaning of *wahm* (*aestimatio*) and of *intellectus adeptus,* the views of Avicenna and Aristotle on the existence of a substantial self, and Avicenna's view of intellectual memory.

Not all scholars will agree with the judgments reached in these sections. The author differs, for example, with Gilson's interpretation of the teaching of Alexander of Aphrodisias and of Al-Farabi on the divisions of the intellect (in *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age,* IV, 21-33). Rahman says, too, that St. Thomas Aquinas's comment on intellectual memory in *Summa Theologica,* I, q. 79, a. 6, ad 2—namely, that "pastness" attaches to the intellectual act only and not to the object of the act—seems to rest on a confusion. Actually, however, the confusion may be due to Rahman's difficulty in seeing the distinction between sense forms and intelligible forms (cf. p. 19). But the author does give an explanation (p. 120) which in fact removes the "confusion" that he thought he had found in the text. Rahman also suggests (and with some probability), in a view contrary to that of Marcel de Corte, that Aristotle never explicitly taught the existence of a substantial soul or self (cf. pp. 12-18, 104, 111-14). The book concludes with textual notes and bibliography.

The central portion of the book, the English translation of *Kitāb al-Najāt,* Book II, Chapter VI, contains discussions of the definition of soul; the vegetative soul; the animal soul and its faculties, especially the internal senses; the rational soul and its division into the practical and theoretical faculty; the divisions of theoretical intellect; "intuition" and prophecy; grades of abstraction; the role of the corporeal organ in the perception of the particular; the intellect as an immaterial substance and how it functions in knowing; the relations of soul and body; the question of the pre-existence and transmigration

of soul; the immortality and substantiality of soul; and the active intelligence and its functions. The impression of Avicenna's thought which this work leaves with the reader is that of an underlying vein of Aristotelianism (an impression reinforced by the notes) combined with strong Neoplatonic trends and with original contributions of Avicenna himself, among them a theory of prophecy.

The wide range of topics discussed suggests that this work might be a very complete introduction to Avicenna's psychology. Yet the author himself warns that although the *Najāt* often follows closely the text of the *Shifā'*, it is not to be understood as a work which gives in concise language all or even most of what is contained in the *Shifā'*. Book II, Chapter VI of the *Najāt* is therefore not to be understood as a complete summary of the *Shifā'*'s section on psychology, the *De Anima*. On the internal senses, however, the pertinent sections of Rahman's translation can easily be compared with the study of Father Klubertanz which is based on the Latin translation of Avicenna's *De Anima* (cf. pp. 89-106 of *The Discursive Power*, [St. Louis, 1952]).

On abstraction, the *Najāt* discussion has an Aristotelian tone which is to some extent offset by the last chapter's reference to the active intellect's function in human knowledge; but if the reader were restricted to these texts alone, he could scarcely know Avicenna's full meaning. He needs to know also where the agent intellect fits into the total picture of Avicenna's cosmogony (cf. *Metaphys.*, IX, 4, fol. 104v-105r [Venice: Junta, 1508]); and he ought to know, too, the implications of the statement in *De Anima*, V, 5: ". . . aptatur anima ut emanet in eam ab intelligentia agente abstractio" (fol. 25 rb; cf. p. 125 of the transcription made by Father Klubertanz from the 1508 edition of the *De Anima*, and published in mimeographed form, St. Louis, 1949).

Rahman's translation cannot therefore be used as a complete introduction to Avicenna's psychology. It is not intended as a substitute for some acquaintance with the fuller context of the *Shifā'*. But this is not to deny that it can and will be very useful. Anyone who wishes to get some background for the study of Avicennian influence on medieval thought, in an easily accessible work, will want to see this translation. He will find of special interest the texts on the origin of the soul, the immortality of the soul, and the soul's relation to the body.

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Essays in Criticism. By E. Jordan. With an Introduction and Synopses by Robert D. Mack. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952. Pp. 384. $7.00.

Professor Jordan in this book quotes no one—philosopher or poet—lays claim to no school of philosophy, and identifies his thought with no systematic body of thought; but for purposes of summary review it seems fair to say that he is essentially a Kantian with important variations from his master's rather contemptuous treatment of the whole field of art. The thesis of these essays, then, is that since the aesthetic object is a real, unique, cosmic assertion wholly independent of the poet's (or maker's) mind, criticism is simply the discovery of the true assertions to be made about real objects.

Practically, the book may be considered (1) insofar as it delivers a determined, concentrated attack upon all forms of subjectivism in art criticism and (2) as a defense of a specific idealism or universality of art, a position which is vitiated by the error which monist philosophy invariably reveals: the radical incompatibility between phenomena (subjectivity, sensation) and noumena (objectivity, truth).

Mr. Jordan is professor emeritus of philosophy at Butler University; and his seventy-eight years, over thirty of them spent as head of the Department of Philosophy at Butler, seem to have made him a chronic antagonist. A classical understatement would be that his outlook upon the whole of criticism is jaundiced. Surely the most readable pages in an otherwise ponderous book are those given over to unrestrained diatribe against Professor Jordan's enemies, who are, indeed, legion. He castigates psychologists, scientists, empiricists, existentialists, subjectivists, semanticists, symbolists, and more generally, capitalists, Marxists, religionists, and democrats. He dislikes "literary people" and critics, apparently en masse; but Mr. Eliot, I. A. Richards, new critics, and romantics all receive special castigation. He praises no one, not even Kant, without qualification. Mr. Jordan has been an ethician and political scientist for the greater part of his life, and seems to have turned specifically to aesthetic writing only since 1949. Thus, one easily gets the impression that he is not criticizing the actual body of literature which he so largely ignores, but a theoretical and ideal "literature" and "criticism." Modern literary criticism certainly could not receive a better stimulant than a cold douche of objectivity, but this book aims not to cure but to exterminate.

Positively, the thesis of the book seems to rest upon an epistemology of the word (Chapter I), in which words are not signs or symbols, and have no function of communication, but are simply primal reali-

ties referring to nothing and capable of arranging themselves in structures and textures which are "real." This, too, is the "objective" status of the metaphor (Chapter III), which is simply identical with reality. Secondly, the thesis depends upon a metaphysics of reality (Chapter VIII) in which neither experience, nor life, nor nature, nor spirit are real or objective. Thus art is ultimately found in none of these things, but rather in "culture," which is a cosmic reality. Finally, the *Essays* evolves into an aesthetic in which art (poetry, for example) is simply a cosmic process and the poem writes itself.

Idealistically, again, these are judgments filled with value and the total effect of their presentation here is to give a stimulating impression of the independent and objective reality which is the world of art. But unfortunately the positive value of this analysis will be destroyed by its contempt for the whole practical world in which art is immersed. Anyone who denies reality to sense knowledge, to language, and to the whole gamut of psychological experience while he demands credence for an ideal world is guilty of all that really bogus "mysticism" which Professor Jordan seeks to destroy.

The philosophical flaw which draws the author into the extreme position which he takes seems to me to be the basic monism of his thought. Thus, when he asserts the subjectivity and particularity of sense knowledge it seems to him to be self-evident that truth and objectivity are therefore eliminated from all experience and "feeling." Even when he places the "aesthetic object" "between the pure object of thought and the real object of action" (p. 346) by way of compromise, the author seems not to be aware that the logical problem reverts: What, then, is the bond of union between the sensed object and the aesthetic object? Unless there is ultimate integrity and unity behind *all* knowledge—sensed, intuited, or aesthetic—the idealistic world-construct becomes far more fantastic and "mystical" than that which the author ascribes to magic and religion.

It is a sound metaphysic of hylomorphism, even in the very order of existence, which alone establishes an objective ultimate in "pure act" (a concept which Professor Jordan sadly needs) and a perfectly respectable limitation of truth and reality in every finite entity. It is only upon such a basis that the nature of words, of ideas, and ultimately of the art object which is the poem can be soundly realized. It is only upon the same foundation that a criticism equally objective and scientific can be built.

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THE TWO SOVEREIGNTIES. A STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE. By Joseph Lecler, S.J. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1952. Pp. x + 186. $3.75.

This work is the American edition of the same title published by Burns and Oates of London. It is an English rendering of *L'Eglise et la souveraineté de l'État* (Paris: Flammarion, 1944), by Father Joseph Lecler, S.J., professor of fundamental theology at the Institut Catholique of Paris, and associate of the staffs of *Études* and *Recherches de Science Religieuse*.

The work, slight in volume, is important and excellent. As the subtitle indicates, it deals with the problem of the relations between Church and state. In the preface Father Lecler clearly outlines his work. Its principal objective is doctrinal, but the doctrine is formulated in the light of history. This approach was taken because the author believes that the development of doctrine, a function of history, alone can give us the genuine content of canonized formulas.

The book is divided into two parts. The first part proposes the three basic factors of the Catholic "thesis": 1) the theory of dualism of power daringly introduced by Christianity into the world, whereby the Church is sovereign and independent in the field of the spiritual while the state is sovereign and independent in the field of the secular; 2) the need of harmonious collaboration of the two powers for the benefit of the members of the two intercompenetrating societies; 3) the primacy of the spiritual in the affairs of men.

These three factors raise the question whether the supremacy of the spiritual deprives the state of its autonomy as demanded by the thesis. The author gives a solution of this question with the well-known theory of the *indirect power*. However, Father Lecler makes it clear that he understands by this term the doctrine implicit in St. Thomas and explicit in the work of John of Paris. He gently rejects the Bellarmine understanding of the term as inconsistent. For the author, indirect power is *indirect*. It does not give the Church, even under exceptional circumstances, jurisdiction over political and secular affairs. The Church in the pursuit of the spiritual good of man, always remaining in the spiritual domain, imposes spiritual obligation. Such an imposition can make the Christian take a stand in his political and secular life which will affect his activities in the sphere of the state. The *res saecularis* does not fall under the power of the Church, yet the *homo Christianus* does. But he is also *civis*, and in consequence his spiritual loyalty will condition his civic

behavior. Hence there can be secular repercussions to the Church's purely spiritual activity—and this is the indirect power.

The second part of the book presents a survey of Church-State relations in history. The Roman Empire introduced a Caesaro-papism which the Church had to combat, although compromises were made in the struggle. The Middle Ages offered a new situation, the birth of Christendom, the *respublica Christiana,* a child of the Church itself. In this peculiar society (which must not be identified with the state) the tendency was toward clericalism, which produced the quarrels between papacy and crowns. The break-up of Christendom into nationalistic principalities introduced a new Caesaro-papism which evolved into the laicisation of the state.

On the question of laicisation the author makes important distinctions. He states that not all laicisation is contrary to the Catholic thesis. If by laicisation no more is meant than the renunciation of the sacral character of the state, then we are in perfect accord with the Catholic thesis which demands that the sacral belongs to the Church and not to the state. However, the two more conspicuous forms of laicisation are different; they both subscribed to the ambiguous formula, "separation of Church and state". The champions of absolutist statism meant by separation the subjection of the Church to the irreligious state. These Lecler calls "regalists." The champions of liberalism took separation quite literally; the two entities, Church and state, could ignore each other, because they were entities in non-tangential spheres—which meant that the state had no religious obligations nor moral ones. One important point that Lecler makes in this discussion is the observation that the juridical formula of separation is not to be identified with the philosophical formula. It it quite possible that circumstances may demand a juridical "separation" of Church and state in order to permit a more friendly collaboration between the two sovereignties. (Lecler uses "sovereignty" as a synonym for "*societas perfecta.*")

This is the ablest presentation of what this critic has elsewhere called the dynamic consideration of the Church's doctrine on its relations to the state. Its clarity, tranquility, and competence will recommend it to all theologians and philosophers, though the static theologians may be irked by its spirit and method.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS PUBLISHED IN NORTH AMERICA

For the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems.

"Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format, and the like.

The procedure is as follows:

1. *Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.*
2. *Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.*
3. *Books received by* THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN *will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.*

ACTON, LORD. *Essays on Church and State.* Ed. by Douglas Woodruff. New York: Viking Press, 1953. Pp. 524. $6.00.

ANSCHUTZ, R. P. *Philosophy of J. S. Mill.* New York, Oxford Univ. Press. $3.00.

ARBERRY, A. J. *The Mysteries of Selflessness.* Hollywood-by-the-Sea, Fla.: Transatlantic Arts, 1953. $1.25.

ARTZ, FREDERICK BINKERD. *The Mind of the Middle Ages, A.D. 200-1500.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953. Pp. 574. $5.75.

BAILLIE, SIR JAMES BLACK. *Reflections on Life and Religion.* Ed. by Sir Walter Moberly and Oliver de Selincourt. New York: Macmillan Co., 1953. Pp. 288. $3.75.

BECK, L. J. *Method of Descartes: A Study of the* Regulae *of Descartes.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press; Feb., 1953. $6.00.

BERKELEY, GEORGE. *Philosophical Writings.* Ed. by T. E. Jessop. Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1953. $2.50.

BOULDING, KENNETH E. *The Organizational Revolution: A Study in the Ethics of Economic Organization.* New York: Harper & Bros.; Feb., 1953. $3.50.

BRENNAN, JOSEPH G. *Meaning of Philosophy.* New York: Harper & Bros.; April, 1953. $4.00.

BROAD, C. D. *Religion, Philosophy, and Psychical Research.* "International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method"; New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.; March, 1953. $3.50.

BROWNE, SIR THOMAS. *Religio Medici.* Ed. by Jean-Jacques Denonain. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press; March, 1953. $4.50.

CAMPBELL, NORMAN. *What is Science?* New York: Dover Publs., 1953. Pp. 186. $2.50; paper, $1.25.

This somewhat general and philosophical introduction to the nature of scientific thought was first published in 1921. It is a fine

example (because so clearly written) of what one group of British scientists thought in the early twenties. The author first lays down a distinction between pure learning which aims at intellectual satisfaction and practical knowledge. He thinks that science is a single division of knowledge and that its various parts are distinguished because of historical contingencies and for pragmatic purposes. In developing his argument further, the author gets into the problem of how we know the external world and lays down Humean criteria for distinguishing between sensations and other conscious acts. To avoid subordinating science to epistemology, the author defines science as "the study of those judgments concerning which universal agreement can be obtained" (p. 27). He asserts further that science is interested in universals, not particulars, and that what is universal is relations, or laws. Laws express invariable association—not "cause and effect," which the author understands, according to Humean empiricism, as "necessary sequence" (pp. 48-56).

Later sections of the book take up the discovery of laws, measurement, mathematics in science, and the applications of science.

CANNON, SIR ALEXANDER. *The Power Within.* New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1952. Pp. 207. $3.00.

CARLSON, SEBASTIAN, O.P. *The Virtue of Humility.* "The Aquinas Library"; Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown Co., 1952. Pp. xiii + 144. $3.50.

This is a study of humility according to the teaching of St. Thomas. In a systematic fashion the author goes over the nature of this virtue, its subject, its acts, its relation to the other virtues, and its place in the supernatural order. In the second part, the author compares the doctrine of St. Thomas with that of his predecessors. In the third part (pp. 105-36), a selected series of passages from St. Thomas is given, with the Latin text in smaller print after the manner of footnotes. A selected bibliography has been added.

The book is valuable as supplementary reading in ethics courses. It should also be of great interest and value to moral theologians and all who are concerned with the theory or practise of asceticism.

CASSIRER, ERNST. *Language and Myth.* New York: Dover Publs.; April, 1953. $2.25; Paper, $1.25.

COLE, G. D. H. *Socialist Thought: The Forerunners, 1789-1850.* New York: St. Martin's Press; March, 1953. $6.00.

COPI, IRVING M. *Introduction to Logic.* New York: Macmillan Co.; April, 1953. $4.00.

COPLESTON, FREDERICK, S.J. *A History of Philosophy.* Vol. III, *Ockham to Suarez.* Westminster: Newman Press; April, 1953. $4.50.

CORNFORD, FRANCIS MACDONALD. *Principium Sapientiae.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 277. $5.00.

CREEL, HERRLEE G. *Chinese Thought from Confucius to Mao Tse-Tung.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; May, 1953. $5.00.

CROCE, BENEDETTO. *Aesthetic.* Tr. by Douglas Ainslie. New York: Noonday Press; May, 1953. $6.50.

CROCKER, LESTER G. *Two Diderot Studies: Ethics and Esthetics.* "Johns Hopkins Studies in Romance Literature and Languages"; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press; Jan., 1953. $2.50.

CROMBIE, A. G. *Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science.* New York, Oxford Univ. Press. $7.00.

DATTA, DHIRENDRA MOHAN. *The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi.* Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press; May, 1953. Pp. 196. $2.50.

DE BROGLIE, LOUIS. *The Revolution in Physics.* Tr. by Ralph W. Niemeyer. New York: Noonday Press; March, 1953. $4.50.

De Wulf, Maurice. *History of Mediaeval Philosophy.* Vol. II. New York: Dover Publs.; Feb., 1953. $4.00.

Ducasse, C. J. *A Philosophical Scrutiny of Religion.* New York: Ronald Press, 1953. Pp. x + 441. $4.50.

As its large number of pages and its eighteen chapters amply testify, this study of religion is inclusive enough. The author claims to study religion objectively, and to the extent that this implies dispassionate exposition, he is right. In his introduction, the author disagrees with both theism and secularism; yet he also wants to hold that religion has a value, though not necessarily the value claimed for it.

As a philosophical and objective study (understood not merely as a dispassionate but an accurate exposition), the book has a number of limitations. The author insists that *religion* be so defined as to include every activity which has been so called; and he justifies himself by saying that all religions produce the same effect on man (pp. 94-147). This is like arguing that sleep, a blow on the head, and ether must have a common name and a common definability because they interrupt consciousness. Another defect of the book is seen in its treatment of terms like *belief* (pp. 80-83), *supernatural* (pp. 60-63), and *spiritual* (pp. 70-72), which, on the one hand, are treated as if they had a common meaning in all contexts, and, on the other, are not given their specifically Catholic senses. A third and very serious defect is the treatment of the arguments for the existence of the God of monotheism (pp. 333-50). The first premise of the "cosmological argument," we read, is that "nothing can exist or occur without a sufficient cause" (p. 334). It is not very hard to show that this premise excludes the existence of an uncaused being. The "ontological argument" is disposed of by the author with a quotation from Schopenhauer. The argument from design is expounded from Paley (referred to as a "classic" instance, p. 343, note 18). These arguments, in the author's mind, constitute the case for theism—and it must be admitted that many theists have offered poor reasons for a perfectly rational conclusion. But this fact does not excuse the author's ignorance of arguments which do not contain these logical flaws.

Finally, it might be pointed out that the author holds that "religion . . . rests essentially on faith, not on knowledge" (p. 148); that the realization of the falsity of, or lack of evidence for, his religious beliefs still allows him "to hold them as fervently as ever" (p. 155); and that truth has really nothing to do with the value of religion (pp. 156-67).

Duncan, Hugh Dalziel. *Language and Literature in Society.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, March, 1953. $5.00.

Durant, Will. *The Pleasures of Philosophy.* New York: Simon & Schuster; March, 1953. $5.00.

———. *The Story of Philosophy.* New York: Pocket Books, 1953. Pp. 575. 50c.

Eaton, John. *Dialetical Materialism.* New York: International Publs.; April, 1953. $2.00.

Eberdt, Mary Lois, and Schnepp, Gerald. *Industrialism and the Popes.* New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons; May, 1953. $3.50.

Emerson, Thomas I., and Haber, David. *Political and Civil Rights in the United States.* Foreword by Robert M. Hutchins. Buffalo: Dennis & Co., 1952. Pp. 1229. $7.50.

ERASMUS, DESIDERIUS. *Praise of Folly.* Tr. by Harry Carter. Illustrated by Frans Masereel. New York: George Macy; May, 1953. $5.00.

FARAON, MICHAEL JOSEPH, O.P. *The Metaphysical and Psychological Principles of Love.* "The Aquinas Library"; Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown & Co., 1953. Pp. xx + 93. $3.00.

After a brief introduction, orienting this study to current existentialism and to the historical problem of love, the author presents the Thomistic doctrine of love. In giving the metaphysical analysis of love, the author first gives the metaphysical analysis of finite being (in thirteen pages) and then analyzes the nature and types of appetite. In the second part, the psychological analysis, the author takes as his particular guide John of St. Thomas. He asserts that there is a produced term in the act of love, the "*pondus* or affective union" (p. 51). In the course of this argument, there is a peculiar textual analysis. St. Thomas (*S.T.*, I-II, q. 50, a. 5 ad 1) is arguing for the necessity of habit in the will; the author quotes this text, incompletely, as a proof that the indifference toward a particular object must be removed before the will can tend to that particular concrete good (p. 42).

There is a brief bibliography. There is no index. The book should be useful for supplementary reading in studying the philosophy of man.

FASNACHT, G. E. *Acton's Political Philosophy.* Foreword by Sir Harold Butler. New York: Viking Press, 1953. Pp. 279. $4.00.

FLEW, A. G. N. *Logic and Language.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Feb., 1953. $4.75.

GARVIN, LUCIUS. *A Modern Introduction to Ethics.* Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1953. Pp. 572. $4.50.

GAY, PETER. *The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism. Eduard Bernstein's Challenge to Marx.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. xvii + 334. $4.50.

GILBY, THOMAS. *Between Community and Society: A Philosophy and Theology of the State.* New York: Longmans, Green & Co.; April, 1953. $6.50.

GILLET, M. *St. Thomas Aquinas.* Westminster: Newman Press; May, 1953. $4.00.

GREENE, THEODORE M. *Liberal Education Reconsidered.* "Inglis Lecture," 1952; Cambridge; Harvard Univ. Press; March, 1953. $1.50.

HALE, ROBERT L. *Freedom through Law.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. xvi + 591. $7.50.

HARE, R. M. *The Language of Morals.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 209. $2.00.

HARTMANN, NICOLAI. *New Ways of Ontology.* Tr. by Reinhardt Kuhn. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.; April, 1953. $4.00.

HARTSHORNE, CHARLES, and REESE, WILLIAM. *The Varieties of Theism.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; May, 1953. $7.50.

HAYEK, FRIEDRICH AUGUST VON. *The Sensory Order.* Introd. by Heinrich Klüver. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952. Pp. 231. $5.00.

HUIZINGA, J. *Erasmus of Rotterdam.* Garden City: Garden City Pub. Co., 1953. $2.95.

HUME, DAVID. *Letters of David Hume: Supplementary Volume to Grieg's Edition.* Ed. by Raymond Klibansky and E. C. Mossner. New York, Oxford Univ. Press. $5.00.

———. *Political Essays.* Ed. by Charles W. Hendel. "Library of Liberal Arts," No. 34; New York: Liberal Arts Press; Feb., 1953. 75c

———. *Theory of Knowledge.* Ed. by D. D. Yalden-Thompson. Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1953. $2.00.

———. *Theory of Politics.* Ed. by Frederick Watkins. Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1953. $2.00.

HUTCHINS, ROBERT M. *Great Books.* New York: Simon & Schuster; June, 1953. $3.00.

JASPERS, KARL. *Tragedy Is Not Enough.* Tr. from the German by Harold A. T. Reiche and others. Boston: Beacon Press, 1952. Pp. 213. $2.25.

JEPSEN, LAURA. *Ethical Aspects of Tragedy.* Gainesville: Univ. of Florida; April, 1953. $3.75.

JOHNSON, ALLISON HEARTZ. *Whitehead's Theory of Reality.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1952. Pp. 276. $4.00.

KARPF, FAY B. *The Psychology and Psychotherapy of Otto Rank.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1953. $3.00.

KATTSOFF, LOUIS O. *First Book in Philosophy.* New York, Ronald Press. $4.50.

KIRK, RUSSELL. *The Conservative Mind. From Burke to Santayna.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.; May, 1953. Pp. 450. $6.50.

KLUBERTANZ, GEORGE P., S.J. *Philosophy of Human Nature.* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts; April, 1953. Pp. x + 444. $3.50.

LANGER, SUSANNE K. *Feeling and Form.* New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons; Feb., 1953. Pp. 448. $7.00.

LOUGH, JOHN. *Selected Philosophical Writings of Diderot.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press; May, 1953. $3.00.

MANNHEIM, KARL. *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge.* Ed. and tr. from the German by Paul Kecskemeti. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 335. $6.00.

MARKHAM, F. M. H. *Henri Comte de Saint-Simon: Blackwell's Political Texts.* New York: Macmillan Co.; Jan., 1953. $2.00.

MAY, ROLLO. *Man's Search for Himself.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co.; Jan., 1953. $3.50.

MCCREAL, IAN. *The Art of Making Choices.* Dallas: Southern Methodist Univ. Press; April, 1953. $3.75.

Mediaeval Studies. Vol. XIV. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952. Pp. 275. $7.00.

Among the many learned studies appearing in this volume, several concern medieval philosophy. Armand Maurer, C.S.B., continuing a study begun two years ago, writes on "Siger of Brabant's *De Necessitate et Contingentia Causarum* and MS Peterhouse 152" (pp. 48-60). Father Maurer compares the doctrine of the manuscript on necessity, contingency, freedom, and providence with that of the certainly authentic work. He finds agreement on the first three points, and some difference in the fourth: the *De Necessitate* says that God's foreknowledge can be denied, whereas the manuscript work clearly affirms it. The text of the question is given at the end of the article.

J. Leclercq, O.S.B., in "Textes sur Saint Bernard et Gilbert de la Porrée" (pp. 107-28), presents a series of texts on the two men and their relations, with a helpful introduction and commentary.

Peter W. Nash, S.J., in "The meaning of *Est* in the *Sentences* (1152-1160) of Robert of Melun" (pp. 129-142), adds further proof of the wide-spread adherence to the Boethian doctrine of *esse* prior to St. Thomas Aquinas.

MELAND, BERNARD E. *Higher Education and the Human Spirit.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; June, 1953. $4.50.

MESNARD, JEAN. *Pascal, His Life and Works.* Foreword by Ronald Knox. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1952. Pp. xvi + 210. $3.75.

This is the English translation of *Pascal: l'homme et l'oeuvre.* The work makes use of the most recent critical studies on the text, as well as of all the available background data. There is a great deal of material compressed into this book, yet the exposition is never labored, never obscure. The author treats his subject with verve and sympathy. Perhaps the sympathy carries the author a little far: Pascal, it seems, was never in the wrong, never changed.

There is a short bibliography, but no index.

MEYER, R. W. *Leibnitz and the Seventeenth-Century Revolution.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.; Jan., 1953. Pp. 227. $5.00.

MUELLER, GUSTAV E. *Dialectic: A Way into and within Philosophy.* "Library of Current Philosophy and Religion Series"; Bookman Associates; Feb., 1953. $4.00.

MURDOCK, IRIS. *Sartre.* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; March, 1953. $2.50.

NICHOLL, DONALD. *Recent Thought in Focus.* New York: Sheed & Ward, 1953. $3.50.

NISBET, ROBERT A. *Quest for Community: A Study in the Ethics of Order and Freedom.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press; Feb., 1953. $5.00.

NONAN, J. DONALD, and OTHERS. *Philosophy of Human Knowing.* Westminster: Newman Press; May, 1953. $3.00.

NUTTIN, JOSEPH. *Psychoanalysis and Personality.* New York: Sheed & Ward, 1953. $5.00.

O'CONNOR, D. J. *John Locke.* "Pelican Philosophy Series"; Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1953. Pp. 224. Paper, 65c

First published in England in 1952, this book is called "a critical introduction." The author intends, first, to expound Locke's arguments and conclusions and, second, to criticize the theories in the light of later philosophical developments, specifically those of logical empiricism (analysis).

After a brief introduction, the book takes up in successive chapters the aim and method of Locke's theory of knowledge, ideas and experience, substance and causality, the understanding, language and thought, knowledge, judgment and opinion, and political theory. The last chapter summarizes the author's conclusions.

There is an index; brief suggestions for further reading are given.

PAINE, THOMAS. *Common Sense, and Other Writings.* Ed. by Nelson Adkins. "American Heritage Series," No. 5; New York: Liberal Arts Press; Feb., 1953. 75¢

PASSMORE, JOHN ARTHUR. *Hume's Intentions.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 173. $3.75.

PONTIFEX, MARK, and TRETHOWAN, ILLTYD. *Meaning of Existence.* New York: Longmans, Green & Co.; March, 1953. $2.75.

RADHAKRISHNAN, S. (ed.). *History of Philosophy: Eastern and Western.* 2 vols.; New York: Macmillan Co.; April, 1953. $15.00.

READ, HERBERT. *The Philosophy of Modern Art.* New York: Horizon Press; March, 1953. $4.50.

REISS, SAMUEL. *Universe of Meaning.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; May, 1953. $3.75.

ROSSER, J. BARKLEY. *Logic for Mathematics.* "International Series in Pure and Applied Mathematics"; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.; Jan., 1953. $10.00.

ROUBICZEK, PAUL. *Thinking in Opposites.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1952. Pp. 256. $3.50.

RUBISSOW, GEORGE A. *The House of Life.* New York: Ricardo Press, 1951. Pp. 281. $4.00.

It may be true that professors of philosophy often devitalize their subject and by making it into a mere academic pursuit of curious fact destroy its nature as a view of the whole of reality. But the cure is not, as this book would have us believe, an inarticulate cult of life or cosmic force. Nor is an enthusiastic desire for the progress and happiness of men a substitute for the discipline of rational thinking.

SANTAYANA, GEORGE. *Persons and Places.* Vol. III, *My Host the World.* New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons; March, 1953. Pp. 160. $3.00.

Science, Language and Human Rights. Prepared for the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division. Vol. I; Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1952. Pp. 211. $2.50.

SEELY, CHARLES S. *Philosophy and the Ideological Conflict.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; May, 1953. $5.00.

SHEED, F. J. *Society and Sanity.* New York: Sheed & Ward, 1953. $3.00.

SIWEK, PAUL, S.J. *The Enigma of the Hereafter.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1953. Pp. xiv + 140. $3.00.

The theory of reincarnation has been held by greater or smaller numbers of people throughout recorded history, as the author points out in his introduction. At the present time, theosophical and Vedantic varieties are becoming popular in the English-speaking world. For this reason the author submits the theory to a searching philosophical examination. In the first part, the author studies reincarnation and religion; in the second, reincarnation and psychology; in the third, reincarnation and ethics; and in the fourth he presents a positive case for rejecting the theory as a whole.

Throughout, the author presents the theory, in its various forms, according to its leading proponents. He presents their alleged evidences and proofs and examines them in the light of experience, science, and philosophy.

The book should be valuable for supplementary reading in psychology and ethics.

SMITH, NORMAN KEMP. *New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes: Descartes as Pioneer.* New York: St. Martin's Press; April, 1953. $5.00.

SMITH, T. V., COHEN, BENJAMIN V., and OTHERS. *Vision and Action: Essays in Honor of Horace Kallen.* New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press; June, 1953. $5.00.

SNELL, BRUNO. *Discovery of the Mind: The Greek Origins of European Thought.* Tr. by T. G. Rosenmeyer. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Feb., 1953. $5.50.

STERN, ALFRED. *Sartre: His Philosophy and Psychoanalysis.* New York: Liberal Arts Press; April, 1953. $3.50.

STRAWSON, P. F. *Introduction to Logical Theory.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1952. Pp. 276. $3.50.

TAYLOR, A. E. *Elements of Metaphysics.* 13th ed.; New York: British Book Centre; Feb., 1953. $4.75.

THOMAS AQUINAS, ST. *Catechetical Instructions of St. Thomas Aquinas.* Tr. with a Commentary by the Rev. Joseph B. Collins, S.S. Introd. by the Rev. Rudolph G. Bandas. New York: Joseph F. Wagner, 1953. $3.25.

———. *Truth.* Vol. II. Tr. by James V. McGlynn. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.; April, 1953. $7.00.

THOMPSON, MANLEY, JR. *The Pragmatic Philosophy of Peirce.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; May, 1953. $5.75.

TOULMIN, STEPHEN. *Philosophy of Science.* "Hutchinson Univ. Lib."; New York: Longmans, Green & Co.; Feb., 1953. $2.25; text ed. $1.80.

TOYNBEE, ARNOLD J. *The World and the West.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press; March, 1953. $2.00.

TSANOFF, RADOSLAV A. *The Great Philosophers.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1953. Pp. ix + 653. $6.00.

In his introduction, the author puts the philosophical purpose of the history of philosophy well when he says that "it enables us to develop a critical appraisal of alternative ideas by seeing how they have fared in human reflection" (p. 2). The plan of the book selects for consideration only the thoughts of the more important or more influential philosophers. Greater inclusiveness would expand an introductory book to unreasonable size or reduce it to a mere catalogue of names.

In general, the author does an excellent job; his expositions are careful, fair, and remarkably complete within the limitations of space. It is almost inevitable that when such a vast subject is treated by a single man in a single volume some inaccuracies creep in. For example, we read that "regarding the problem of universals, St. Thomas shared the position of moderate realism adopted by Albert the Great and, more than two centuries before them, by Avicenna" (p. 201).

There is an index. Each chapter concludes with suggestions for further reading.

TSE-TUNG, MAO. *On Contradiction.* New York, International Publs. $1.00.

Twelve Steps and Twelve Traditions. A Co-Founder of Alcoholics Anonymous. New York: Harper & Bros.; May, 1953. $2.50.

UNTERSTEINER, MARIO. *The Sophists.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; May, 1953. $4.75.

VARTANIAN, ARAM. *Diderot and Descartes.* "History of Ideas Series," No. 6; Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press; Feb., 1953. $6.00.

WELLS, HARRY K. *Pragmatism?* New York: International Publs.; April, 1953. $3.50.

WHITE, VICTOR, O.P. *God and the Unconscious.* Foreword by C. G. Jung. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.; March, 1953. Pp. 304. $4.00.

WILD, JOHN. *Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; May, 1953. $5.50.

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INDEX TO VOLUME XXX

ARTICLES

ALBERTSON, JAMES S., S.J. The *Esse* of Accidents according to St. Thomas 265
CLARK, JOSEPH T., S.J. Aristotle's Feeling for Development in Philosophy 1
COLAÇO, PAUL S., S.J. A Critical Estimate of Aurobindo's Being-Becoming Absolute 123
————. Final Evaluation of Aurobindo's Theory of the Absolute 279
————. Some Consequences of the Fundamental Error of Aurobindo 217
CUNNINGHAM, FRANCIS A., S.J. *Certitudo* in St. Thomas Aquinas 297
JOHNSTON, HERBERT. On the Meaning of "Consumed in Use" in the Problem of Usury 93
MEENAN, DANIEL F. X., S.J. John Dewey's Theory of Valuation 187
OWENS, JOSEPH, C.Ss.R. The Conclusion of the *Prima Via* 33, 109, 203
THOMAS, LEVIAN, F.S.C. Ulrich of Strasbourg: His Doctrine of the Divine Ideas 21

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

Chronicle 59, 145, 235, 331
English Translations of St. Thomas 333
FLYNN, THOMAS J., S.J. The 1952 Meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association 325
PAUSON, JOHN J. Postscripts and Addenda to *De Principiis Naturae* 54, 141
SWETNAM, JAMES, S.J. A Note on *In Idipsum* in St. Augustine . . . 328
THRO, LINUS J., S.J. Fifth Annual Meeting of the Missouri State Philosophy Association 144

BOOKS REVIEWED

Actus del Primer Congreso Nacional de Filosofia (Rodolfo Mendoza) . 236
BRYAR, WILLIAM. *St. Thomas and the Existence of God: Three Interpretations* (James S. Albertson, S.J.) 245
BUSA, ROBERTO, S.J. *Varia Specimina Concordantiarum* (George P. Klubertanz, S.J.) 68
COLLINS, JAMES. *The Existentialists: A Critical Study* (Ralph Harper) 175
DAVITT, THOMAS E., S.J. *The Nature of Law* (Jerome G. Kerwin) . 164
DONLAN, THOMAS C., O.P. *Theology and Education* (George P. Klubertanz, S.J.) 161
GEATCH, PETER, and BLACK, MAX (eds.). *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege* (James S. Albertson, S.J.) 179
HENLE, ROBERT J., S.J. *Method in Metaphysics* (Francis C. Wade, S.J.) 151
HOLZ, HANS HEINZ. *Jean Paul Sartre, Darstellung und Kritik seiner Philosophie* (Victor R. Yanitelli, S.J.) 238
JASPERS, KARL. *La Situation spirituelle de notre epoque* (Victor R. Yanitelli, S.J.) 166
———. *Way to Wisdom* (Victor R. Yanitelli, S.J.) 174
JEANSON, FRANCIS. *La Phénoménologie* (James Collins) 240
JOLIVET, RÉGIS. *Essai sur le problème et les conditions de la sincérité* (Victor R. Yanitelli, S.J.) 162
LECLER, JOSEPH, S.J. *The Two Sovereignties* (Gustave Weigel, S.J.) . 345
OLIVER, W. DONALD. *Theory of Order* (Francis X. Meehan) 335
OWENS, JOSEPH, C.Ss.R. *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian* Metaphysics: *A Study in the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought* (Henry Veatch) 146
PADOVANI, U.A., and SCIACCA, M.F. (eds.). *Bibliografia Filosofica Italiana: Anno 1949* (James Collins) 165
RAHMAN, F. *Avicenna's Psychology* (Beatrice H. Zedler) 340
SIMON, YVES R. *Philosophy of Democratic Government* (Kurt V. Schuschnigg) 242
———. *Traité du libre arbitre* (George P. Klubertanz, S.J.) . . . 172
SMITH, GERARD, S.J. *Natural Theology* (William R. O'Connor) . . . 63
THOMAS AQUINAS, ST. *Super Evangelium S. Matthaei Lectura* (George P. Klubertanz, S.J.) 165
Tributes to Avicenna (Beatrice H. Zedler) 157
VON MISES, RICHARD. *Positivism: A Study in Human Understanding* (Joseph F. Wulftange, S.J.) 167
VON RINTELEN, FRITZ-JOACHIM. *Philosophie der Endlichkeit als Spiegel der Gegenwart* (Victor R. Yanitelli, S.J.) 154
WARBEKE, JOHN M. *The Power of Art* (Leonard A. Waters, S.J.) . . 339

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